Monument Midseason Supplement

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**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its foreign military presence and/or foreign military commitments.**

1. ANTI-AMERICANISM – No Impact, No Solution 3
2. ARMS RACES - Not a problem 9
3. ATSUGI NAVAL AIR FACILITY – Better not shut it down 11
4. CEJA - Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 13
5. CHINA BAD - Big threat 19
6. CHINA GOOD - No Threat, Confrontation won’t work 23
7. CNV-73 (*USS GEORGE WASHINGTON*) 27
8. DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS - bad 33
9. DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS – no problem 37
10. DEFICIT SPENDING DISAD 39
11. DRUG WAR – Good 41
12. GENERIC: HEGEMONY - bad 49
13. HEGEMONY – Good 57
14. HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERION - Not needed/ Won’t work 61
15. INTERVENTION – bad 65
16. INTERVENTION – Good 67
17. IRAN - Big Threat 69
18. IRAN - NO THREAT 75
19. ISRAEL - Doesn’t need more U.S. support 83
20. JAPAN MILITARY ALLIANCE/PRESENCE – good 89
21. MILITARY BASE CLOSURES - BAD 99
22. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - BAD 105
23. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - Not a problem 107
24. NUCLEAR TERRORISM - Not a problem 111
25. OKINAWA - Essential 115
26. PIRACY 123
27. PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE – not a problem 125
28. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS (PMC) - Bad 133
29. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS - Good 139
30. PTSD PURPLE HEART – not needed, won’t work, may backfire 145
31. SOFT POWER - Bad 157
32. SPACE WEAPONS / OUTER SPACE TREATY 165
33. START TREATY - good 173
34. TAIWAN SUPPORT - good 177
35. TERRORISM - NOT A THREAT 191

ANTI-AMERICANISM – No Impact, No Solution

(Matthew Baker contributed most of the evidence in this brief)

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

If a policy is good, we shouldn’t change it just because some foreigners don’t like us

Dr. Andrew Garfinkle 2004 (PhD in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania), “Anti-Americanism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism,” chapter in Garfinckle, ed., A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism, Hoover Institute Press Publication #530, August 2004, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817945423_197.pdf>

But to the extent that anti-Americanism is based on irrational premises that spring from social-political dysfunction abroad, we need to unmask and contend with that irrationality and dysfunction. Americans are, by and large, open to rational persuasion, and sometimes we are persuaded. But the American government should not, and will not, alter policies it knows to be correct just to please those who threaten the United States. It certainly will not bend before those who defame and impugn the United States from pathologies of their own making. After all, as many a wit has pointed out, it can be an honor to be hated, if one is hated by the right sort of people.

IMPACT TURN

Changing US foreign policy under pressure of terrorism threat would make things worse

Dr. Andrew Garfinkle 2004 (PhD in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania), “Anti-Americanism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism,” chapter in Garfinckle, ed., A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism, Hoover Institute Press Publication #530, August 2004, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817945423_197.pdf>

Only some anti-Americanism is a function of American policy, and the most dangerous kind linked to terrorism really is not (of which, more below). Changing good, reasonable policies under the pressure of terrorist threats would not make us safer. To the contrary, it would unleash a feeding frenzy of pressure on American interests worldwide.

NO GLOBAL-WAR-ON-TERROR (GWOT) IMPACT

Foreign government officials involved in GWOT are less likely to harbor radical anti-Americanism and to the extent they do, it may be caused by deeper philosophical or historical issues

Lindberg & Nossel 2005. Tod Lindberg (research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and editor of Policy Review) and Suzanne Nossel (Executive Director of Amnesty International and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs). “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism,” The Princeton Project on National Security, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/AA.pdf>

“As to whether anti-Americanism is threatening cooperation to fight terror, the signs are less conclusive, though the uncertainty should come as no surprise. Whereas prospective terrorist fighters and their accomplices are motivated by a radical form of anti-Americanism, government officials in charge of formulating counter-terrorism policy are less likely to harbor anti-Americanism in this form. To the extent that they are anti-American, their resentment may originate in liberalism (for example in Europe), concerns over sovereignty (in Pakistan), or legacy issues (U.S. support of the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines).”

NO ECONOMIC IMPACT

Current U.S. economic dominance isolates companies from backlash

Lindberg & Nossel 2005. Tod Lindberg (research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and editor of Policy Review) and Suzanne Nossel (Executive Director of Amnesty International and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs). “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism,” The Princeton Project on National Security, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/AA.pdf>

“There is some evidence that the very fact of American economic dominance in itself insulates certain U.S. businesses from anti-U.S. backlash. GMI’s poll found that while Coca-Cola was widely identified as an American product, few of those who stated an intent to back away from U.S. brands said they planned to give up Coke. Global consumers seeking alternatives to Microsoft or Coke, for example, may find themselves with few viable competitive alternatives.

U.S. brands are highly regarded and developing countries are decades away from US

Isaac Pino 2012. (Financial Analyst at the Motley Fool and former associate at Deloitte), “How American Brands Rule the World,”January 12, 2012, <http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/01/12/how-american-brands-rule-the-world/>

“As shown, U.S. companies own the lion's share of the world's greatest brands. The rest of the world doesn't come close to adding up to America's slice of the pie. Because American companies create quality products, their brands are highly regarded around the world. In my previous article on brands, I noted that great brands stem from great products, and U.S. firms seem to have a significant edge on the competition. The data also reveals an interesting perspective on emerging markets. Notice that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are conspicuously absent from the chart. In fact, of the world's 10 largest economies by GDP, only five are reflected in the chart above. For the alarmists concerned about the decline of Western countries, consider the competitive advantage provided by American brands. While economic output might be rapidly increasing in China and Brazil, these countries are decades away from building a portfolio of brands that compares with the U.S.”

Boycotts of US businesses are short-lived, and companies know how to strengthen their ties to local culture

Tod Lindberg & Suzanne Nossel 2005. (Lindberg - research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and editor of Policy Review. Nossel - Executive Director of Amnesty International and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs). “Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism,” The Princeton Project on National Security, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/AA.pdf>

“Concrete evidence of serious damage to U.S. business interests as a result of anti-Americanism is limited. Boycotts of American products and businesses have been sporadic and short-lived, with their primary impact more symbolic than financial. The U.S.’s highest profile cultural exports — movies, music, and television — have shown little sign of vulnerability to politically motivated rejection. There are indications that certain well-known American franchises such as KFC have taken steps to strengthen perceptions of their ties to local cultural mores, populations, and producers in each market in which they operate, partly as a way of insulating themselves against anti-American backlash — but also perhaps simply as a matter of improved marketing strategy.”

SOLVENCY BARRIERS – things beyond the Affirmative’s control that will block efforts to reduce anti-Americanism in the world

1. FOREIGN ELITES IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Changing US foreign policy won’t eradicate anti-Americanism because of the influence of foreign elites in the Islamic world

Prof. Lisa Blaydes & Prof. Drew Linzer 2012. ( Blaydes - Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. Linzer - Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University). “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” American Political Science Review, May 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/~blaydes/AA.pdf>

“Yet it is unclear how far a more balanced approach to American foreign policy making would go toward eradicating anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. Our results indicate that to the extent Muslim anti-Americanism is a domestic phenomenon, a certain degree of pessimism is warranted toward the potential of American actions to lessen negative perceptions of the United States in the Islamic world. Foreign elites continue to have their own motivations for promoting negative views about the United States, which are related to incentives surrounding local political mobilization. A core assumption made by advocates of an enhanced public diplomacy campaign is that anti-Americanism stems from poor “strategic communication” on the part of the United States (Nisbet and Shanahan 2008). The results of this study suggest that Muslim publics are highly responsive to messages from domestic elites and that any American-led effort to offer a counternarrative would have to compete with local media environments that may be firmly oriented toward the instrumental advancement of anti-American attitudes.”

2. RUSSIAN POLITICAL POSTURING

U.S. as the enemy is a political scapegoat for unsuccessful Russian policies

Dr. Ariel Cohen & Helle Dale, 2010. (Cohen - PhD from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Dale - Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy at the Heritage Foundation), February 24, 2010, “Russian Anti-Americanism: A Priority Target for U.S. Public Diplomacy,” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/02/Russian-Anti-Americanism-A-Priority-Target-for-US-Public-Diplomacy>

“On the Russian domestic front, the United States as "the enemy" is used as a scapegoat for unsuccessful policies and to lend legitimacy to Putin's leadership. For example, the Kremlin has blamed the current economic crisis, which has hit Russia harder than many other countries, on perfidious American policies.”

Russian leaders are committed to anti-American policies – doesn’t matter if we try to improve relations

Dr. Ariel Cohen & Helle Dale, 2010. (Cohen - PhD from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Dale - Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy at the Heritage Foundation), February 24, 2010, “Russian Anti-Americanism: A Priority Target for U.S. Public Diplomacy,” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/02/Russian-Anti-Americanism-A-Priority-Target-for-US-Public-Diplomacy>

“Russian anti-Americanism remains an entrenched and politically expedient phenomenon among the country's governing elites. This may seem puzzling, given the rapprochement between Russia's political leadership and the Obama Administration. Yet the idea of "resetting" the relationship between the two, as conceived by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, rests on the profound fallacy that the current Russian leadership and the United States share common values. From the Kremlin's perspective, anti-Americanism is a strategic tool for pursuing domestic and foreign policy goals. It has remained this way for almost the past 100 years. After World War II, Joseph Stalin denounced American "imperialism" as the enemy at the gate. In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev infamously threatened the United States: "We will bury you!" Since then, Soviet and Russian anti-Americanism has become a part of the Russian national psyche. Anti-Americanism is not confined to Russia alone. Russia is deliberately spreading this poisonous propaganda to neighboring countries through the Russian mass media, briefings, and conferences. This anti-Americanism also provides the glue that keeps together Russia's de facto anti-American coalition with countries such as Iran and Venezuela.”

Putin’s political narrative is that his true opposition are external agents of the West

Dr. Andreas Umland 2008. (a former fellow at Stanford, Harvard and Oxford who has been published in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Jerusalem Post, Moscow Times, Kyiv Post and many other periodicals and scholarly journals.), 3/6/2008, “Post-Soviet Nationalism and Russia's Future,” Global Politician, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24244-russia>

“The major determinant in Russian nationalism’s recent rise is that the Kremlin’s political technologists have discovered it as a tool suitable to reconfigure political discourse in general. In the Kremlin’s new political reality, Putin is not competing with alternative programs or parties. Putin’s opponents are not socialists, liberals or other Russian political movements. Instead, Putin is juxtaposed to Chechen terrorists, Estonian fascists, Georgian russophobes, Ukrainian neo-Nazis, American imperialists, Western conspirators, and, in general, to various non-Russians who desire to destroy, divide or, at least, humiliate Russia. In this atmosphere of paranoia, it is only logical that those opposing Putin are not acknowledged to constitute legitimate (not to speak of useful) political opposition. Instead, they are represented as a “fifth column” of the West, as traitors who are, in Putin’s words, skulking around foreign embassies like jackals.”

3. POLYVALENCE OF AMERICA (Our diverse society – it means that whatever you don’t like, you can find it in some segment of American society because we are so diverse we have some of everything. There’s always something you can hate, if you want to hate. The same country and culture produced and supported Britney Spears and Billy Graham.)

Conflicting and evolving beliefs in both America and overseas, makes Anti-Americanism persistent. Foreigners hate America because we’re too religious AND too secular

Dr. Peter Katzenstein & Dr. Robert Keohane 2005. (Katzenstein - from Harvard University and Professor of International Studies at Cornell University. Keohane - PhD from Harvard University and Professor of Political Science at Princeton University), “Conclusion: Anti-Americanisms and the Polyvalence of America,” December 28, 2005, <http://www.princeton.edu/~rkeohane/publications/AntiAmerInWPConclusion.pdf>

“Because there is so much in America to dislike as well as to admire, polyvalence makes anti-Americanism persistent. American society is both extremely secular and deeply religious. This is played out in the tensions between blue “metro” and red “retro” America and the strong overtones of self-righteousness and moralism that conflict helps generate. If a society veers toward secularism, as much of Europe has, American religiosity is likely to become salient -- odd, disturbing, and due to American power, vaguely threatening. How can a people who believe more strongly in the Virgin Birth than in the theory of evolution be trusted to lead an alliance of liberal societies? If a society adopts more fervently Islamic religious doctrine and practices, as has occurred throughout much of the Islamic world during the past quarter-century, the prominence of women in American society and the vulgarity and emphasis on sexuality that pervades much of American popular culture are likely to evoke loathing, even fear. Thus anti-Americanism is closely linked to the polyvalence of American society.”

America’s values are diverse and America’s symbolism both generates and diffuses anti-Americanism

Dr. Peter Katzenstein & Dr. Robert Keohane 2005. (Katzenstein - from Harvard University and Professor of International Studies at Cornell University. Keohane - PhD from Harvard University and Professor of Political Science at Princeton University), “Conclusion: Anti-Americanisms and the Polyvalence of America,” December 28, 2005, <http://www.princeton.edu/~rkeohane/publications/AntiAmerInWPConclusion.pdf>

“In a phrase, the symbolism generated by America is so *polyvalent* that it continually generates and diffuses anti-American views. The polyvalence of America embodies a rich variety of values. And different values associated with America resonate differently with the cognitive schemas held by individuals and reinforced by groups. Which schemas predominate varies cross-nationally. Furthermore, these schemas are internally complex and may contain elements that are in tension or contradiction with one another. When polyvalent American symbols connect with varied, shifting and complex cognitive schemas, the resulting reactions refract like a prism in sunlight. Many colors appear in the prism, just as America elicits many different reactions around the world. Often, different components of what is refracted will simultaneously attract and repel.”

4. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

US support for Israel angers Muslims

Prof. Lisa Blaydes & Prof. Drew Linzer 2012. ( Blaydes - Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. Linzer - Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University). “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” American Political Science Review, May 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/~blaydes/AA.pdf>

Another key U.S. foreign policy development in the post–World War II era is American support for the state of Israel. There is widespread anger on the part of many Muslims toward the United States for its political support of Israel, which is invariably seen ascoming at the expense of Palestinian interests. The fate of Jerusalem—–the third most holy city in Islam and the location of important Muslim holy sites—–is also of importance to Muslims around the world. Describing the Arab world, Hammond (2007, 57) writes that “views of the United States today are ﬁrst and foremost conditioned by American policy vis-a-vis the `Israel-Palestinian conﬂict and the degree to which the United States is seen backing Israel to the detriment of the Palestinians.”

For America to be liked in the Arab/Muslim world, we would have to embrace anti-Semitism

Dr. Andrew Garfinkle 2004 (PhD in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania), “Anti-Americanism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism,” chapter in Garfinckle, ed., A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism, Hoover Institute Press Publication #530, August 2004, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817945423_197.pdf>

Given this “vision” of what Israel is, which is very widely shared from Morocco to Indonesia, no imaginable American-sponsored compromise settlement could erase the contention that American policy is one-sided, unfair, perpetuates inequities, and so forth. Indeed, for America to be truly liked these days in much of the Arab and Muslim worlds, American society and policy would have to become as routinely and as matter-of-factly anti-Semitic as theirs. Happily, this is not very likely.

ARMS RACES - Not a problem

Arms races are not always dangerous and sometimes failing to race would be dangerous

Dr. James D. Fearon 2011. (PhD; Professor of Political Science, Stanford Univ) 24 Mar 2011 “Arming and Arms Races” <http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/events/documents/Fearon_arming3.2011.pdf>

At least for the case of symmetric states, the model and analysis here are largely consistent with the Roman adage “if you want peace, prepare for war.” The reason states build is to deter attack (or coercion) by other states that would like to expand or otherwise change the status quo away from what the state likes. Arms build ups are costly and inefficient. The states could do better if they could commit themselves not to arm, or not to use arms for attack or coercion. Either possibility would enable a stable outcome at zero or lower levels of arms. In the symmetric case, however, even if arms build ups are costly they are not themselves “dangerous.” They do not raise the probability of war by any sort of dynamic internal to the build up itself. Indeed, it is failing to race that would be dangerous, if states start from or newly find themselves in a position where current arms are inadequate for deterrence.

**Avoiding arms race is not the guarantee of lasting peace - historically proven by WW2**

Joseph Maiolo 2010. (senior lecturer in international history in the department of war studies at King's College London) 28 Nov 2010 “Do Arms Races Cause Wars?” <http://hnn.us/articles/133458.html>

Ever since Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Grey in 1914 declared that the arms race had made war “inevitable,” the question of whether military rivalry causes war has perplexed policymakers and scholars alike. In 1919 the peacemakers agreed with Lord Grey. To guarantee lasting peace, they made disarmament one of the aims of the League of Nations. The events of the 1930s, however, appeared to prove Grey wrong. It was not the arms race that caused another World War, but the abject failure of France, Britain and the United States to outgun Japan, Italy, and above all Hitler’s Germany.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Hyping a potential arms race is bad. Anticipating an arms race can increase the risk of war

Link: Our opponents discuss and raise the issue of an arms race, provoking higher anticipation of such an event, particularly if the Judge votes for them.

Link & Impact: While the arms race itself is not dangerous, anticipating an arms race could provoke states to fight “now” rather than bear the costs of an arms race - the anticipation creates pressure for immediate war

Dr. James D. Fearon 2011. (PhD; Professor of Political Science, Stanford University) 24 Mar 2011 “Arming and Arms Races” (the “Roman adage” is: “If you want peace, prepare for war.” <http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/events/documents/Fearon_arming3.2011.pdf>

Contrary to the Roman adage, or going beyond it, the analysis does make clear that while build ups in the symmetric case are not in themselves dangerous, the anticipation of a costly arms race could be dangerous, by inclining states to fight in the present rather bear the costs of arming to a stable level. In this complete information model this is “all or nothing” in the sense that either the states fight at the outset or they do not. Note, however, that the mechanism is more general in that the greater the anticipated costs of getting to stability, the more willing the states would be to run risks of armed conflict in crisis bargaining over other issues. This is a potential source of pressure for war that is almost completely missed in standard Realist discussions.

2. Unpreparedness

Link: Our opponents want to prevent an arms race

Link & Impact: In some cases, failing to arm leads to attack or coercion by the stronger power, because the weaker one did not adequately prepare

*Dr. James D. Fearon 2011. (PhD; Professor of Political Science, Stanford University) 24 Mar 2011 “Arming and Arms Races”* [*http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/events/documents/Fearon\_arming3.2011.pdf*](http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/events/documents/Fearon_arming3.2011.pdf)

As noted above, from the perspective of a state in the model, the biggest danger would be failing to arm against a greedy adversary, as this would lead to attack or coercion if they are starting from low enough arms levels. Nonetheless, armed conflict can arise in equilibrium in these models even when the states are well aware of this danger and are trying to avoid it.

ATSUGI NAVAL AIR FACILITY – Better not shut it down

MINOR REPAIR

Let’s save money but don’t hurt aircraft carriers and naval aviation (those will cause big disads, as we argue later). Instead, we should cancel unbuilt budgeted new Navy destroyers, at $2 billion each. These cuts don’t weaken the Navy because they haven’t been built yet. And they don’t hurt the aircraft carriers or naval aviation.

Benjamin H. Friedman and Dr. Christopher Preble 2010. (Friedman - research fellow in defense and homeland security at Cato Institute; doctoral candidate in Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Preble - PhD history, Temple Univ.; director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute ) 23 Sept 2010 “Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint” [www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf)

Build and operate fewer destroyers. We would save $34 billion from 2011 through 2020 by reducing the number of destroyers (DDGs) that the Navy buys and operates. This reduction is accomplished by maintaining the number of DDG-51s at the current level of 62. The Navy has already proposed stopping production of its newest destroyer, the DDG-1000, at three, and instead plans to buy eight Flight IIA version DDG-51s and as many as eight Flight III version DDG-51s by 2020 at an average cost of about $2 billion.

DISADVANTAGES

1. 7th Fleet Aviation maintenance training disappears

Link: AFF removes Atsugi and replaces it with nothing

Link : Atsugi provides aviation maintenance training for the entire 7th Fleet

Johnie Hickmon 2003. (Navy journalist) 22 Sept 2003 “FASO: Keeping Sailors Trained” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&ved=0CC8QFjAAOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.navy.mil%2Fsearch%2Fdisplay_word.asp%3Fstory_id%3D9628&ei=zDjGUO3bLc65hAfJ0ICgDg&usg=AFQjCNE9B3AULkvbRA-omTbnogXbpe6QZw&sig2=v49Hh2m8qACZCapj_OJB2Q>

FASO Atsugi has a total of 24 military personnel assigned to its detachment. These personnel provide training courses in the latest procedures for all aspects of Aviation Maintenance Administration Management Training (AMAMT), and various aspects of Undersea and Surface-Submarine Warfare (USW/SUW), which are available to all applicable Western Pacific Sailors and Marines. Their territory covers the entire 7th Fleet area of responsibility, which stretches from the east Horn of Africa to Hawaii.

Impact: Accidents. Without training, skills weaken and accidents happen

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE FORCES 2007. COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1D” <http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Documents/3502_1D_Change_1.pdf>

It cannot be overemphasized that unit level training (ULT) must be continuous throughout the FRTP. Skills atrophy and personnel rotate. Even in instances where repetition seems to be sufficient, absent a formal approach to training, complacency and the potential for accidents increase. Continuous training and readiness is the center of mass of every thing we do. The fundamental goal of unit level training is for ship’s training teams to effectively self assess and train themselves, and the ship to be certified in required CNSF certification criteria and primary mission areas; be ready to commence integrated and sustainment phase training under the numbered fleet commander (NFC); and be independent unit ready for tasking (RFT) in the event national tasking requires ships to be ready for immediate deployment.

2. Naval aviation weakened

Link: Atsugi is the largest US naval aviation site in the Pacific

NAVY TIMES copyright 2012. “Naval Air Facility Atsugi – Navy” <http://www.navytimes.com/community/installations/?a=show&id=1049>

Atsugi is the largest naval air facility in the Pacific. Its mission is to provide facilities, services and materiel support for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation operations, and to provide logistic support for Carrier Air Wing 5.

Brink: Lack of reliable bases is increasing demands on naval aviation

Owen R. Cote Jr. 2006. (Associate Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program) Feb 2006 “The Future of Naval Aviation” <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/cote/MIT_SSP_FutureofNavalAviation.pdf>

The main source of new demands on naval aviation is the decline in secure and predictable access to overseas bases resulting from the shift in strategic focus away from the central front of Europe to the long Eurasian littoral, which extends from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea. Along this arc, the United States lacks and is unlikely to recreate the tight, long term alliance relationships which were a hallmark of the Cold War, from which flowed assured access to bases ashore. Instead, it faces a security environment in which ad hoc coalitions will form to solve specific problems; access to bases ashore will be episodic and unpredictable in advance of conflict, as was the case with Turkey in the run up to Iraqi Freedom; and the freedom to operate from such bases during conflicts can be suddenly withdrawn, as happened more recently in Uzbekistan.

Impact: Naval aviation is key to national security

Owen R. Cote Jr. 2006. (Associate Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program) Feb 2006 “The Future of Naval Aviation” <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/cote/MIT_SSP_FutureofNavalAviation.pdf>

The relative value of Naval Aviation as a guarantor of national security and an instrument of national will has never been greater than in today’s post-9/11 strategic landscape. From the Pacific campaigns of World War II through the complete battlespace dominance demonstrated during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Naval Aviation continues to evolve as a decisive force through ongoing incorporation of advanced technology. The necessary investments must be made to sustain this preeminent force to ensure the United States’ continued access and ability to shape world events.

Impact: There is no alternative to solving major national security challenges – we must sustain naval aviation

Owen R. Cote Jr. 2006. (Associate Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program) Feb 2006 “The Future of Naval Aviation” <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/cote/MIT_SSP_FutureofNavalAviation.pdf>

As this report shows, naval aviation is progressing toward solutions to each of these challenges. Success in these areas will in turn enable the full exploitation of the sea base’s capabilities to influence and control events both on the high seas and ashore, against the full spectrum of threats. It is necessary to sustain this progress in the coming years and decades because the future security environment will brook no alternative solutions to the major security challenges faced by the United States.

CEJA - Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

CASE NOTES

Background:

This case appears in Ethos. We add here additional evidence not provided in their Negative brief, with the hope that it may help against Affirmatives who are already familiar with their evidence but may not be prepared for additional arguments not covered there.

Case Analysis:

The plan is to extend criminal liability to all security contractors working for the US government abroad. In the Status Quo, the criminal liability only extends to contractors working for the US Dept of Defense (DOD). You have to watch carefully for some sleight-of-hand in the 1AC. There are lots of numbers thrown around about how many contractors there are and how they are growing, but the numbers cited include mostly DOD contractors, and the Affirmative will either explain clearly, or else admit if you ask in CX, that the DOD guys are already covered under existing law. Thus, any numbers citing DOD contractors are irrelevant to the case. Force the Affirmative to admit or explain how many their plan actually covers and subtract the DOD contractors from any general contracting numbers they cite. There won’t be many left.

Affirmatives are probably well-prepared for Negative topicality attacks on contractors being “civilians” and/or not really part of the American “military presence” abroad. That’s not a bad argument and you could certainly use it. However, Affirmatives are less likely to be as well-prepared for the topicality arguments we present here, like “insignificant” reform. Even if we concede that PMCs are a part of America’s military presence, the actual contractors touched by the Affirmative’s plan are only a tiny percentage of the total number of contractors engaged abroad. Remember, AFF will concede (because they must) that the Department of Defense contractors are already covered by existing law. All they’re changing are the contractors that remain, which are a tiny insignificant percentage of the total.

TOPICALITY

1. Insignificant reform. Let’s compare the number of Defense Department contractors with State Department during the height of the Iraq War, or “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” to give a perspective on the size of the Affirmative’s reform.

Link: Defense Department had 20,000 contractors in 2004 and 30,000 contractors in 2007. But they’re not covered by Affirmative’s plan, they’re already covered in the Status Quo.

Rand Corporation Study 2010. (written by Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber. RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization ) “Hired Guns Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom” (brackets added) <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf>

The number of armed contractors employed by all entities in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] grew from approximately 10,000 in 2003 to approximately 20,000 in 2004, ballooning to about 30,000 in 2007 (Traynor, 2003; Witte, 2005; Miller, 2007). By March 2009, this number had again receded to 10,422 (Schwartz, 2009).

Link: State Department in 2006 had 1,500 security contractors in Iraq. (These are the ones affected by the Affirmative plan)

Rand Corporation Study 2010. (written by Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, Michael Webber. RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization ) “Hired Guns Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom” <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG987.pdf>

For the State Department, armed contractors likewise perform a variety of security tasks. Greg Starr, former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, explained:

Staﬃng for security programs in Iraq includes nearly 50 diplomatic security special agents, marine security guards, approximately 1,500 third country national local guards, hundreds of U.S. coalition troops protecting the international zone and regional embassy oﬃces, and nearly 1,500 highly trained contract personal security specialists (Committee on Government Reform, 2006, p. 44).

**Standard:** “Significant” means “of a noticeably or measurably large amount” *(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2012* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant?show=0&t=1347811998*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant?show=0&t=1347811998)*)*

Notice that it’s the amount of the reform that has to be significant, not the impact of the reform (that’s a separate issue and the Affirmative will lose there too). “Significantly reform” is not the same as “Tiny reform that may have significant results.”

Violation: Using Iraq as a guide, the Affirmative’s plan would have only covered 1500 out of 30,000 contractors in Iraq. That’s a grand total of 5% of the armed contractors. Changing 5% of our armed foreign contractors is not a significant reform of our foreign military presence.

Impacts:

**1. No Affirmative team.** No one in this room today is advocating significantly reforming US foreign military presence or commitments. One team is arguing for an insignificant reform, and the other is arguing for no reform. With no one affirming the resolution, no matter who wins you should write Negative on the ballot.

**2. Opportunity cost.**  The time spent debating this tiny policy could have been spent debating something worthwhile. The impact to debating insignificant things is that we are losing the opportunity to debate meaningful things. We will never get this hour and a half back again. Experts agree that we have to consider Opportunity Cost when debating public policy:

*Prof. Daniel Drezner 2010. (professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) FOREIGN POLICY 16 Nov 2010 What do you do with dumb debates?* [*http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/16/what\_do\_you\_do\_with\_dumb\_debates*](http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/16/what_do_you_do_with_dumb_debates)

When it comes to policy debates I'm always on the side of John Stuart Mill -- the best way to deal with stupid arguments is to counter them with better arguments in the public sphere. That said, there's a serious cost to this philosophy in a world in which the stupid ideas can command the policy agenda. The opportunity cost to the inordinate amount of time that is spent swatting away these ideas is that less time is spent debating policies and ideas that have a real chance of being enacted.

2. “Military” presence versus State Department presence.

Link: Affirmative plan changes State Department contractors. They may have clarified it in the 1AC but in case they didn’t, listen to Affirmative plan advocate Melissa Brickell in 2010 as she explains that the CEJA is designed to work on contractors who are not with the US armed forces - like the State Department, for example. In the context, she uses the abbreviation DOS for “Department of State”:

Melissa Brickell 2010 (American University Washington College of Law), "Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad: U.S. v. Slough and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3. 24 Sept 2010 American University Washington College of Law, (ellipses in original) <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=lpb>

Five years after the MEJA amendment attempted to close the criminal liability “loophole” for PMCs abroad and one month after a U.S. Federal court dismissed criminal indictments against five Blackwater PMC defendants, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010 (CEJA) to definitively close jurisdictional gaps for certain contractors and to authorize additional investigative and reporting resources. CEJA would add another section after MEJA in the U.S. Code that allows Federal criminal jurisdiction and prosecution for certain crimes for anyone “. . . employed by or accompanying any department or agency of the United States other than the Armed Forces.” This language is simple, but it effectively brings all PMCs employed by the U.S. government under the same umbrella. No longer would there be a liability distinction based on the department or agency that contracts with a PMC. For example, Blackwater PMCs under contract with the DOS would clearly fall within the statute.

**Link: The State Department is not part of the Defense Department, where America’s military is located. It’s obvious, but just in case you need evidence:**

Dr. William Joseph Davis, Jr. & Dr. Christopher R. Paparone 2012. (Davis - associate professor of strategic and operational studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; served 24 years as a Naval Officer; PhD from Old Dominion University. Paparone is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College’s Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations; retired Army colonel; Ph.D. from Penn State University) Departments of State and Defense Relations: Are Perceptions Important? <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/IAJ-3-1-pg31-39.pdf>

As far back as the authors can remember, colleagues from both the Department of State (State) and Department of Defense (DoD) have taken every opportunity to highlight what they see as the significant differences between their organizational cultures. Many are quick to quote the title of a popular article entitled “Defense is from Mars, and State is from Venus.”

**Violation: The plan reforms the US State Department’s foreign presence, not the US military presence. The Affirmative’s own plan advocate says the plan applies only to contractors who are working with QUOTE “other than the Armed Forces.” UNQUOTE. It doesn’t get any clearer than that.**

**Impact: No Affirmative team.** No one in this room today is advocating significantly reforming US foreign military presence or commitments. One team is arguing for an insignificant reform to the US State Department, and the other is arguing for no reform. With no one affirming the resolution, no matter who wins you should write Negative on the ballot.

EXTRA-TOPICALITY (XT). Even if you believe the plan at its foundation is topical, there are aspects to the CEJA that are necessary for its success that go beyond what is allowed in the Resolution. In other words, the Affirmative is trying to win by doing the Resolution “plus more” that the Negative should not have been required to prepare to debate in today’s round. The Affirmative cannot win this round by simply affirming the resolution, and the benefits of these extra-topical aspects of CEJA should be thrown out of the round. We should only be debating the parts of the Affirmative plan that actually comply with the resolution.

XT VIOLATION 1. Foreign nationals.

Link: Affirmative plan advocate Melissa Brickell admits in 2010 that most of the PMC contractors are citizens of foreign countries, not Americans

Melissa Brickell 2010 (American University Washington College of Law), "Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad: U.S. v. Slough and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3. 24 Sept 2010 American University Washington College of Law, (ellipses in original) <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=lpb>

In addition, PMCs [private military contractors] often possess important skill sets and expertise that are undercompensated in the public sector, and they can be drawn from local populations that more closely match indigenous culture than would the public force. In September 2009, a surprising 74% of DOD contractors in Iraq and 91% in Afghanistan were local and third-country nationals.

**Violation: These aren’t part of the US federal government’s presence, since they aren’t Americans.**

**Impact: Drop 74 to 91 percent of the solvency out of the round. The Affirmative can only claim the benefits of reforming America’s foreign military presence, not the foreign military presence of foreigners.**

XT VIOLATIONS 2 and 3. 2) Criminal investigation programs and 3) law enforcement jurisdiction. In another card from Affirmative plan advocate Melissa Brickell in 2010, she mentions 2 more aspects to CEJA that are essential for making it work. Neither of these reform America’s foreign military presence. The first establishes a new investigative unit back in the USA. The second expands current criminal liability law to cover “law enforcement personnel” contractors. These are not military contractors, so they are not part of anyone’s foreign military presence.

Melissa Brickell 2010 (American University Washington College of Law), "Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad: U.S. v. Slough and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3. 24 Sept 2010 American University Washington College of Law, (ellipses in original) <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=lpb>

In addition to providing a jurisdiction clearly encompassing all contractors, the legislation would also establish “Investigative Units for Contractor and Employee Oversight” to investigate allegations of criminal offenses. Arrest authority would also be expanded from current law to include anyone serving in a law enforcement position in any U.S. department or agency, not just persons at the DOD. These provisions attempt to provide additional resources that would improve upon the ambiguous investigative procedures that surrounded the Nisoor Square shooting.

SIGNIFICANCE

All those hundreds of thousands of overseas contractors? Forget it: Only 4-6% of them are actually “Security” contractors

[And, remember once again, that these are DOD, which are already covered under existing law]

Congressional Research Service 2008. (written by: Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Moshe Schwartz, Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Kennon H. Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 29 Sept 2008 “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues <http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RL32419.pdf>

Some government officials and industry experts also attribute part of the drop in the number of PSC employees working in Iraq to DOD’s improved ability to accurately track PSCs. Generally, private security contractors constitute a relatively small portion — approximately 4-6% — of the over 160,000 strong contractor workforce working for DOD in Iraq. DOD was unable to provide data on how much was being spent on PSCs in Iraq.

INHERENCY

Blackwater/Iraq scenario was prosecuted under existing law. The case dismissal was due to prosecutorial mismanagement, not lack of legal authority. Affirmative plan advocate Melissa Brickell admitted in 2010:

Melissa Brickell 2010 (American University Washington College of Law), "Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad: U.S. v. Slough and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3. 24 Sept 2010 American University Washington College of Law, (ellipses in original) <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=lpb>

One of the most negatively publicized incidents during the war in Iraq was a disputed Baghdad shooting in September 2007, which involved a convoy of U.S. PMCs. These PMCs, part of the Blackwater Tactical Support Team, were contracted by the DOS to provide back-up fire support to other Blackwater personal security details in Baghdad. On September 16, the convoy took up positions at a traffic circle in Nisoor Square to secure an evacuation route for American and Iraqi officials after a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated near the compound at which they were meeting. Soon after, a shooting incident occurred, which the PMCs claimed was a self-defense response to an insurgent attack. The U.S. government, however, maintained after its investigation that the violence was unprovoked and that the victims were unarmed. Prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) ultimately culminated in indictments for voluntary manslaughter and firearms violations, but the indictments were dismissed in December 2009 in the closely watched case *U.S v. Slough* because of evidentiary taint from prosecutorial case mismanagement.

SMTJ – Special Maritime & Territorial Jurisdiction rules: CIA contractor was prosecuted under SMTJ

Congressional Research Service 2008. (written by: Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Moshe Schwartz, Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Kennon H. Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 29 Sept 2008 “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues <http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RL32419.pdf>

U.S. contractor personnel and other U.S. civilian employees in Iraq are subject to prosecution in U.S. courts under a number of circumstances. Jurisdiction of certain federal statutes extends to U.S. nationals at U.S. facilities overseas that qualify as part of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the United States. For crimes involving a U.S. national as a perpetrator or a victim, the SMTJ includes:

(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities. Criminal statutes that apply within the SMTJ include maiming, assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault or contact, murder and manslaughter. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for prosecuting crimes in this category. A CIA contractor was convicted under this provision in 2007 for the assault of a detainee in Afghanistan.

**Dept of Defense (DOD) already has contractor oversight** **plan**

**[Remember: Affirmative admits that Status Quo already has legal liability coverage for DOD contractors]**

Moshe Schwartz 2010. (Congressional Research Service, Specialist in Defense Acquisition) June 22, 2010, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145576.pdf>

DOD has also taken a number of steps to specifically improve management and oversight of PSCs. In July 2009, DOD issued an Instruction, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, establishing policy and procedures for managing private security contractors during contingency operations. DOD also released an interim rule modifying the Code of Federal Regulations that lays out policy regarding the use of private security contractors in war zones. The interim rule includes policies and procedures for selecting, training, equipping and overseeing private security contractors. DOD established Contractor Operations Cells in Iraq and in Afghanistan to coordinate the movement of PSCs, and it established the Armed Contractor Oversight Division to receive serious incident reports involving PSCs and to ensure that all of the incidents are reported, tracked, and investigated.

CHINA BAD - Big threat

Brink: There are multiple flashpoints of potential war with China, as Chinese military buildups intensify

Clifford Coonan 2012. (journalist) 23 Apr 2012 IRISH TIMES “China warns US naval exercise may lead to conflict” <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0423/1224315048178.html>

What defence analysts detect in the region are several potential flashpoints, with China at the centre. “What we see is an arms race among Southeast Asian nations looking at China. There is a perceived threat there, in countries like Vietnam and the Philippines,” said one defence analyst, who asked to remain anonymous. China’s efforts to boost its military have been intensified since Washington signalled it was increasing its interests in the Pacific, stationing troops in Australia and boosting alliances with Japan and the Philippines, and boosting ties with its old enemy, Vietnam.

China threatens war over Scarborough Shoal

Clifford Coonan 2012. (journalist) 23 Apr 2012 IRISH TIMES “China warns US naval exercise may lead to conflict” <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0423/1224315048178.html>

Recent weeks have seen a maritime standoff between the Philippines and China in disputed sovereign seas near the Scarborough Shoal, west of a former US navy base at Subic Bay. An article in the Liberation Army Daily warned that the standoff could turn into full-on conflict and said it was largely the fault of the US, which has been staging joint military exercises in the region with the Philippine navy. China refers to the area as Huangyan Island, and says it is “an inherent part of China’s territory”.

**China has a plan to use military advantages to start and win a war against US**

Patrick Winn 2008. (Staff writer) 28 Jan 2008, "Hypothetical attack on U.S. outlined by China" AIR FORCE TIMES, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/01/airforce_china_strategy_080121/>

But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds. This is China’s anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy. It’s designed to strike America’s military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other service. In a script written by Chinese military officers and defense analysts, a bruised U.S. military, beholden to a sheepish American public, puts up a small fight before slinking off to avoid full-on war. This strategic outlook isn’t hidden in secret Chinese documents. It’s printed in China’s military journals and textbooks.

China promotes authoritarian repressive ideology in Asia

John J. Tkacik, Jr. 2007. (Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud­ies Center at The Heritage Foundation) 17 Mar 2007, “China's Quest for a Superpower Military” HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Backgrounder #2036 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm>

America could engage and strengthen the cur­rent robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting the democracies of the Americas with their counter­parts along the Western Pacific Rim, or a disengaged America could allow a Sino-centric axis to crystal­lize as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, and eventually Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band­wagon with China. The latter would make Leninist-mercantilist China the rule-maker in Asia, not just for transnational trade and financial structures, but also for a new Asian security architecture and a new ideology of authoritarian state-mercantilism that defends repressive "development models based on national conditions."

China is building new nuclear forces that have grave implications for US security

John J. Tkacik, Jr. 2007. (Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud­ies Center at The Heritage Foundation) 17 Mar 2007, “China's Quest for a Superpower Military” HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Backgrounder #2036 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm>

Moreover, this modernized and sophisticated nuclear force is clearly well in excess of any mere Taiwan contingency. It involves new power projec­tion capabilities that give Beijing two advantages: "area denial" strength, which is achieved by placing forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam at risk, and coercive diplomacy instruments to resolve other territorial disputes, such as in the East China Sea with Japan and the South China Sea with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Indeed, China's new nuclear weapons systems present grave implications for U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific, the security of U.S. allies and friends in democratic Asia, and regional military balances in general.

Brink: Conflicting naval claims and arms purchases in Southeast Asia could trigger dangerous situation

Kathrin Hille & Tim Johnston 2010. (journalists) FINANCIAL TIMES (British news magazine), “Arms purchases by China's neighbours fuel fears of clashes” (ellipses and parentheses in original) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4865edbc-2fd3-11df-9153-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1u6RYh3CP>

Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), said that several south-east Asian countries had "dramatically" stepped up their purchases of submarines, fighter aircraft, and long-range missiles in recent years. "While south-east Asian governments . . . still don't openly voice concerns over China, they think about it, and they are making a statement with what they are buying," he said. "Fifteen years ago, there were the same conflicting claims in the South China Sea but the countries didn't have the means to enforce their claims. Now, the moment somebody hits oil there, things might look very dangerous."

Huge discrepancy in power between China and other southeast Asian nations

Kathrin Hille & Tim Johnston 2010. (journalists) FINANCIAL TIMES (British news magazine), “Arms purchases by China's neighbours fuel fears of clashes” (ellipses and parentheses in original) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4865edbc-2fd3-11df-9153-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1u6RYh3CP>

Singapore's concern is over the impact of the shift in the balance of power in the region, said Tim Huxley of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore. "The real problem is the huge discrepancy in power between China and the south-east Asian nations."

“China’s defense spending is still low compared to USA” - Response: But China’s military is concentrated in East Asia, while the US is spread throughout the world, so China’s impact is big locally

Dr. Jihwan Hwang 2011. (PhD polit. science, Univ of Colo, Boulder; assistant professor of International Relations at University of Seoul, S. Korea ) 30 Dec 2011 From Preponderance of Power to Balance of Power? South Korea in Search of a New North Korea Policy, East Asia Institute <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots783=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=135854>

Furthermore, the military spending between the two countries cannot be compared just in nominal figures. While U.S. military power has been involved all over the world, including Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, China has focused mainly on East Asia. The military rise of China therefore means a much stronger influence on the Korean Peninsula than the figure shows.

US security engagement in the region motivates Chinese cooperation and may stabilize the region

Michael Mochizuki 2011. (Associate Dean, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington Univ) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense>

But, you know, as Jonathan said, you know, China is also deeply engaged with the region and I think these kinds of relationships that the United States is building up may give an incentive for the Chinese to come up with their own very positive multilateral and bilateral policy. And, you know, a case in point is this past week, you know, we have now a China-Vietnam agreement to deal with maritime security issues in a more cooperative fashion and, you know, probably one of the big incentives for China to move in this direction was that the United States was developing a security relationship with Vietnam. So, the net effect of this is not to create kind of a bipolar structure between two contending camps, but really to develop an interweaving set of relationships that in the end may help to stabilize the region.

CHINA GOOD - No Threat, Confrontation won’t work

NO THREAT

China is getting weaker, not stronger

Prof. Minxin Pei 2012. (professor of government at Claremont McKenna College; nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States) 29 Aug 2012, FOREIGN POLICY, “Everything You Think You Know About China Is Wrong” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/29/everything_you_think_you_know_about_china_is_wrong>

The disconnect between the brewing troubles in China and the seemingly unshakable perception of Chinese strength persists even though the U.S. media accurately cover China, in particular the country's inner fragilities. One explanation for this disconnect is that elites and ordinary Americans remain poorly informed about China and the nature of its economic challenges in the coming decades. The current economic slowdown in Beijing is neither cyclical nor the result of weak external demand for Chinese goods. China's economic ills are far more deeply rooted: an overbearing state squandering capital and squeezing out the private sector, systemic inefficiency and lack of innovation, a rapacious ruling elite interested solely in self-enrichment and the perpetuation of its privileges, a woefully underdeveloped financial sector, and mounting ecological and demographic pressures.

No long-term problem: Either China will reform and adopt American-style democracy or else they will collapse like the Soviet Union

Analysis: It’s a good dilemma, the Status Quo wins either way. If China reforms to become a democracy, then they’re no threat because more democracy is a good thing. If China doesn’t reform, their economy will collapse just like the Soviet Union did, because without freedom and democracy, their economy can’t survive. If they collapse, then they’re no threat.

Dr. Bruce Cordell 2010. (Ph.D. University of Arizona, Planetary Science; Dean, Natural Sciences Division, Fullerton College) China Surges to #2 and Contemplates More Freedom: The Implications for Space, 21 Aug 2010 (brackets added, ellipses in original) <http://21stcenturywaves.com/2010/08/21/china-surges-to-2-and-contemplates-more-freedom-the-implications-for-space/>

China’s challenges include its low GDP per capita value of $ 3,600 –similar to “impoverished nations like Algeria, El Salvador and Albania” – versus $ 46,000 for the United States. Interestingly, the Times credits the Communist Party with China’s surge.  
  
[quoting New York Times] There is little disputing that under the direction of the Communist Party, China has begun to reshape the way the global economy functions by virtue of its growing dominance of trade, its huge hoard of foreign exchange reserves and United States government debt and its voracious appetite for oil, coal, iron ore and other natural resources. [end quote of NY Times]  
  
Quite a different view is offered by a Chinese General recently in the popular Hong Kong magazine, Phoenix, in which he sees a choice for China of either “American-style democracy or Soviet-style collapse.” According to General Liu Yazhou,  
  
If a system fails to let its citizens breathe freely and release their creativity to the maximum extent, and fails to place those who best represent the system and its people into leadership positions, it is certain to perish … ‘The secret of US success is neither Wall Street nor Silicon Valley, but its long-surviving rule of law and the system behind it … The American system is said to be ‘designed by genius and for the operation of the stupid’. A bad system makes a good person behave badly, while a good system makes a bad person behave well. Democracy is the most urgent; without it there is no sustainable rise.

Key to peace in the Asia-Pacific region is military cooperation with China

Sec. of Defense Leon Panetta 2012. “U.S. Naval Academy Commencement” 29 May 2012 <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1679>

We also need you to strengthen defense ties with China. China’s military is growing and modernizing. We must be vigilant. We must be strong. We must be prepared to confront any challenge. But the key to peace in that region is to develop a new era of defense cooperation between our countries – one in which our militaries share security burdens to advance peace in the Asia-Pacific and around the world.

We need to stop overestimating China’s power and stop underestimating US power

Jonathan Pollack 2011. (senior fellow with the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings Institution; former professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the Naval War College) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense.pdf>

I have, frankly, a lot more faith in the United States Navy than apparently a lot of strategic observers do. I mean, we are the global predominant power, I don’t -- military power. You can ask whether that’s something that we always need to have as part of our toolkit, but I don’t see anyone remotely close to that, least of all the Chinese. China, we might note, for example, has not been engaged in a significant military conflict in over 30 years, they have never used any of the capabilities that they’ve been acquiring in any kind of actual operational sense; traditionally more a land power, now becoming more an air and naval power. That may be an inevitability, but let’s not give them, if you will, more credit than they deserve. There’s an enormous risk, it seems to me, to diminish what our own -- the perception of our own capabilities and imagining their accomplishments being that much greater.

SOLVENCY

Growing our economy is the only way long-term that we can counterbalance China

David Brown 2011. (adjunct professor of China studies, Johns Hopkins Univ. Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense.pdf>

If, at some point, China does emerge as the world’s largest economy with a much more robust military, they are going to expect that people acknowledge that and accommodate their views on international relations. It’s not so much that we need to deter that kind of China from using force, we need to counterbalance its ability to use this comprehensive national power to cause countries in the region to bandwagon with them. So, we’re in a period where China isn’t number one yet, and I think the kinds of things that President Mochizuki has talked about and others on the panel are the wise kinds of strategies to pursue at this point in time. We need to maintain our strength in the region, we need to maintain our alliances, we need to work on these multilateral institutions to embed China and ourselves in a multilateral network, which will, frankly, constrain us and constrain them. We need this super committee to be successful, not so much because it’s going to reduce the budgetary pressures on the defense budget, but because hopefully it will help our economy grow because only by growing our economy over the long term are we going to be able to counterbalance China.

DISADVANTAGE to confronting China

1. Worrying about China’s animosity increases it.

Link: US defense policy intended to “hedge” against Chinese animosity could be a self-fulfilling prophecy by sending signals that increase China’s animosity

Jonathan Pollack 2011. (senior fellow with the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings Institution; former professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the Naval War College) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY, (“pernicious” means: harmful) <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense.pdf>

I’m struck that Representative McKeon, I’m told, chairman of the House Arms Services Committee, has purportedly said that if the choice is cutting the U.S. defense budget or increasing taxes, he’ll opt for increasing taxes. Now that’s -- he’s being honest about it, all right, about what his presumed priorities are because I think in all of this, though, we have to ask ourselves first and foremost, what is it that we are ramping up to? If the argument, for example, is that we, at a minimum, need to have a more credible hedge vis-à-vis China, what does a hedge really look like? What is the signal that one sends to China in that context? Is there always the danger that that hedge becomes a little too self-fulfilling given that, frankly, as China grows, both economically and militarily, and as it expresses its own animosities of one kind or another towards the United States, the easy temptation to make China, if you will, the force that will save the DoD budget, if I could coin a phrase, could be very, very pernicious in its own right, begging the issue of whether or not there is a means by which we could conceptualize a longer-term, regional order that does not include China in a meaningful sense. I mean, we have to ask questions about where are Chinese presumed security goals in conflict with the United States, where are they not?

Uniqueness: Status Quo policy plans for China’s rise without making our response seem directed against them

Jonathan Pollack 2011. (senior fellow with the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings Institution; former professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the Naval War College) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY, (“pernicious” means: harmful) <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense.pdf>

So, I think that the U.S. is entering this whole set of discussions at a time that relations have already changed in very, very significant ways around the region, but the very fact that the growth of Chinese power is causing concern on the part of so many regional actors is something that the United States is trying to respond to without making it -- but doing it in a way, hopefully, that can be understood by China and not be seen axiomatically as directed against China in some sense.

Impact: If China’s animosity is bad, our opponent’s position makes it worse

More Impact: US -China cooperation is the most important foreign policy goal - we can’t solve any big problems in the world without China

US-China Smart Power Commission 2009. (chaired by former US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg), March 2009, "Smart Power in US-China Relations," CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf>

The evolution of Sino-US relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable US alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of US and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of US-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without US-China cooperation.

Impact: Must have China's cooperation to solve world problems

US-China Smart Power Commission 2009. (chaired by former US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg), March 2009, "Smart Power in US-China Relations," CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf>

US-Chinese ties could have a greater impact on international affairs than any other relationship. Solving the world's most serious issues -- including global financial instability, proliferation and terrorism, climate change, and energy insecurity -- is difficult to envision without joint action by Beijing and Washington. In today's globalized world, transnational challenges require transnational solutions, especially by the most important states. US-China partnership is indispensable for addressing many of the main challenges of the twenty-first century.

CNV-73 (*USS GEORGE WASHINGTON*)

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Quoted at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/where.htm>

"When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it's no accident that the first question that comes to everyone's lips is: 'Where's the nearest carrier?'" - President Bill Clinton, March 12, 1993 , aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt

SOLVENCY

Savings not so great: Japan pays for some of the maintenance cost of the USS George Washington, because it is based in Japan

Christopher Cavas 2011. (journalist) DEFENSE NEWS, 6 Oct 2011 “US Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111006/DEFSECT03/110060301/U-S-Navy-May-Cut-Carrier-s-Life-Half-Save-Money>

Easing the situation is the fact that the George Washington is based in Japan, where the U.S. Navy shares facilities at Yokosuka naval shipyard with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japanese government contributes to the carrier's upkeep, and the dockyard has an excellent reputation for maintaining ships. The GW also may be able to run longer past her half-life refueling point because she doesn't need to steam thousands of miles from the U.S. to reach the Western Pacific, the ship's normal operating area.

No Cost Savings: US law requires 11 carriers in the Navy, and the Affirmative did not have Congress repeal this law in their plan. The Navy would be required by law to replace the USS G.Washington when it was decommissioned.

Decommissioning the USS G.Washington would leave the US with 10 carriers, while law requires 11

Christopher Cavas 2011. (journalist) DEFENSE NEWS, 6 Oct 2011 “US Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111006/DEFSECT03/110060301/U-S-Navy-May-Cut-Carrier-s-Life-Half-Save-Money>

Along with the carrier, the Navy could also disband one of its 10 carrier air wings - a move that would save roughly as much money and people as cutting the ship. Decommissioning the GW would leave the Navy with a 10-ship carrier fleet, a move that would need to be approved by Congress. U.S. law currently mandates an 11-ship force.

DISADVANTAGES to decommissioning CNV-73/USS GEORGE WASHINGTON

1. Lost deterrence of China

Link: Cutting aircraft carrier strength in the Pacific devastates US military predominance in the region

Dean Cheng & Bruce Klingner 2011. (Cheng - studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program. Klingner - graduate of the National War College with master's degree in national security strategy; also earned a master's in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College ) “Defense Budget Cuts Will Devastate America’s Commitment to the Asia–Pacific” 6 Dec 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/defense-budget-cuts-will-devastate-americas-commitment-to-the-asia-pacific>

The Department of Defense is already preparing for more than $400 billion in spending cuts over the next 10 years, and if the automatic reductions dictated by the 2011 Budget Control Act are not reversed, that number will increase by an additional $500 billion–$600 billion. These spending cuts will result in further reductions in the total number of U.S. aircraft carriers and/or carrier operations and maintenance—reductions that will affect America’s ability to maintain combat-ready, forward-deployed units. Given America’s global commitments, such cuts will in turn hinder this nation’s ability to deter potential opponents and reassure friends and allies in Asia. They will devastate America’s military predominance and leadership in the Western Pacific at the very moment the Administration is declaring this century “America’s Pacific Century.”

Link: Forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is essential to U.S. China Strategy

Richard C. Bush III 2010. (PhD from Columbia University and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution) “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” The Brookings Institution, March 10, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/03/10-japan-politics-bush>

“The threat environment in Northeast Asia is not benign. North Korea’s WMD capabilities are a matter of concern but will hopefully be a medium-term problem. More attention, however, is focused on China which has gradually developed a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the first island chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However, how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing that China has nuclear weapons? There are also specific points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan, some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hope that China will not seek to dominate East Asia at the U.S. and Japan’s expense, we can’t be sure of their intentions either. Hope is not a policy. The most sensible strategy—for both the U.S. and Japan—is to try to shape China’s intentions over time so that they move in a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japan’s strategy since the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each other’s respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important.”

Brink: There are multiple flashpoints of potential war with China, as Chinese military buildups intensify

Clifford Coonan 2012. (journalist) 23 Apr 2012 IRISH TIMES “China warns US naval exercise may lead to conflict” <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0423/1224315048178.html>

What defence analysts detect in the region are several potential flashpoints, with China at the centre. “What we see is an arms race among Southeast Asian nations looking at China. There is a perceived threat there, in countries like Vietnam and the Philippines,” said one defence analyst, who asked to remain anonymous. China’s efforts to boost its military have been intensified since Washington signalled it was increasing its interests in the Pacific, stationing troops in Australia and boosting alliances with Japan and the Philippines, and boosting ties with its old enemy, Vietnam.

**Impact: China has a plan to use military advantages to start and win a war against US**

Patrick Winn 2008. (Staff writer) 28 Jan 2008, "Hypothetical attack on U.S. outlined by China" AIR FORCE TIMES, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/01/airforce_china_strategy_080121/>

But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds. This is China’s anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy. It’s designed to strike America’s military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other service. In a script written by Chinese military officers and defense analysts, a bruised U.S. military, beholden to a sheepish American public, puts up a small fight before slinking off to avoid full-on war. This strategic outlook isn’t hidden in secret Chinese documents. It’s printed in China’s military journals and textbooks.

2. Lost regional stability in Asia

Link: cross-apply DA-1 link: Cutting aircraft carrier strength in the Pacific devastates US military predominance in the region

Link: We need a big military deterrent capability in Asia to maintain stability in Asia

Dr. Michael Auslin 2010. (Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the American Enterprise Institute Director of Japan Studies) “The U.S. -Japan Alliance,” American Enterprise Institute, January 7, 2010, <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-us-japan-alliance/>

“Ultimately, however, the credibility of the alliance will rest on the combination of military capability and willingness to maintain stability in Asia that each partner possesses. In this regard, then, the Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missile-defense plans naturally raise questions about long-term U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific. Will the Obama administration maintain U.S. force levels in Asia at their current strength? Moreover, what are the Hatoyama administration's defense-spending plans? Japan must make decisions regarding its fighter-experimental (F-X) fighter program, but will Japan commit to building more surface ships and the surveillance systems needed to maintain its own capabilities? In this regard, the alliance must continue to rest on a basis of traditional "hard power."Clearly, the two allies should continue to research, develop, and deploy missile-defense systems on land and sea. Moreover, they must keep up their conventional forces, including advanced fighter aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and intelligence and surveillance systems. This is, and will continue to be, expensive, especially in a time of reduced budgets, but the goal of preserving peace requires a formidable military deterrent to any country that may be thinking of employing force to obtain its objectives or to obtain asymmetric advantages that can negate U.S. and Japanese military superiority.

Brink: USS G.W. is the first line of defense for unique obstacles in the region

Spencer Rhoades 2012. (Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Recruit, US Navy) USS George Washington Returns to Yokosuka After 2012 Patrol, 21 Nov 2012 (brackets added) <http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29177:uss-george-washington-returns-to-yokosuka-after-2012-patrol&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156>

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier also took part in Valiant Shield, a weeklong U.S.-only exercise that provided high-level joint training among all U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps; this type of exercise ensures that the U.S. remains vigilant in the 7th fleet area of operations. "We conduct these exercises to practice operational interoperability in a real-time war fighting scenario, keeping everybody sharp and prepared for possible real events," said [USS George Washington commander Capt. G.J.] Fenton. "There is a reason George Washington is the forward-deployed aircraft carrier; the 7th fleet area of operations presents a number of unique obstacles not present in other operational theatres and we are the first line of defense."

Impact: Protecting prosperity and deterring aggression in the region

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“It is important that both the United States and Japan realize that maintaining—and, indeed, strengthening—their alliance best serves their respective national interests. The U.S. military in Asia provides both a shield behind which nations can develop and prosper and a sword whose threat deters those nations that would otherwise try to influence weaker nations through coercive diplomacy or the threat of force.”

3. Longer deployments, leading to mission failure.

Link: Taking the USS G.Washington out of service will require longer deployments for the rest of the fleet

Analysis: “Longer deployments” refers to the amount of time ships spend out on patrol. They come off deployment to return to their home port to give the sailors a chance to see their families and to do maintenance on the ship. If fewer ships are available, the remaining ones have to spend more time out at sea and less time in port, in order to cover the same duties.

Christopher Cavas 2011. (journalist) DEFENSE NEWS, 6 Oct 2011 “US Navy May Cut Carrier’s Life In Half To Save Money,” <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111006/DEFSECT03/110060301/U-S-Navy-May-Cut-Carrier-s-Life-Half-Save-Money>

But with the GW out of service, the Navy would also save millions by not operating the ship for another 20 or more years. Not only would the ship's crew of about 2,700 people not be needed, but many thousands of future sailors won't need to be trained. A similar number of sailors come with each carrier air wing. The Navy wouldn't need the 70-plus aircraft in the wing, and wouldn't need to train those pilots and aircrew and pay to fly the planes. A price could be paid, however, in a higher operating tempo for the remaining carrier fleet. Like the submarine force, it's possible that deployments of seven or eight months, or more, could become the norm.

Brink: Status Quo fleet deployment time is already at the edge of what can be sustained. It cannot be safely increased – there is no margin for error (they won’t have enough time to do the maintenance in port before sending them out again)

Sydney J. Freedberg 2012. (journalist) “Navy Strains to Handle Both China and Iran At Once,” 21 May 2012 <http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/21/navy-strains-to-handle-both-china-and-iran-at-once/> (brackets added, ellipses in original)

Since demand is growing and the fleet is not, the short-term expedient is to use each ship more. The almost 11-month deployment of the USS Bataan (pictured, in the Strait of Hormuz) was extreme, but it's a sign of things to come. "Right now demand exceeds supply, so that is driving longer deployments," [retired US Navy Admiral Peter] Daly said, "getting much, much more out of the existing force." Before 9/11, on a typical day, about a third of Navy ships were out of port and underway and about 28 percent were actually deployed, operating in foreign seas rather than training in waters close to home. "Today those numbers are much, much higher," Daly said, more like 44 percent of ships underway and 38 percent deployed. In the long term, though, this higher tempo of operations puts more strain on both sailors and ships. A warship's complex systems take a lot of work to maintain, much of which can't be done underway but rather requires the facilities of a port. With more, longer deployments and shorter intervals in between, "when that ship has to be maintained, that's the time," said Daly. There's no more margin of error for delays or unexpected problems – including sequestration: "All these ship repair contracts and all these ship repair actions...they'll come to a screeching halt" if there's a sequester, Daly warned.

Impact: Mission Failure. Lack of maintenance means Navy deployments will fail in their missions

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011. (Congressman from Virginia; chairman of the House Armed Services Readiness Subcomittee) 12 July 2012 “Forbes Asks: Is our Navy Ready” <http://forbes.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=251451>

In the last four years inspection failures for Navy ships have nearly tripled. Currently, 1 in 5 ships inspected is either unsatisfactory or unfit for combat. Since 2007 inspection failure rates have risen from roughly 8% to 24%. Yet, this year alone, the Navy faces a $367 million funding shortfall for ship maintenance. On average, Navy deployed ships are forced to spend nearly 40% of their time with at least one major equipment or systems failure. Essential equipment or systems on Navy ships could include anti-air defenses, radar, satellite communications, or engines. Almost 40% of the time, deployed ships have at least one essential piece of equipment that has failed and prevents them from meeting a primary mission.

4. Strait of Hormuz threatened

Link: Decommissioning the USS G.Washington in 2012 would leave the US with 9 carriers until 2016. Status Quo will have 10 carriers between 2012-2016.

Link & Brink: Carriers are critical to the Navy, and status quo has already reduced their number

Sydney J. Freedberg 2012. (journalist) “Navy Strains to Handle Both China and Iran At Once,” 21 May 2012 <http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/21/navy-strains-to-handle-both-china-and-iran-at-once/> (brackets added, ellipses in original)

Carriers are particularly critical because the Navy has already dropped from 12 to 11 of the massive floating airfields, and when the 50-year-old USS Enterprise is retired this fall, said Daly, "we're going to go down to 10 deployable carriers between now and the time the Ford comes out in 2016." But carriers aren't the only ship in short supply.

Link & Brink: We need 11 aircraft carriers to support operations in the Strait of Hormuz and deter Iran

INDIAN EXPRESS 2012. “US to keep 11 aircraft carriers to project sea power against Iran,” 23 Jan 2012 <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-to-keep-11-aircraft-carriers-to-to-project-sea-power-against-iran/903009/0> (ellipses in original)

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told sailors aboard the country's oldest aircraft carrier that the US is committed to maintaining a fleet of 11 of the formidable warships despite budget pressures, in part to project sea power against Iran. Panetta also told the crowd of 1,700 gathered in the hangar bay of the USS Enterprise that the ship is heading to the Persian Gulf region and will steam through the Strait of Hormuz in a direct message to Tehran. Iran has warned it will block the Strait, a major transit point for global oil supplies, and bluntly told the US not to send carriers into the Gulf. The US has said it would continue to deploy ships there. "That's what this carrier is all about,'' said Panetta. "That's the reason we maintain a presence in the Middle East ... We want them to know that we are fully prepared to deal with any contingency and it's better for them to try to deal with us through diplomacy.'' There was speculation that budget pressures would force the Pentagon to scale back the number of carriers, perhaps to 10, and Panetta's predecessor, Robert Gates, questioned maintaining 11 ships.

Link: Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which carries 17 million barrels/day of oil. Aircraft carrier is our strategy for preventing it

David Blair 2012. (journalist) 23 Jan 2012 “Iran threatens to close Strait of Hormuz over EU oil sanctions” THE TELEGRAPH (British newspaper) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9032948/Iran-threatens-to-close-Strait-of-Hormuz-over-EU-oil-sanctions.html>

Britain, America and France delivered a pointed signal to Iran, sending six warships led by a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier through the highly sensitive waters of the Strait of Hormuz. The naval deployment, led by an aircraft carrier, defied explicit Iranian threats to close the waterway. It coincided with an escalation in the West's confrontation with Iran over the country's nuclear ambitions. The EU embargo on Iranian oil exports, amounts to the most significant package of sanctions yet agreed. They are also likely to impose a partial freeze on assets held by the Iranian Central Bank in the EU. Tehran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation. Tankers carrying 17 million barrels of oil pass through this waterway every day, accounting for 35 per cent of the world's seaborne crude shipments.

Link: US military action would be needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz and stabilize oil prices

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

Iranian threats to block oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, if acted upon, could disrupt the global energy supply and cause oil prices to spike. However, as this report suggests, this scenario is relatively short term. It leaves the oil-producing infrastructure intact, and prices would stabilize if military action, led by the United States, and a coordinated international response successfully restore security to the sea-lanes.

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy

Dr. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Kai-Wei Hsu 2012. (Chen - PhD economics; professor of economics at National Taiwan University; Hsu - economics department, National Taiwan University) Reverse Globalization: Does High Oil Price Volatility Discourage International Trade? Jan 2012, <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36182/1/MPRA_paper_36182.pdf>

It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with subsequent economic downturns. Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks are the main cause of recessions, Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.

5. Weaker US Navy

Link: Weaker US Navy means decline of US influence in the world

Seth Cropsey 2010. ( Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute; served as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy during both the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations) 1 Sept 2010 “Ebb Tide” <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7235>

Only one statement can be made with certainty about the future of the U.S. Navy: Its strength is a necessary precondition of U.S. continuance as a great power. A robust, globally distributed and technologically superior naval force does not ensure the future of American international preeminence, but a waning fleet composed of fewer and less fearsome vessels guarantees the decline of U.S. influence in the world. Venice, Spain, Holland, France and England learned the identical lesson over the past 500 years: The loss of seapower paralleled and was in large measure responsible for their decline as great powers.

Impact: Our commerce and security depend on naval power, and weakness invites aggression

Seth Cropsey 2010. ( Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute; served as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy during both the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations) 1 Sept 2010 “Ebb Tide” <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7235>

The Navy’s future looks troubled. That is a serious matter for a nation that depends increasingly on safe and unchallenged passage across the seas for commerce, security, crisis response and great-power reputation. There is nothing inevitable about this troubled future, however, any more than enmity with China is inevitable. But there is no better prod to the latter than the former. Weakness invites aggression—miscalculation, too.

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS - bad

No budget benefit: Defense isn’t driving federal deficits - you could eliminate national defense and still not solve the federal spending crisis

Ernest Istook 2011. (was a U.S. Congressman for 14 years and served on the National Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee) 31 May 2011 “The Constitutional Charge to Defend America” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/The-Constitutional-Charge-to-Defend-America>

As documented in The Heritage Foundation’s *2011 Budget Chart Book*, even eliminating all defense spending would not solve the federal spending crisis. Since 1976, annual entitlement spending has exceeded defense spending, even with the cost of wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Because entitlement spending has tripled while defense spending declined as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), entitlement spending (Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) is now 10 percent of GDP, whereas defense spending is only 5 percent.

Link: Further cuts in the Army will risk threats to national security

Brink: Status Quo is cutting the Army budget - any more cuts will deeply impact US national security

Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli 2011. (vice chief of staff of the Army) “Oct. 27, 2011 - VCSA testimony to HASC Subcommittee on military readiness, budget cuts” (even though Chiarelli’s name appears in the middle, the entire quote is from Gen. Chiarelli both before and after.) <http://www.army.mil/article/68210/Oct__27__2011___VCSA_testimony_to_HASC_Subcommittee_on_military_readiness__budget_cuts/>

I -- I'd like to leave you with three key points in my opening statement. The first is that we recognize budget cuts and corresponding reductions to force structure will be made. However, we must make them responsibly so that we do not end up with either a hollowed out force, and I can expand on that later on, or an unbalanced force. Our nation is in the midst of a fiscal crisis and we recognize we must all do our part. We are continuing to identify efficiencies. We worked very -- very hard on our capability portfolio review process, which have found many of those efficiencies and we will book many -- many more. When we appeared before the committee in July, we were looking at cuts in the vicinity of $450 billion over 10 years. If the Army's portion of that cut is at historical percentages, at about 26 percent, that will be in fact tough, but as the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff have said, it will be doable. I'm the vice. I get paid to worry about things and I worry our cut may be a little higher than that.

CHIARELLI:

And that causes me some angst. But above and beyond that will directly and deeply impact every part of our Army and our ability to meet our national security objectives and effectively protect our country against all threats. Whatever cuts are made carry risks.

“We need to cut the military to save the economy” – Response: History proves that’s a big mistake

Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli 2011. (vice chief of staff of the Army) “Oct. 27, 2011 - VCSA testimony to HASC Subcommittee on military readiness, budget cuts” (even though Chiarelli’s name appears in the middle, the entire quote is from Gen. Chiarelli both before and after.) <http://www.army.mil/article/68210/Oct__27__2011___VCSA_testimony_to_HASC_Subcommittee_on_military_readiness__budget_cuts/>

I was in Indianapolis recently, and I saw a war memorial to the war. Of course it was World War I, and we cut our Army down to just over 300,000 folks. Only to grow it to 8.5 million to fight that four year war. At the end of that war we cut our Army again, down to about 530,000 folks -- soldiers. Number sounds familiar I hope. And we ended up with the Korean War. And in the Korean War the first battle of that war was for the Army. Very famous task force with Smith. An ill equipped, ill trained force that had infantry battalions that were incomplete. Infantry battalions that were missing, and the results were predictable. And it's interesting to note that General Bradley when the cuts were talked about after World War II -- supported them. He -- he went on to say that the strength of the military depended on the economy, and we must not destroy that economy. But in his autobiography after the Korean War Bradley wrote, "My support of this decision, my belief that significantly higher defense spending would probably wreck the economy, was a mistake. Perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my post-war years in Washington." I went through an Army that came out of Vietnam, and did some of the same kind of things. And for 10 to 12 years we had to rebuild that Army. This -- these questions, these decisions have been made before, and there's just a tenancy to believe at the end of a war that we'll never need ground forces again. Well, I tell you that we've never got that right. We have always required them. We just don't have the imagination to always be able to predict exactly when that will be.

Link & Brink: Defense modernization is at risk due to budget cuts

Baker Spring 2011. (F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation; master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown Univ) An Unacceptable Squeeze on Defense Modernization 21 Dec 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/an-unacceptable-squeeze-on-defense-modernization>

The implications of the coming squeeze on defense modernization under the existing spending caps should cause great alarm for all concerned, particularly since it comes on the heels of the “procurement holiday” of the 1990s. The result will be a military that lacks the modern weapons and equipment it needs, loses its technological edge over future enemies, and finds itself dependent on a seriously eroded defense industrial base. Congress will have to take two essential steps to avoid a disastrous outcome for the military and U.S. security. First, it will have to increase the existing caps on spending for the core defense program and find savings elsewhere in the federal budget to offset this change, in accordance with Heritage’s December 5 recommendations.

Link: Maintaining the budget for US fighting forces is essential to US global leadership

Baker Spring 2011. (F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation; master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown Univ) An Unacceptable Squeeze on Defense Modernization 21 Dec 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/an-unacceptable-squeeze-on-defense-modernization>

Maintaining a U.S. fighting force that possesses modern weapons and equipment and retains its technological advantage is essential to the nation’s global leadership. Accordingly, the DOD will have to depart from the projected budget path that has been established for it by the Budget Control Act. This is the case even if the threatened sequestration under the Act is not triggered for the defense budget.

Impact: Risk of global conflicts. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

Impacts: 1) Small crises turn into major conflagrations; 2) Can’t do humanitarian relief missions

Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 2011. (assistant commandant of the Marine Corps) “Oct. 27, 2011 - VCSA testimony to HASC Subcommittee on military readiness, budget cuts” <http://www.army.mil/article/68210/Oct__27__2011___VCSA_testimony_to_HASC_Subcommittee_on_military_readiness__budget_cuts/>

When we went through the force structure review effort, we came up with a size Marine Corps of 186,800. That is a single major contingency operation force. So that force can respond to only one major contingency. One hundred and fifty thousand would put us below the level that's necessary to support the single contingency. The other thing I would -- I would think about is what amphibious forces have done over the past year. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief efforts in Pakistan. Supporting operations in Afghanistan with fixed wing aviation. Responding to the crisis with pirates on the M.V. Magellan Star. Supporting operations in Libya. Supporting our friends in the Philippines and Japan. And quite frankly at 150,000 Marines we're going to have to make some decisions. We will not be able to do those kinds of things on a day to day basis. We will not be able to meet the combatant commanders' requirements before deploying foreign engaged forces. Will not be there to deter our potential adversaries. We won't be there to assure our potential friends, or to our assure our allies. And we certainly won't be there to contain small crises before they become major conflagrations. So I think that 150,000 Marines I would offer there would be some significant risk both institutionally and inside the Marine Corps. Because we will be spending fast and causing our Marines to do more with less. But as importantly, perhaps more importantly, the responsiveness that we'll have -- combatant command as contingencies and crisis response will be significantly degraded.

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS – no problem

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (highest ranking military officer in the USA) says: National debt is a national security crisis

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD, Harvard; director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute ) Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea 23 Sept 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer>

No discussion of sequestration can begin without first looking at the financial situation that got America into this predicament. In the words of leaders who range from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of State, the United States faces a “national security crisis” when it comes to our economic security situation. The U.S. debt presently stands at $16 trillion and growing.

US defense budget is so big, it dwarfs the rest of the world – many of whom are US allies or not likely to be our enemies

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD, Harvard; director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute ) Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea 23 Sept 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer>

But to understand the actual impact that these cuts might have, including weighing the predictions that such a scenario would “destroy the US military” or mean the US would be “unable to keep up with potential adversaries,” it is useful to pull back and examine where the US defense budget stands in relation to the rest of the world. The U.S. is the only global superpower, with capabilities and responsibilities that dwarf any and every other state in the world. And, as the below charts show, the U.S. defense budget reflects that reality, outspending all other nations by a significant amount. What is notable about the scale of the U.S. budget is not just its relative size to other nations, but also how many other of the major players (albeit an order of magnitude smaller) are close U.S. allies, like the U.K. or Japan, or unlikely foes, like India or Brazil. Only two of the top ten, China and Russia could be put in the category of potential adversaries.

Even 10% or 30% cuts would not “destroy” the military nor invite aggression

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD, Harvard; director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute ) Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea 23 Sept 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer>

Yet, while the numbers of forces available obviously are worse in either a scenario of 10% or even 30% cuts to the U.S. forces, it’s still hard to see any connection to the nightmarish visions being painted of a “destroyed” military that “invites aggression.” And, again, these numbers only reflect what is available in East Asia on the first day of a conflict with North Korea, not forces that might be flowed in from other regions or deployed into action from the continental U.S. (such as long range strike planes and fighter jets based in the U.S. that would flow in by the literal hundreds after a conflict began).

“Defense Cuts Dangerous” Turn: Complaining about the impact of defense cuts can invite aggression. Example: N.Korea could believe we’re weak and attack

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD, Harvard; director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute ) Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea 23 Sept 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer>

One can easily see how South Korean leaders might be concerned when they hear American leaders say that sequestration would be “catastrophic” for the U.S. military and that “the gap between the U.S. military and our closest rivals will collapse with sequestration.” They share a border with North Korea, a rival that still considers itself to be in a state of war with the U.S., and in the past has reacted to what it perceived to be weakness with violent acts of aggression. Many, in fact, believe that the original Korean War back in 1950 was started when the North Koreans perceived U.S. weakness and withering alliance ties.

“Defense Cuts Dangerous” Turn: Cutting defense budget would make America safer

Dr. Christopher Preble 2011. ( PhD history, Temple Univ.; director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute ) 6 Apr 2011 “ A Plan B for Obama” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/11/a_plan_b_for_obama?page=0,8>

The United States could shed the burden of defending other countries that are able to defend themselves, abandon futile efforts to fix failed states, and focus on those security challenges that pose the greatest threat to America. A strategic shift of this magnitude will not only reduce conflict and make the United States safer, but it will enable Obama to reshape the military to suit this more modest set of objectives, at a price that's far easier for taxpayers to swallow.

Counter-terrorism efforts don’t require big military spending

Benjamin H. Friedman and Dr. Christopher Preble 2010. (Friedman - research fellow in defense and homeland security at Cato Institute; doctoral candidate in Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Preble - PhD history, Temple Univ.; director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute ) 23 Sept 2010 “Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint” [www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf)

Contrary to conventional wisdom, counterterrorism does not require much military spending. U.S. military forces are most useful in defeating well-armed enemies. Terrorists are mostly hidden and lightly armed. The difficulty is finding them, not killing or capturing them once they are found. The best weapons in that fight are intelligence and policing. The most useful military tools are relatively cheap niche capabilities: surveillance and intercept technologies, special operations forces, and drones.

DEFICIT SPENDING DISAD

Link: Affirmative raises the deficit by doing \_\_\_\_\_\_

Sudden Brink: Deficits can have a sudden tipping point that triggers a big financial crisis

Dr William Gale and Benjamin Harris 2011. (Gale - PhD in economics, Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center; former assistant professor in the Department of Economics at UCLA, and a senior economist for the Council of Economic Advisers under President George H.W. Bush; Harris - master’s degree in economics from Cornell University and a master’s degree in quantitative methods from Columbia University; senior research associate with the Economics Studies Program at the Brookings Institution) “A VAT for the United States: Part of the Solution” <http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/GALE-HARRIS-5.pdf/$file/GALE-HARRIS-5.pdf>

While short term fiscal stimulus can boost an otherwise slack economy, as it has over the past year and a half, large and persistent deficits will have deleterious effects that can materialize gradually or suddenly. The sudden scenario has been emphasized in the past (Ball and Mankiw 1995, Rubin et al. 2004) under considerably better fiscal conditions than exist today, and it has been highlighted recently by Burman et al. (2010). Under this scenario, investors’ fears about future deficits can reach a tipping point and trigger a financial crisis with potentially calamitous effects. Some analysts cite this potential sudden impact as the most important reason to avoid substantial ongoing budget deficits.

No Brink: Debt crisis doesn’t depend solely on the size of the debt

Congressional Budget Office 2010. “Federal Debt and the Risk of a Fiscal Crisis” 27 July 2010 <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/116xx/doc11659/07-27_Debt_FiscalCrisis_Brief.pdf>

Nonetheless, a review of fiscal crises in Argentina, Ireland, and Greece in the past decade reveals instructive common features and differences. For all three countries, the crises occurred abruptly and during recessions. However, the crises occurred at different levels of government debt relative to GDP, showing that the tipping point for a crisis does not depend solely on the debt-to-GDP ratio; the government’s long-term budget outlook, its near-term borrowing needs, and the health of the economy are also important.

**No Brink: The higher the debt, the greater the risk of a crisis. If we don’t act soon, risk of crisis will increase**

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM 2010. (bipartisan panel appointed by Pres. Obama in 2010 to write a report on ways to solve the imbalance in the federal budget; chaired by Sen. Alan Simpson, Former Republican Senator from Wyoming and Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff to President Clinton) Dec 2010, “THE MOMENT OF TRUTH - REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM” (brackets added) [www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12\_1\_2010.pdf](http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf)

Predicting the precise level of public debt that would trigger such a crisis is difficult, but a key factor may be whether the debt has been stabilized as a share of the economy or if it continues to rise. Investors, reluctant to risk throwing good money after bad, are sure to be far more concerned about rising debt than stable debt. In a recent briefing on the risk of a fiscal crisis, CBO [Congressional Budget Office] explained that while “there is no identifiable tipping point of debt relative to GDP indicating that a crisis is likely or imminent,” the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is “climbing into unfamiliar territory” and “the higher the debt, the greater the risk of such a crisis.” If we do not act soon to reassure the markets, the risk of a crisis will increase, and the options available to avert or remedy the crisis will both narrow and become more stringent. If we wait ten years, CBO projects our economy could shrink by as much as 2 percent, and spending cuts and tax increases needed to plug the hole could nearly double what is needed today. Continued inaction is not a viable option, and not an acceptable course for a responsible government.

Greek Scenario Link: Surging debt will bring the US to the Greek scenario of capital withdrawal, high interest rates and immediate reforms

Brian Riedl 2010. (bachelor's degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin, master's degree in public affairs from Princeton University; lead budget analyst at Heritage Foundation) 21 June 2010 “The Three Biggest Myths About Tax Cuts and the Budget Deficit” Backgrounder #2423 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/the-three-biggest-myths-about-tax-cuts-and-the-budget-deficit

The surging budget deficit will likely dominate the national economic debate for years to come. Even after the recession ends, persistent trillion-dollar deficits are projected to double the national debt by the end of the decade. In the absence of reform, the financial markets will eventually respond by withdrawing capital, pushing up interest rates, and demanding immediate budget reforms—much like Greece is currently experiencing.

Greek Scenario Impact: Nice people sifting through garbage cans and rioting in the streets...

Landon Thomas 2011. (journalist) NEW YORK TIMES 15 May 2011 Money Troubles Take Personal Toll in Greece <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/business/global/16drachma.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>

Evidence of the emotional and social shock was abundant in Athens last week. Even as I.M.F. and European banking officials worked with Greek officials to hash out the contours of a second bailout package, a nicely dressed middle-aged woman with silver buckles on her shoes sifted through the garbage cans outside the five-star hotels where many of these officials were staying. At dusk, riot police fired tear gas at rock-throwing protesters as tourists and workers on their way home took cover.

IMPACTS

Impacts: Deficits = lower savings rates, higher interest rates, reduced national income, reduced economic growth

Dr William Gale and Benjamin Harris 2011. (Gale - PhD in economics, Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center; former assistant professor in the Department of Economics at UCLA, and a senior economist for the Council of Economic Advisers under President George H.W. Bush; Harris - master’s degree in economics from Cornell University and a master’s degree in quantitative methods from Columbia University; senior research associate with the Economics Studies Program at the Brookings Institution) “A VAT for the United States: Part of the Solution” <http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/GALE-HARRIS-5.pdf/$file/GALE-HARRIS-5.pdf>

But even in the absence of a crisis, sustained deficits have deleterious effects, as they translate into lower national savings, higher interest rates, and increased indebtedness to foreign investors, all of which serve to reduce future national income. Gale and Orszag (2004a) estimate that a 1 percent of GDP increase in the deficit will raise interest rates by 25 to 35 basis points and reduce national saving by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points of GDP. Engen and Hubbard (2004) obtain similar results regarding interest rates.

Impact: Large debt = risk of exposure to foreign creditors and reduced standard of living

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM 2010. (bipartisan panel appointed by Pres. Obama in 2010 to write a report on ways to solve the imbalance in the federal budget; chaired by Sen. Alan Simpson, Former Republican Senator from Wyoming and Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff to President Clinton) Dec 2010, “THE MOMENT OF TRUTH - REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM” [www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12\_1\_2010.pdf](http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf)

Large debt will put America at risk by exposing it to foreign creditors. They currently own more than half our public debt, and the interest we pay them reduces our own standard of living. The single largest foreign holder of our debt is China, a nation that may not share our country’s aspirations and strategic interests. In a worst-case scenario, investors could lose confidence that our nation is able or willing to repay its loans – possibly triggering a debt crisis that would force the government to implement the most stringent of austerity measures.

DRUG WAR – Good

(some of the evidence in this brief was contributed by Matthew Baker)

LINKS: MILITARY DRUG WAR IS EFFECTIVE

Current Drug Policy has cut marijuana use over 50% since 1979

Dr. Robert L. Dupont 2010. (M.D. from Harvard Medical School, Partner at Bensinger Dupont and Associates, Ex-President of the Institute for Behavior and Health, and Ex-Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse), April 20, 2010, “Why We Should Not Legalize Marijuana” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267223/Why_We_Should_Not_Legalize_Marijuana>

“Contrary to the beliefs of those who advocate the legalization of marijuana, the current balanced, restrictive, and bipartisan drug policies of the United States are working reasonably well and they have contributed to reductions in the rate of marijuana use in our nation. The rate of current, past 30-day use of marijuana by Americans aged 12 and older in 1979 was 13.2 percent. In 2008 that figure stood at 6.1 percent. This 54-percent reduction in marijuana use over that 29-year period is a major public health triumph, not a failure.”

**US/International military cooperation is effective at removing illegal drugs**

*Rear Admiral Wayne Justice 2009. (Asst. Commandant for Capabilities, US Coast Guard) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, "Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction (brackets added)* [*http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\_1237405074399.shtm*](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1237405074399.shtm)

The Coast Guard has experienced recent record-setting years of illicit drug removals in the transit zone that can be directly attributed to law enforcement information and intelligence gleaned from OCDETF [Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force] investigations. JIATF-South [Joint Interagency Task Force] and Panama Express are models of cooperation among U.S. and cooperating nation military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities and demonstrates the tremendous increases in effectiveness and efficiency such creative collaboration can bring.

Military drug interdiction effective: They caught 229 metric tons of cocaine in 2010

Admiral Joe Nimmich 2011. (Rear Admiral, US Coast Guard, Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force South) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48204/html/CHRG-111hhrg48204.htm>

While focusing efforts on the transnational illicit threat, JIATF South has continued to disrupt record levels of cocaine bound for world markets, last year yielding 229 metric tons, statistically, 41 percent of the world's cocaine seizures and disruptions. This translates into the removal of $4.5 billion worth of cocaine, and this also reflects the removal of 71 hits of cocaine for each and every U.S. high school student.

BRINK: Without US involvement, drug interdiction will fail

Central and South American countries are trying to fight drug trafficking, but need help – they don’t have the resources to do it effectively

Admiral Joe Nimmich 2011. (Rear Admiral, US Coast Guard, Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force South) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48204/html/CHRG-111hhrg48204.htm>

As far as the partner countries, within their capacity, they operate as well as can be expected. Most of the countries in Central and South America have very little capacity and, with the downturn in the economy, find themselves even strapped for something as simple as the gasoline to run their boats. When they have the capacity, they respond and they respond in a very effective manner. There is not a country in the region that I have not had a report on that actually entered into a firefight in order to prevent the drug cartels from moving their product. These are people who put their lives at risk in terms of actually being shot trying to interdict the drug cartels.

IMPACTS – INTERNATIONAL / POLITICAL / VIOLENCE

Impact: Illegal drugs are a big maritime security threat and big threat to public safety

*Rear Admiral Wayne Justice 2009. (Asst. Commandant for Capabilities, US Coast Guard) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, "Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction (ellipses in original)* [*http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\_1237405074399.shtm*](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1237405074399.shtm)

The influx of illegal drugs is one of America’s greatest maritime-security threats. The National Drug Intelligence Center’s National Drug Threat Assessment for 2009 identifies cocaine as the leading drug threat to the United States. National law enforcement and drug use surveys show that the adverse impact to the nation’s communities, families, and individuals caused by the distribution and abuse of powder and crack cocaine exceeds that caused by all other drugs. At the first-ever meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Safety of the Americas, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, warned that the biggest threat to public safety in the Americas comes from drug trafficking and the violence perpetuated by organized crime…he correctly called drug trafficking a “hemispheric security issue.”

Impact: Drug trafficking organizations are violent, commit thousands of murders

*Rear Admiral Wayne Justice 2009. (Asst. Commandant for Capabilities, US Coast Guard) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, "Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction* [*http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony\_1237405074399.shtm*](http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1237405074399.shtm)

Mr. Costa correctly noted that the Americas face the world’s biggest drug problem – whether we measure it in hectares of cultivation, tons of production, its market value or even by the gruesome number of people killed. In the Western Hemisphere, powerful Drug Trafficking Organizations, which I’ll refer to as DTOs, challenge the authority of democratic institutions, undermine the rule of law, and threaten public safety and national security. A vivid demonstration of the evil wrought by powerful DTOs is playing out in plain view along our shared border with Mexico. During 2008, over 5,000 murders in Mexico were attributed to DTO violence and many public officials, police officers, news reporters and citizens who spoke out and worked against the DTOs were targeted for kidnapping and assassination. DTO violence isn’t isolated to Mexico and threatens public safety throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Impact: Drugs and drug-related violence are killing people every day

Admiral Joe Nimmich 2011. (Rear Admiral, US Coast Guard, Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force South) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48204/html/CHRG-111hhrg48204.htm>

Mr. Chairman, today, 71 Americans will lose their lives to illicit drugs. Nineteen will be the direct result of cocaine. These Americans come from all walks of life; rich and poor, young and old, rural and urban. And as the Chairman pointed out, inner cities bear the largest burden. Also, nearly 17 Mexican citizens will be executed today in never before seen gang violence against each other and Mexican law enforcement and military.

Impact: Drug cartel violence. US military fighting drugs south of Mexico cuts drug cartel funding for violence

Admiral Joe Nimmich 2011. (Rear Admiral, US Coast Guard, Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force South) 11 Mar 2009 testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48204/html/CHRG-111hhrg48204.htm>

Sir, we have known about and worked on those routes for a considerable length of time. JIATF South, as well as the interagency partners, are part of the ongoing surge efforts now both in San Diego and around the Brownsville, Texas area. Those are areas we are going to need to continue to watch. The real answer for me, sir, in the world I operate in is preventing the drugs from getting in Mexico in the first place, and that is what we do in the transit zone, when those drugs are in the multi-ton load, where you have the most impact. Once they enter Mexico, even across the borders in terms of Brownsville, they come in 100 kilos, 50 kilos, 75 kilos. It takes far more infrastructure to be able to interdict them. So I focus on trying to take out the largest loads before they get to Guatemala and Mexico. If we can be successful in that, that eliminates the benefit to the drug cartels and eliminates their ability to fund the violence.

Impact: Drug trafficking in West Africa threatens peace, stability and democracy in the region

William Wechsler 2009. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats) Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee <http://www.scribd.com/doc/22602725/The-threat-of-drug-trafficking-in-West-Africa-Testimony-Before-the-Senate-Foreign-Relations-Committee>

Narcotics trafficking in West Africa is not a new phenomenon, but the unprecedented growth in trafficking since 2005 demonstrates that West Africa is now firmly tied into international trafficking patterns and is being systematically targeted by international drug trafficking organizations, principally from South America. While the direct threat to the U.S. is limited, this trafficking problem endangers peace, development, stability and democracy in West Africa and poses an increasing threat to both our African and European partners.

Impact: Drug trafficking in West Africa seriously impacts US Dept of Defense goals of stability and reconstruction in the region

William Wechsler 2009. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats) Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee <http://www.scribd.com/doc/22602725/The-threat-of-drug-trafficking-in-West-Africa-Testimony-Before-the-Senate-Foreign-Relations-Committee>

In accordance with NSPD 50, the national security goals for Africa include building capacity, consolidating democratic transition, bolstering fragile states, strengthening regional security and providing humanitarian and developmental assistance. The Department of Defense strategy for achieving these goals include reducing threats that flow from ungoverned areas of weak and fragile states, countering humanitarian tragedies that often arise from conflict, ethnic tensions and extreme poverty, working with our partners to build capacity and reduce threats by promoting reform and professionalism in African militaries, and by fostering stability and assisting in reconstruction. Together with regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and partner countries such as Senegal and Ghana we have worked to raise regional peacekeeping capabilities. The recent explosive growth in narcotics trafficking in West Africa seriously impacts our strategy and goals.

Impact: Drug-related violence undermines progress on nation-building in West Africa

William Wechsler 2009. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats) Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee <http://www.scribd.com/doc/22602725/The-threat-of-drug-trafficking-in-West-Africa-Testimony-Before-the-Senate-Foreign-Relations-Committee>

The recent explosive growth in narcotics trafficking in West Africa seriously impacts our strategy and goals. We have seen how drug traffickers on other continents work to corrupt politicians, militaries and the judicial process. They are using the same tactics in Africa. West Africa has made great progress since the horrendous civil wars at the turn of this century. The corruption and violence associated with the drug trade can rapidly undermine the progress made in the region. What we see as vulnerabilities in Africa the traffickers see as opportunities. Drug related corruption and violence will undermine overall U.S. regional strategy and weaken African militaries unless the traffickers can be convinced now, while they are still establishing their networks, that West Africa, and the rest of the continent is not open for their business.

IMPACTS – DRUG USE

Impact: Marijuana currently the leading cause of substance abuse

Dr. Robert L. Dupont 2010. (M.D. from Harvard Medical School, Partner at Bensinger Dupont and Associates, Ex-President of the Institute for Behavior and Health, and Ex-Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse), April 20, 2010, “Why We Should Not Legalize Marijuana” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267223/Why_We_Should_Not_Legalize_Marijuana>

“Marijuana is currently the leading cause of substance dependence other than alcohol in the U.S. In 2008, marijuana use accounted for 4.2 million of the 7 million people aged 12 or older classified with dependence on or abuse of an illicit drug. This means that about two thirds of Americans suffering from any substance use disorder are suffering from marijuana abuse or marijuana dependence.”

Hazardous Driving

Dr. Robert L. Dupont 2010. (M.D. from Harvard Medical School, Partner at Bensinger Dupont and Associates, Ex-President of the Institute for Behavior and Health, and Ex-Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse), April 20, 2010, “Why We Should Not Legalize Marijuana” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267223/Why_We_Should_Not_Legalize_Marijuana>

Drug-impaired driving will also increase if marijuana is legalized. Marijuana is already a significant causal factor in highway crashes, injuries and deaths. In a recent national roadside survey of weekend nighttime drivers, 8.6 percent tested positive for marijuana or its metabolites, nearly four times the percentage of drivers with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08 g/dL (2.2 percent).”

Marijuana can cause dependence, respiratory problems, mental illness, poor motor performance and cognitive impairment

R. Gil Kerlikowske 2010. (Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), March 4, 2010, “Why Marijuana Legalization Would Compromise Public Health and Public Safety,” Annoted Remarks, Office of National Drug Control Policy, <http://ondcp.gov/news/speech10/030410_Chief.pdf>

“The concern with marijuana is not born out of any culture-war mentality, but out of what the science tells us about the drug’s effects. And the science, though still evolving, is clear: marijuana use is harmful. It is associated with dependence, respiratory and mental illness, poor motor performance, and cognitive impairment, among other negative effects.”

Studies show marijuana has harmful health effects

R. Gil Kerlikowske 2010 Annoted Comments. (Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), March 4, 2010, “Why Marijuana Legalization Would Compromise Public Health and Public Safety,” Annoted Remarks, Office of National Drug Control Policy, <http://ondcp.gov/news/speech10/030410_Chief.pdf>

“Moore and colleagues (2005) summed up the literature on respiratory illnesses and marijuana in the *7*See Moore, B.A., et al, Respiratory effects of marijuana and tobacco use in a U.S. sample, *Journal of General Internal Medicine* 20(1):33-37, 2005. Also see Tashkin, D.P., Smoked marijuana as a cause of lung injury, *Monaldi Archives for Chest Disease* 63(2):93-100, 2005. Other evidence on the effect of marijuana on lung function and the respiratory system, and the link with mental illness, can be found in expert reviews offered by Hall W.D, and Pacula R.L. (2003), *Cannabis use and dependence: Public health and public policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press., and Room, R., Fischer, B., Hall, W., Lenton, S., and Reuter, P. (2009), *Cannabis Policy: Moving beyond stalemate,* The Global Cannabis Commission Report, the Beckley Foundation. Room et al. write, “Cannabis use and psychotic symptoms are associated in general population surveys and the relationship persists after adjusting for confounders. The best evidence that these associations may be causal comes from longitudinal studies of large representative cohorts.” Also see Degenhardt, L. & Hall, W. (2006), Is cannabis a contributory cause of psychosis? *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, 51: 556-565. A major study examining young people and, importantly, a subset of sibling pairs was released in February 2010 and concluded that marijuana use at a young age significantly increased the risk of psychosis in young adulthood. See McGrath, J., et al. (2010), Association between cannabis use and psychosis-related outcomes using sibling pair analysis in a cohort of young adults, *Archives of General Psychiatry*.”

Thousands visiting emergency rooms b/c of marijuana

*R. Gil Kerlikowske 2010. (Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), March 4, 2010, “Why Marijuana Legalization Would Compromise Public Health and Public Safety,” Annoted Remarks, Office of National Drug Control Policy,* [*http://ondcp.gov/news/speech10/030410\_Chief.pdf*](http://ondcp.gov/news/speech10/030410_Chief.pdf)

“We know that over 120,000 people who showed up voluntarily at treatment facilities in 2007 reported marijuana as their primary substance of abuse. Additionally, in 2008 marijuana was involved in 374,000 emergency visits nationwide.”

Marijuana different from alcohol

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Alcohol differs from marijuana in several crucial respects. First, marijuana is far more likely to cause addiction. Second, it is usually consumed to the point of intoxication. Third, it has no known general healthful properties, though it may have some palliative effects. Fourth, it is toxic and deleterious to health. Thus, while it is true that both alcohol and marijuana are less intoxicating than other mood-altering drugs, that is not to say that marijuana is especially similar to alcohol or that its use is healthy or even safe.”

Marijuana harms the lungs, makes heart attacks more likely, can result in birth defects, brain damage, and stroke

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“For example, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (a division of the National Institutes of Health) has released studies showing that use of marijuana has wide-ranging negative health effects. Long-term marijuana consumption “impairs the ability of T-cells in the lungs’ immune system to fight off some infections.” These studies have also found that marijuana consumption impairs short-term memory, making it difficult to learn and retain information or perform complex tasks; slows reaction time and impairs motor coordination; increases heart rate by 20 percent to 100 percent, thus elevating the risk of heart attack; and alters moods, resulting in artificial euphoria, calmness, or (in high doses) anxiety or paranoia. And it gets worse: Marijuana has toxic properties that can result in birth defects, pain, respiratory system damage, brain damage, and stroke.”

THC stays in someone’s system for days or even weeks after consumption

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Unlike alcohol, marijuana has been shown to have a residual effect on cognitive ability that persists beyond the period of intoxication. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, whereas alcohol is broken down relatively quickly in the human body, THC (tetrahydrocannabinol, the main active chemical in marijuana) is stored in organs and fatty tissues, allowing it to remain in a user’s body for days or even weeks after consumption. Research has shown that marijuana consumption may also cause “psychotic symptoms.””

Marijuana worse than tobacco smoke

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Marijuana’s effects on the body are profound. According to the British Lung Foundation, “smoking three or four marijuana joints is as bad for your lungs as smoking twenty tobacco cigarettes.” Researchers in Canada found that marijuana smoke contains significantly higher levels of numerous toxic compounds, like ammonia and hydrogen cyanide, than regular tobacco smoke. In fact, the study determined that ammonia was found in marijuana smoke at levels of up to 20 times the levels found in tobacco. Similarly, hydrogen cyanide was found in marijuana smoke at concentrations three to five times greater than those found in tobacco smoke.”

Prolonged Marijuana use is associated with lower test scores and lower educational attainment

R. Gil Kerlikowske 2010. (Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), March 4, 2010, “Why Marijuana Legalization Would Compromise Public Health and Public Safety,” Annoted Remarks, Office of National Drug Control Policy, <http://ondcp.gov/news/speech10/030410_Chief.pdf>

“Marijuana negatively affects users in other ways, too. For example, prolonged use is associated with lower test scores and lower educational attainment because during periods of intoxication the drug affects the ability to learn and process information, thus influencing attention, concentration, and short-term memory.”

Marijuana dependence can produce compulsive behavior and withdrawal

R. Gil Kerlikowske 2010. (Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), March 4, 2010, “Why Marijuana Legalization Would Compromise Public Health and Public Safety,” Annoted Remarks, Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://isite.lps.org/jshan/web/Obama.swf

“Several studies have shown that marijuana dependence is real and causes harm. We know that more than 30 percent of past-year marijuana users age 18 and older are classified as dependent on the drug, and that the past-year prevalence of marijuana dependence in the US population is higher than that for any other illicit drug. Those dependent on marijuana often show signs of withdrawal and compulsive behavior.”

Marijuana may alter nervous system to promote violence

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Although some studies have shown marijuana to inhibit aggressive behavior and violence, the National Research Council concluded that the “long-term use of marijuana may alter the nervous system in ways that do promote violence.” No place serves as a better example than Amsterdam. Marijuana advocates often point to the Netherlands as a well-functioning society with a relaxed attitude toward drugs, but they rarely mention that Amsterdam is one of Europe’s most violent cities. In Amsterdam, officials are in the process of closing marijuana dispensaries, or “coffee shops,” because of the crime associated with their operation. Furthermore, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport has expressed “concern about drug and alcohol use among young people and the social consequences, which range from poor school performance and truancy to serious impairment, including brain damage.”

vi) Economy

Bad smells, crime, and driving down property values

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Legalization of marijuana would also inflict a series of negative consequences on neighborhoods and communities. The nuisance caused by the powerful odor of mature marijuana plants is already striking California municipalities. The City Council of Chico, California, has released a report detailing the situation and describing how citizens living near marijuana cultivators are disturbed by the incredible stink emanating from the plants. Perhaps worse than the smell, crime near growers is increasing, associated with “the theft of marijuana from yards where it is being grown.” As a result, housing prices near growers are sinking.”

Marijuana could sap productivity and boost health care costs

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Marijuana use is associated with cognitive difficulties and influences attention, concentration, and short-term memory. This damage affects drug users’ ability to work and can put others at risk. Even if critical workers—for example, police officers, airline pilots, and machine operators—used marijuana recreationally but remained sober on the job, the longterm cognitive deficiency that remained from regular drug use would sap productivity and place countless people in danger. Increased use would also send health care costs skyrocketing—costs borne not just by individual users, but also by the entire society.”

The costs associated with problems from increased use would outweigh any tax revenue

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“In sum, legalization would put additional strain on an already faltering economy. In 2008, marijuana alone was involved in 375,000 emergency room visits. Drug overdoses already outnumber gunshot deaths in America and are approaching motor vehicle crashes as the nation’s leading cause of accidental death. It is true that taxing marijuana sales would generate some tax revenue, but the cost of handling the influx of problems resulting from increased use would far outweigh any gain made by marijuana’s taxation. Legalizing marijuana would serve only to compound the problems already associated with drug use.”

vii) Gateway Drug

Marijuana a gateway drug that is strongly correlated with cocaine use

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“Citizens also should not overlook what may be the greatest harms of marijuana legalization: increased addiction to and use of harder drugs. In addition to marijuana’s harmful effects on the body and relationship to criminal conduct, it is a gateway drug that can lead users to more dangerous drugs. Prosecutors, judges, police officers, detectives, parole or probation officers, and even defense attorneys know that the vast majority of defendants arrested for violent crimes test positive for illegal drugs, including marijuana. They also know that marijuana is the starter drug of choice for most criminals. Whereas millions of Americans consume moderate amounts of alcohol without ever “moving on” to dangerous drugs, marijuana use and cocaine use are strongly correlated.”

Lower marijuana prices increase the prevalence of cocaine

Charles D. Stimson 2010. (Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor), September 13, 2010, “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/lm0056.pdf>

“While correlation does not necessarily reflect causation, and while the science is admittedly mixed as to whether it is the drug itself or the people the new user associates with who cause the move on to cocaine, heroin, LSD, or other drugs, the RAND Corporation reports that marijuana prices and cocaine use are directly linked, suggesting a substitution effect between the two drugs. Moreover, according to RAND, legalization will cause marijuana prices to fall as much as 80 percent. That can lead to significant consequences because “a 10-percent decrease in the price of marijuana would increase the prevalence of cocaine use by 4.4 to 4.9 percent.” As cheap marijuana floods the market both in and outside of California, use of many different types of drugs will increase, as will marijuana use.”

GENERIC: HEGEMONY - bad

by Matthew Baker

HEGEMONY DOES NOT EXIST

A) RISING CHINA

America is competing but losing in the geopolitical marketplace

PARAG KHANNA 2008. (Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, US Special Operations Forces Advisor) January 2008. PARAG KHANNA, (2008 senior geopolitical advisor to United States Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relation, a widely recognized expert on global politics, offers a study of the 21st century’s emerging geopolitical marketplace dominated by three first world superpowers, the U.S., Europe and China.), January 27, 2008, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony ," New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html>

“At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.

China challenging US dominant authority

Prof. Earl Fry, 2010. ((Professor of Political Science and Endowed Professor of Canadian Studies at Brigham Young University. During his long career, he has served as Special Assistant in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and as Fulbright Professor at the Sorbonne and the University of Toronto. Some of his earlier books include America the Vincible: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century (1994); The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs (1998); and The Urban Response to Internationalization), 2010, "Lament for America: Decline of the Superpower, Plan for Renewal," [Accessed Google Documents], <http://books.google.com/books?id=kZQskXwg3kUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=earl+fry&hl=en&ei=gApjTMb3FYP98Ab605DgCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false>

“The second factor is the rise of new competitors challenging U.S. ascendancy in an increasingly interdependent global setting. China's explosive growth should permit it to surpass the U.S. as the world's largest economy in roughly two decades. The European Union, with twenty-seven nation states and a half a billion people is also becoming a more prominent international economic and political actor, and the euro may one day challenge the U.S. dollar as the worlds major trade and reserve currency. India, Japan, Brazil, Russia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are among the other countries or groups of countries that might exert a larger voice in international decision-making within the next few decades. Even if the U.S. economy continues to grow, its portion of the global economic pie will shrink, and it will be viewed as a major country among several major countries or blocs of countries, but not as a nation-stat exerting the dominant authority of a so-called "unipolar power".

B) Economic Decline

1/2 of US federal debt in foreign hands with 22% in China’s hands

NIALL FERGUSON 2010. (MA, D.Phil, Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School), July 29, 2010, "Decline and fall of the US," The Age:National Times, <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/decline-and-fall-of-the-us-20100728-10w1x.html>

For now, the world still expects the US to muddle through, eventually confronting its problems when, as Winston Churchill famously said, all the alternatives have been exhausted. With the sovereign debt crisis in Europe combining with growing fears of a deflationary double-dip recession, bond yields are at historic lows. There is therefore a strong incentive for those in the US Congress to put off fiscal reform. Remember, half the US federal debt in public hands is in the hands of foreign creditors. Of that, a fifth (22 per cent) is held by the monetary authorities of the People's Republic of China, down from 27 per cent in July last year. China now has the second-largest economy in the world and is almost certain to be America's principal strategic rival this century, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

High debt should rings alarm bells for U.S. hegemony

*NIALL FERGUSON 2010. (MA, D.Phil, Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business School), July 29, 2010, "Decline and fall of the US," The Age:National Times,* <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/decline-and-fall-of-the-us-20100728-10w1x.html>

The most obvious point is that imperial falls are associated with fiscal crises - sharp imbalances between revenues and expenditures, and the mounting cost of servicing a mountain of public debt. Think of Ottoman Turkey in the 19th century: debt service rose from 17 per cent of revenue in 1868 to 32 per cent in 1871 to 50 per cent in 1877, two years after the great default that ushered in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Consider Britain in the 20th century. By the mid 1920s, debt charges were absorbing 44.5 per cent of total government expenditure, exceeding defence expenditure every year until 1937, when rearmament finally got under way in earnest. But Britain's real problems came after 1945, when a substantial proportion of its immense debt burden - equivalent to about a third of gross domestic product - was in foreign hands. Alarm bells should therefore be ringing loudly in Washington, as the US contemplates a deficit for 2010 of more than $US1.47 trillion - about 10 per cent of gross domestic product, for the second year running.

C) Future Trends

By 2025 U.S. relative strength will become more constrained

Prof. Earl Fry, 2010. Earl H. Fry, ((Professor of Political Science and Endowed Professor of Canadian Studies at Brigham Young University. During his long career, he has served as Special Assistant in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and as Fulbright Professor at the Sorbonne and the University of Toronto. Some of his earlier books include America the Vincible: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century (1994); The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs (1998); and The Urban Response to Internationalization), 2010, "Lament for America: Decline of the Superpower, Plan for Renewal," [Accessed Google Documents], <http://books.google.com/books?id=kZQskXwg3kUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=earl+fry&hl=en&ei=gApjTMb3FYP98Ab605DgCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Historians of the future will likely refer to the United Stats as having been the foremost superpower in human history, or at least the most powerful since the legendary Roman empire. Sadly for its own citizens and many of its allies abroad, the United Stats is currently a superpower and in the throes of decline. America's National Intelligence Council predicts that by 2025 the international system "will be almost unrecognizable" with "an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from west to east." The report adds that "the United States" relative strength-even in the military realm-will decline and U.S. leverage will become more constrained".

D) Regionalism

New Trade Relations giving rise to Post-Hegemonic Era

Prof. Richard Falk & Terrence Paupp 2009. ( Falk - is an American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, writer (the author or co-author of 20 books), appointee to two United Nations positions on the Palestinian territories), Terrence Edward Paupp (Pauppis - Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington;, he served as National Chancellor of the United States for an NGO operating under the auspices of the United Nations called The International Association of Educators for World Peace; served as Vice-president of the Association of World Citizens (AWC). He has authored numerous articles on human and civil rights, nuclear disarmament, Latin American affairs and US foreign policy in the global south.), July 1st, 2009, "The future of global relations: crumbling walls, rising regions," <http://books.google.com/books?id=a6-H50KN0BEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Future+of+Global+Relations+by+Terrence+Edward+Paupp&hl=en&ei=1pRkTL79MIWclge96JWWCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false>

hroughout this book, I refer to this new phase of struggle for a world order as one that purposefully advances the often-neglected developmental goals of the global South. Evidence pointing toward the regional development of this new Post-Hegemonic Era is already emerging on every major continent of the world in the form of maturing regional organizations, new regional trade relationships within and between regional powers, and among many different centers of economic and political power. Therefore, in order to understand the trends that are creating a Post-Hegemonic Era, this book is dedicated to explaining how and why a multicentric world of rising regions is coming into being. Such an undertaking is especially critical at a time when the embryonic attributes and features of a new multicentric or multipolar world order is already visible and is already connecting China with Africa and Latin America, as well as India with Africa, South and East Asia, New bonds are being forged between Latin America and the European Union, and common security and energy policies have begun to be created between Russia, Eurasia and the Middle East.

E) Overstretch

Financial Deficit and Military Over-Extension Leave U.S. Vulnerable to Power Decline

Prof. Richard Falk & Terrence Paupp 2009. ( Falk - is an American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, writer (the author or co-author of 20 books), appointee to two United Nations positions on the Palestinian territories), Terrence Edward Paupp (Pauppis - Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington;, he served as National Chancellor of the United States for an NGO operating under the auspices of the United Nations called The International Association of Educators for World Peace; served as Vice-president of the Association of World Citizens (AWC). He has authored numerous articles on human and civil rights, nuclear disarmament, Latin American affairs and US foreign policy in the global south.), July 1st, 2009, "The future of global relations: crumbling walls, rising regions," <http://books.google.com/books?id=a6-H50KN0BEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Future+of+Global+Relations+by+Terrence+Edward+Paupp&hl=en&ei=1pRkTL79MIWclge96JWWCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false>

The decline of America's global power is already in progress. The capacity and long-term ability of the United States to continue as a unilateral superpower is over. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent U.S. occupation, the global community has been alienated and estranged by the exercise of American hegemony on the world stage. In tandem with the abuses wrought by the intervention of American military power, there has been a corresponding and parallel over-extension of it, which has strained both its fighting capacity and the nation's budgetary capability. Growing financial deficits in combination with military over-extension have left the nation vulnerable to the historical forces of great power decline.

HEGEMONY BAD

A) ANTI - AMERICANISM

U.S Hegemony created Al-Qaeda

Prof. CHANDRA MUZAFFAR 2007. (First Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya. He then became the Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia (USM) in Penang), 2007, "HEGEMONY, TERRORISM, AND WAR—IS DEMOCRACY THE ANTIDOTE?," Widener Law Review, Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>

Al-Qaeda, the world’s most notorious terrorist network, was, in a sense, a response to the most obvious manifestation of global hegemony, namely, military power. As soon as the United States had established a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991, immediately after the Kuwait War, the al- Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, announced to the world that he would attack Dhahran. He considered the establishment of an “infidel” military base in Islam’s holiest land—Saudi Arabia, where Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Media, are situated—an act of sacrilege.1 In June 1996, al-Qaeda was allegedly involved in a bomb attack upon the base, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 250 others. Two years later, al-Qaeda targeted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This was followed by the 2000 assault on a U.S. warship, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen. The climax was of course the infamous 9-11 episode when al-Qaeda operatives allegedly smashed aircrafts into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Almost three thousand men and women were massacred in those horrendous tragedies on the eleventh of September 2001. There is no need to emphasize that the WTC was a symbol of U.S.’s global economic power while the Pentagon represented its global military might.”

U.S. hegemony continues to provoke terrorists

Prof. CHANDRA MUZAFFAR 2007 (First Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya. He then became the Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia (USM) in Penang), 2007, "HEGEMONY, TERRORISM, AND WAR—IS DEMOCRACY THE ANTIDOTE?," Widener Law Review, Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>

After 9-11, U.S. global hegemony continued to provoke al-Qaeda and other terrorist outfits. Since the U.S. and its allies had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to oust the Taliban regime that was protecting Osama, the invasion became the justification for further terrorist attacks. The Bali bombings of October 2002, purportedly carried out by a group affiliated withal-Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyyah, were primarily to avenge the Afghan invasion. The n in March 2003, the U.S. and its allies embarked upon a second military invasion. This time the target was Iraq. One year after Iraq was conquered, al-Qaeda struck again; it was responsible for a dastardly carnage at a Madrid railway station. The unconcealed aim was to compel the Spanish government to withdraw its soldiers from the U.S. led force in Iraq. Al-Qaeda succeeded in its objective. If we reflect upon al-Qaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar screen.

US hegemony fuels al-Qaeda

Prof. CHANDRA MUZAFFAR 2007 (First Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya. He then became the Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia (USM) in Penang), 2007, "HEGEMONY, TERRORISM, AND WAR—IS DEMOCRACY THE ANTIDOTE?," Widener Law Review, Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>

“It may be appropriate at this point to ask: if American hegemony comes to an end, will al-Qaeda terrorism also cease to exist? Without American hegemony, al-Qaeda will lose much of its constituency. That segment of the Muslim population that applauds Osama because he is prepared to stand up to the arrogance of hegemonic power will disappear immediately. Besides, it will be more difficult for al-Qaeda to recruit its operatives. In this regard, it is the U.S. led occupation of Iraq—more than any other event—that has accelerated al-Qaeda’s recruitment drive! Having said that, we must nonetheless concede that even without U.S. hegemony, al-Qaeda may still be around. It nurses a foolish dream of establishing a global Islamic Caliphate based upon its doctrinaire Wahabist ideology—an ideology that dichotomizes the world into pure Muslims and impure infidels, deprives women of their dignity, subscribes to a bigoted, punitive concept of law, and has no qualms about employing violence in pursuit of its atavistic goals.

B) UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE

U.S. hegemony through the UNSC blocks democracy and perpetuates injustice

Prof. CHANDRA MUZAFFAR 2007 (First Director of the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue at the University of Malaya. He then became the Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia (USM) in Penang), 2007, "HEGEMONY, TERRORISM, AND WAR—IS DEMOCRACY THE ANTIDOTE?," Widener Law Review, Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>

“In fact, existing global institutions more often than not only serve to perpetuate global hegemony. This is particularly true of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While it formally concentrates power in the five veto-wielding permanent members, the UNSC, in reality, is dominated by the U.S. both in theory and in practice, it is that one global institution which is the biggest stumbling block to the emergence of global democracy. Time and again, the U.S. has used and abused its power over the UNSC to prevent the world body from acting effectively against injustices especially in the context of the Middle East.”

C) ECONOMY

Quest for hegemony = instability, decreased legitimacy, and strain on economic resources

Prof. Ronald Steel, October 2006. (Professor of International Relations and History, Univ Of Southern Calif.), October 6, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq's future impact on the future US foreign defense policy, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11680/iraqs_impact_on_the_future_of_us_foreign_and_defense_policy.html>

“So the quest for hegemony, I think, is not bringing about a more stable world. It’s not defending American interests. It undermines American legitimacy, on which our whole global role and our alliance system rests. It strains our economic and political resources. We are living on a credit card economy not only domestically but in terms of foreign policy as well, with the Asian creditors. And it raises anxieties, a feeling of threat, by—on the part of other nations. It has provided, I think—rather than reassurance, it’s provided fodder for enemies.”

Imperialism impoverishes all but the elites in society

Dr. Mark Thornton 2009 ( Ph.D. from Auburn University. Thornton taught economics at Auburn University for a number of years, additionally serving as founding faculty advisor for the Auburn University Libertarians. He also served on the faculty of Columbus State University, and is now a senior fellow and resident faculty member at the Ludwig von Mises Institute), November 9th, 2006, "Financing the Empire," Ludwig von Mises Institue, <http://mises.org/daily/2369>

“Imperialism is inherently expensive, nonproductive, and unprofitable. Imperialism therefore cannot be justified with the idea that it helps the domestic population because only a tiny minority of elites benefit, but it impoverishes the rest of society. The beneficiaries include government contractors, ego-crazed politicians, and mercantilist business enterprises.

D) SECURITY

Hegemony makes U.S. less secure: terrorism, balancing, and overstretch

Dr. Christopher Layne 2006 (Christopher Layne, PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M Univ. An international relations theorist, he is a noted neorealist and critic of liberal internationalism.), 2006, "The Peace of Illusions," <http://books.google.com/books?id=baGI7O3wd5kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+peace+of+illusions&hl=en&ei=LNZlTL-gBMWclgfnv5CMDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false>

“When great powers chose between (or among) alternative grand strategies, the important question is which is likely to yield the most security. In the history of the modern international system, some great powers have had little choice but to seek security by trying for hegemony, but the United States has not been one of them. In fact, far from bolstering its security, its hegemonic grand strategy renders the United States less secure. First, over time – and I concede that “how long” is an important question – new great powers will emerge (or old ones, like Russia, will revive), and balance against U.S. dominance. Second, U.S. hegemony fuels terrorism against the United States by groups such as al Qaeda. In this respect, 9/11 itself is a reminder that U.S. predominance has spawned new, “asymmetric” responses to U.S. military preponderance. Third, until new poles of power emerge to offset U.S. preponderance, the United States will succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation” – employing its formidable military promiscuously and becoming entangled in conflicts that it could avoid. Finally, over time, a hegemonic grand strategy will lead to the enervation of U.S. power (imperial overstretch). The United States can escape these consequences by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.”

E) Overstretch

Hegemony Leads to Over extension and Imperial Overstretch

Dr. Christopher Layne 2006 (Christopher Layne, PhD is Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M Univ. An international relations theorist, he is a noted neorealist and critic of liberal internationalism.), 2006, "The Peace of Illusions," <http://books.google.com/books?id=baGI7O3wd5kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+peace+of+illusions&hl=en&ei=LNZlTL-gBMWclgfnv5CMDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false>

There is another road to U.S. overextension: the United States could succumb—and, arguably, has—to the “hegemon’s temptation.” The hegemon’s temptation is caused by the imbalance of power in its favor. Conscious both of its overwhelming military superiority and of the fact that no other great powers are capable of restraining its ambitions, a hegemon easily is lured into overexpansion. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it—especially when the costs and risks of doing so appear to be low. Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously. From this perspective, it is not surprising that since the cold war the United States has—in addition to Afghanistan and Iraq—intervened in such peripheral places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo while simultaneously extending its military reach into Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and East Central Europe (all areas never previously viewed as ones where the United States had important interests) The very nature of hegemonic power predisposes dominant powers to overexpand in order to maintain their leading position in the international system. As Gilpin observes, a hegemon earns its prestige—others’ perceptions of the efficacy of its hard power capabilities—by using military power successfully to impose its will on others. When a hegemon wields its military power conspicuously, others are put on notice that the prudent course of action is to accommodate its dominance rather than challenging it. In effect, hegemons believe that the frequent use of force has a potent deterrent, or dissuasive, effect on other states. Clearly, U.S. policymakers believe this to be the case. Thus, after extolling the displays of America’s military virtuosity in Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that those wars should be a warning to other states: “If you put yourself in the shoes of a country that might decide they’d like to make mischief, they have a very recent, vivid example of the fact that the United States has the ability to deal with this1”74 There is, of course, a paradox to the hegemon’s temptation: overexpansion leads to “imperial overstretch” and counterhegemonic balancing—the combined effect of which is hegemonic decline. Strategically, hegemons usually end up biting off more than they can chew.”

Attempting to preserve hegemony has produced imperial overkill

Prof. Francis Shor 2010 (Wayne State Univ.), July 27th, 2010, "Imperial Overkill and the Death of U.S. Empire," Foriegn Policy in Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/imperial_overkill_and_the_death_of_us_empire>

“While all empires have had to contend with imperial overstretch, the particular historical situation confronting the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union led to an asymmetrical hyper-power, reliant especially on the reach of the Pentagon. The compulsion to rely even more heavily on the military to compensate for a waning hegemony in other domains — and to contend with shrinking resources (especially hydrocarbons), rising adversaries (especially China) and growing resistance (especially non-state Islamic militants and Latin American national-popular governments) — led to a record number of direct U. S. interventions. In turn, two of the most massive interventions, those in Iraq and Afghanistan, underscored the inability of Washington to realize all of its imperial goals. In effect, out of frustration with unfulfilled geostrategic results, the United States has turned to expanded and deadly military imperial overkill.”

HEGEMONY – Good

by Matthew Baker

HEGEMONY EXISTS

Strong support for American power even in Middle East and Asia and concern about China

Max Boot 2010. (MA in Diplomatic History from Yale University and Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations), May 2010, "America is Still the Best Guarantor of Freedom and Prosperity," Los Angles Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/31/opinion/la-oe-boot-20100531>

"There is an especially large American presence in the Middle East, one of the world's most crisis-prone regions. For all the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, almost all the states bordering what they call the Arabian Gulf support substantial American bases. These governments are worried about the looming Iranian threat and know that only the United States can offer them protection. They are happy to deal with China, but it would never occur to a single sultan or sheik that the People's Liberation Army will protect them from Iranian intimidation. In the Far East, a similar dynamic prevails. All of China's neighbors happily trade with it, but all are wary of the Middle Kingdom's pretensions to regional hegemony. Even Vietnam, a country that handed America its worst military defeat ever, is eager to establish close ties with Washington as a counter to Beijing."

Global aging will not diminish U.S. dominance

Dr. Mark L. Haas 2008 (B.A., Duke University, B.A., magna cum laude, Economics, Political Science, History, Phi Beta Kappa, 1992 M.A., University of Virginia, Political Science, 1996 Ph.D., University of Virginia, Political Science, International Relations, 2000), July 14th, 2008, "Pax Americana Geriatrica," Miller-McCune, <http://www.miller-mccune.com/culture-society/pax-americana-geriatrica-4416/>

“Although the United States is also growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than the other great powers. Consequently, the costs created by aging will be significantly lower for the U.S. than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore likely not only to extend U.S. dominance (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead) but also to deepen it as these other states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. By inhibiting the other powers from challenging American primacy, global aging increases the odds in favor of continued peaceful relations among these states. *Pax Americana* is therefore likely to extend well into the 21st century”

700 American military bases - no other country has a counterpart

Max Boot 2010. (MA in Diplomatic History from Yale University and Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations), May 2010, "America is Still the Best Guarantor of Freedom and Prosperity," Los Angles Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/31/opinion/la-oe-boot-20100531>

"The very fact that the entire world is divided up into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent — not yet even a Chinese counterpart. It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of American bases will stretch from Germany to Japan — more than 700 in all, depending on how you count."

US still possesses force projection capabilities and global goodwill buttresses U.S. status

Max Boot 2010. (MA in Diplomatic History from Yale University and Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations), May 2010, "America is Still the Best Guarantor of Freedom and Prosperity," Los Angles Times, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot-20100531,0,1391318.story>

"This isn't to deny the prevalence of anti-Americanism even in the Age of Obama. Nor is it to wish away the real threats to American power — from external challenges ( Iran, China, Islamist terrorists) to, more worrying, internal weaknesses (rising debt levels, decreasing military spending as a percentage of the federal budget, a shrinking Navy). But if my cross-global jaunt taught me anything, it is that those countries that dismiss the prospects for continuing American leadership do so at their peril. The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and, just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from local bullies. They may resent us, but they fear their neighbors, and that's the ultimate buttress of our status as the world's sole superpower."

LINKS TO “APOLARITY”

Loss of U.S. Hegemony leads to Apolarity

*Prof. Niall Ferguson 2004. (Niall Ferguson is Herzog professor of history at New Yourk University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution a Stanford University), July 1st, 2004, "A World Without Power," The Hoover Institute,* [*http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685*](http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685)

“Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world, and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age.”

Alternative to unipolarity is not multipolarity but apolarity

Prof. Niall Ferguson 2004. (Niall Ferguson is Herzog professor of history at New Yourk University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution a Stanford University), July 1st, 2004, "A World Without Power," The Hoover Institute <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685>

For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony -- it's fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier -- its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity -- a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

Apolarity could lead to New Dark Age

Prof. Niall Ferguson 2004. (professor of history at New Yourk University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution a Stanford University), July 1st, 2004, "A World Without Power," The Hoover Institute <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685>

Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers -- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states -- they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you will) is hardly encoraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that , rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

IMPACTS TO REDUCED/LOST HEGEMONY

Risk of global conflicts. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

US power dominance leads to peace and stability - balance of power leads to war

Dr. Joseph Nye 2004. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, University Distinguished Service Professor Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, PhD in political science from Harvard), 2004 , "American hegemony: preventive war, Iraq, and imposing democracy - Limits of American Power," Academy of Political Science, Editor: Demetrios Caraley, [Accessed Google Books], <http://books.google.com/books?id=h2L_znvDMPcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=american+hegemony:preventive+war,+iraq,+and+imposing+democracy&hl=en&ei=BbNlTKWtJIGC8ga7tIH-Bw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Margaret%20Thacher&f=false>

“A good case can be made that inequality of power can be a source of peace and stability. No matter how power is measured, some theorists argue, an equal distribution of power among major states has been relatively rare in history, and efforts to maintain a balance have often led to war. On the other hand, inequality of power has often led to peace and stability because there was little point in declaring war on a dominant state. The political scientist Robert Gilpin has argued that "Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security."

Reverting to “balance of power” = risk of nuclear war

Dr. Joseph Nye 2004. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, University Distinguished Service Professor Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, PhD in political science from Harvard), 2004 , "American hegemony: preventive war, Iraq, and imposing democracy - Limits of American Power," Academy of Political Science, Editor: Demetrios Caraley, [Accessed Google Books], <http://books.google.com/books?id=h2L_znvDMPcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=american+hegemony:preventive+war,+iraq,+and+imposing+democracy&hl=en&ei=BbNlTKWtJIGC8ga7tIH-Bw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Margaret%20Thacher&f=false>

“It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of war arises. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the United States and for the world is debatable. I am skeptical. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.”

Apolarity could lead to New Dark Age

Prof. Niall Ferguson 2004. (Niall Ferguson is Herzog professor of history at New Yourk University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution a Stanford University), July 1st, 2004, "A World Without Power," The Hoover Institute <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685>

Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers -- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states -- they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you will) is hardly encoraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that , rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

New Dark Age = pirates, nuclear war

Prof. Niall Ferguson 2004. (Niall Ferguson is Herzog professor of history at New Yourk University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution a Stanford University), July 1st, 2004, "A World Without Power," The Hoover Institute, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7685>

The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy -- from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai -- would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East.

HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERION - Not needed/ Won’t work

COUNTER CRITERION: Central purpose of foreign policy is to maximize our nation’s security and well-being

Prof. Stephen M. Walt 2012. ( professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) 31 Aug 2012 On "Leading from the Front" FOREIGN POLICY <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/category/topic/history>

In fact, the idea that the United States should always try to "lead" is completely bone-headed."Exerting leadership" is not the central objective of foreign policy; it is a means to an end but not an end in itself. The central purpose of foreign policy is to maximize the nation's security and well-being. If exerting "leadership" contributes to these ends, fine, but there will be many occasions when the smart strategy is to hold back and pass the buck to someone else. Blindly declaring that the United States must always go to enormous lengths to lead, and must constantly strive to reassure allies who need us far more than we need them, is mere jingoistic hubris. It's an applause line, but not a strategy.

**CRITERION CRITIQUE: Human rights cannot be the sole criterion of foreign policy,**  **we have to consider other factors**

Dr. Uche Ofodile 2009. (Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. S.J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M.. Harvard Law School; LL.M. (International Business Law), University College London. Fellow, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs) “Trade, Aid and Human Rights: China’s Africa Policy in Perspective” JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 4 Issue 2 [www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/download/73/72](http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/download/73/72)

Indeed, when confronted with the issue of a U.S. human rights policy, Kissinger, at his confirmation as the Secretary of State, stated: “I believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of U.S. foreign policy.” In a 1977 article, Kissinger argued that one of the basic challenges of foreign policy was “the perennial tension between morality and pragmatism.” Although admitting that human rights “must be an essential component” of U.S. foreign policy, he argued that to pursue it effectively, the U.S. “must take the measure of the dangers and dilemmas along the way.” Kissinger cautioned that because human rights advocacy is a powerful political weapon, the U.S. must be careful that in its application, all moral dividing lines are not eroded.

No universally agreed standards of human rights, and debate about them can even lead to conflict and war

Dr. Benjamin Rivlin & Peter J. Hoffman 2008. (Rivlin - PhD Harvard, international relations & government Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute on United Nations and Professor Emeritus of Political Science, City University of New York Graduate School & University Center. Hoffman - Research Associate, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, City Univ of New York) “The United Nations Human Rights Council (2008): A U.S. Foreign Policy Dilemma” 28 May 2008 <http://www.ncafp.org/articles/08%20UN%20Human%20Rights%20COuncil.pdf>

The declaration, also referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights, affirmed the commitments of member states to respect a wide range of rights. However, in trying to specify and operationalize those norms, disputes appeared. Those divisions are exemplified by two international agreements: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights. Accordingly, although there is one Universal Declaration, there are two covenants; that is, when rival frameworks could not be reconciled into one document, the deadlock was acknowledged by issuing separate agreements for different categories of rights. In short, during the cold war, human rights became a weapon. Instead of being based on the universal application of consensus-derived principles, human rights were used to embarrass or otherwise undermine political opponents. In addition to differences rooted in the ideological conflict of the cold war, an overarching fracture that fueled contestations over the meaning of human rights resurfaced in international politics in the 1990s in a slightly altered guise, the so-called clash of civilizations. This perspective argues that contrasts in cultural identities invariably lead to conflict and war. The divide between civil/political rights and social/economic/cultural rights became a prominent symptom of political dissension.

Just saying “human rights” doesn’t justify US intervention: There are thousands of human rights abuses happening today - you have to justify this particular intervention by showing how it affects the national interest and the world community.

Prof. Stephen Bronner 2011. (Professor of Political Science and Director of Civic Diplomacy and Human Rights at the Institute for World Challenges: Rutgers University) “On Judging American Foreign Policy: Human Rights, Political Realism, and the Arrogance of Power” LOGOS A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, <http://logosjournal.com/2011/summer_bronner/>

There are policymakers who never encountered a crisis for which American intervention wasn’t a remedy: Richard Barnett called them “white collar militarists.” But, then, hundreds of wars, thousands of human rights abuses are taking place as these words are being read. It is always legitimate to ask how egregious is *this* particular breach of human rights? Why is *this* particular nation the target? How does *this* crisis affect the national interest and the world community? One size does not fit all when it comes to foreign policy and the pursuit of human rights. This only makes the justification for any particular action in any particular instance more important.

Although she advocates increased attention to human rights in our foreign policy, Roberta Cohen in 2008 nevertheless admits that such concerns do not need to be “front & center” in every situation:

Roberta Cohen 2008. (MA with distinction from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights at the State Department and Senior Adviser to the US Delegation to the U.N., is Senior Associate at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University) INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, THE CHALLENGES, AND THE CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY , Statement at the Foreigin Service Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/speeches/2008/4/human%20rights%20cohen/04_human_rights_cohen.pdf>

This is not to suggest that human rights concerns must be front and center in every situation. There may be sound political and strategic reasons for placing human rights in a secondary position. In the case of China, for example, in 1979, normalizing relations with its government based on national security objectives like containing Soviet power and gaining influence in Asia understandably moved human rights concerns aside. Today, in the case of North Korea, reaching a nuclear agreement obviously has to take priority over introducing human rights concerns into the six-party talks. However, it is always important to distinguish between genuine strategic or political interests that may have to move human rights to the side, and shortsightedness, ignorance about the importance of including such concerns or simply not wanting to complicate cozy relationships with governments or warlords.

SOLVENCY

Roberta Cohen, who advocates increased attention to human rights in our foreign policy, in 2008 listed 10 criteria for application of human rights standards to be effective. Some of these criteria are listed below. The impact to these cards is that if the Affirmative claims “human rights” as an advantage, justification or criterion for their plan, they will fail to achieve it if their plan does not implement all of the policies and practices listed below. Just taking one small gesture toward human rights is not the same as actually achieving an effective human rights foreign policy. Since many of the things needed for an effective human rights foreign policy are extra-topical to the resolution (they fall outside the scope of US military commitments and involve other areas of our foreign policy), the Affirmative will not be able to succeed.

1. Lack of Credibility

Link: The U.S. has no international credibility on human rights because of our abusive practices

Prof. Manfred Nowak 2008. (Prof. Dr. Manfred Nowak, Professor for International Human Rights Protection, University of Vienna; United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture) CIA- »EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION« FLIGHTS,TORTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY –A EUROPEAN APPROACH; EDITED BY: EUROPEAN CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS E.V. (ECCHR), SECOND EDITION, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/51893125/Study-on-CIA-Extraordinary-Rendition-Flights>

The United States and Europe, once at the forefront of human rights protection worldwide, have lost much of their credibility as global human rights defenders in the “War on Terror.” In addition, by compromising their principles of combating global terrorism within the boundaries of international human rights law and the rule of law, Western government have in fact played into the hands of terrorists who aim to reveal and criticize the hypocrisy of Western human rights policies.Furthermore, the systematic practice of rendition, torture and disappearance by the United States and its allies has provided an extremely negative example to other states with disastrous consequences. Time and again, I was confronted with one simple question by governments in all regions of the world that I visited in my function as UN Special Rapporteur on Torture: “Why do you criticize us for torture if even the United States of America is officially using this practice? Is torture not legitimate in our common fight against the evil of global terrorism?”

Link: Affirmative plan contains no mandates to correct these abuses that wreck our credibility (and if they did, we would argue they are extra-topical)

Impact: We can’t have an effective human rights policy without correcting our own abuses and getting international credibility

Roberta Cohen 2008. (MA with distinction from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights at the State Department and Senior Adviser to the US Delegation to the U.N., is Senior Associate at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University) INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, THE CHALLENGES, AND THE CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY , Statement at the Foreigin Service Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/speeches/2008/4/human%20rights%20cohen/04_human_rights_cohen.pdf>

What is necessary for an effective human rights policy? Here are ten suggested criteria. The first is credibility. A government cannot effectively promote human rights abroad if it is not observing them at home. If a government considers that habeas corpus and guarantees against torture are at variance with its national security, then it will not be able to urge other governments to respect these rights.

2. Realism - trying to do too much + Cooperation with other actors. Cohen’s 4th criterion for effective human rights policy is that if we try to do too much, we will simply have to step back later, and that we have to engage other actors besides the US government to be effective.

Roberta Cohen 2008. (MA with distinction from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights at the State Department and Senior Adviser to the US Delegation to the U.N., is Senior Associate at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University) INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, THE CHALLENGES, AND THE CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY , Statement at the Foreigin Service Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/speeches/2008/4/human%20rights%20cohen/04_human_rights_cohen.pdf>

Fourth, the policy must be realistic. It cannot overestimate US power to reform countries or democratize them or make them into miniature Americas. When policies become too strident or overblown, the Administration invariably has to retreat. Jimmy Carter had to step back after affirming in his inaugural address that the US commitment to human rights would be “absolute.” President Bush has had to backtrack on his overblown goal of bringing democracy to the Arab Middle East not to speak of his inaugural pledge to end tyranny in the entire world. A realistic policy will also not rely solely on American power and actions but encourage a broad range of actors to become involved -- other governments, in particular a coalition of democracies, multilateral and regional organizations, NGOs, and corporations.

3. Democracy doesn’t necessarily uphold human rights.

Roberta Cohen 2008. (MA with distinction from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights at the State Department and Senior Adviser to the US Delegation to the U.N., is Senior Associate at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University) INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, THE CHALLENGES, AND THE CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY , Statement at the Foreigin Service Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/speeches/2008/4/human%20rights%20cohen/04_human_rights_cohen.pdf>

Fifth, an effective human rights policy must seek to reconcile human rights and democracy goals. An exaggerated faith in elections can be misguided without simultaneous support for the institutions that make democracy work – an independent media, the rule of law, and a vibrant and involved civil society. President Bush’s insistence upon elections in the Palestinian territories led to the unexpected triumph of Hamas -- hardly a human rights victory. In Rwanda, the US provided democracy assistance prior to the genocide but failed to pay attention to human rights violations – the discriminatory actions being taken against the Tutsi minority.

U.S. INTERVENTION – bad

Advocating for US intervention without discussing the role of local governments and leaders is insulting, arrogant, and ignores the most likely solutions

Kate Cronin-Furman & Amanda Taub 2012. (Furman - lawyer who is pursuing a PhD in political science at Columbia University. Taub - lawyer who teaches international law and human rights at Fordham University) THE ATLANTIC 8 Mar 2012 <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/solving-war-crimes-with-wristbands-the-arrogance-of-kony-2012/254193/>

However, we're less concerned with the budgetary issues than with the general philosophical approach of this type of advocacy. Perhaps worst of all are the unexplored assumptions underpinning the awareness argument, which reduce people in conflict situations to two broad categories: mass-murderers like Joseph Kony and passive victims so helpless that they must wait around to be saved by a bunch of American college students with stickers. No Ugandans or other Africans are shown offering policy suggestions in the film, and it is implied that local governments were ineffective in combating the LRA simply because they didn't have enough American assistance. None of us who actually work with populations affected by mass atrocity believe this to be a truthful or helpful representation. Even under horrific circumstances, people are endlessly resourceful, and local actors understand their needs better than outsiders. It's good that Americans want to help, but ignoring the role and authority of local leaders and activists isn't just insulting and arrogant, it neglects the people who are the most likely to come up with a solution to the conflict.

9/11 and death of US Ambassador in Libya are both examples of blowback from US intervention

**Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD; Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Sept 2012 “**The Price of US Interventionism” <http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/26/the-price-of-us-interventionism/>

The attack on the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya, which killed four U.S. diplomats, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens, is the latest example of tragic blowback from the U.S. government’s interventionist foreign policy in the Islamic world. That it happened on the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, an even more severe example of such blowback, is a cruel irony.

Even when we’re trying to “help” they will still hate us for intervening

**Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD; Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Sept 2012 “**The Price of US Interventionism” <http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/26/the-price-of-us-interventionism/>

However, some would say that it was the Internet film insulting Islam that caused worldwide anti-American violence, not U.S. intervention. Yet the film was only the trigger, and the real underlying issue is U.S. and Western meddling in Islamic lands and culture. The U.S. superpower has been pursuing an interventionist policy in the Islamic world since World War II — ramping it up even further after 9/11 with the unnecessary invasion of Iraq — and is roundly hated for it, thus making it the target for such blowback attacks, even among peoples the U.S. tried to “help.”

Intervention puts a bulls-eye on our back – we enable and encourage radical Islamic reaction

**Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD; Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Sept 2012 “**The Price of US Interventionism” <http://consortiumnews.com/2012/09/26/the-price-of-us-interventionism/>

After the doctor’s report in Syria, such an Islamist upsurge should be no surprise to the U.S. government in any post-Assad Syria either. Furthermore, overt U.S. military intervention in Syria will do nothing for America’s already very low popularity in the Islamic world. The attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Libya, Egypt, and worldwide should be a “canary in the coal mine” warning to stop U.S. meddling in the Islamic world. The U.S. has recently conducted military interventions in at least six Muslim nations: Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Even bigger birds flew in on 9/11 without causing any such introspection, however, so the prospect is bleak 11 years later for any badly needed U.S. soul-searching. Thus, unfortunately, at home and abroad, America will continue to needlessly have a big bull’s eye on its back.

Over-reaching intervention will be the ultimate threat to our security

David Rothkopf 2010. (visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy) 1 Feb 2010, "Can the U.S. afford to continue supporting Taiwan?" FOREIGN POLICY, (ellipses in original) <http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/01/can_the_us_afford_to_continue_supporting_taiwan>

It is one of those issues for the Taiwanese and the Chinese to work out among themselves. Just as are the issues between China and Tibet. Just as are countless other border issues of nothing more than regional significance ... unless we continue to choose, in our desire to aggrandize our role on the planet in Yertle the Turtle fashion to involving all issues we survey. Should we support democracy everywhere? Yes. Are we willing to go to war everywhere to defend it? No. Should we support international efforts to preserve the rights of minorities and small states against bullying neighbors? Yes. Is it up to the U.S. to be the last bulwark of defense for all those states (especially the ones that have movie stars or highly-financed lobbies behind them)? No. We are entering The Era of Limits for the United States. We can only actively get involved in those few places where our vital strategic interests are involved and where involvement will actually advance those interests. That should mean a spring cleaning of the attic of U.S. foreign policy and an effort to identify vestigial positions we can no longer afford to support. This will mean some wrenching decisions ... and in some cases, it's probably just as well we keep our changed policies to ourselves. But we don't have the balance sheet we once had. Economic trends are not in our favor on that front. And so we have to accept that we simply can't afford to be the country we once were ... or over-reaching will prove to be the ultimate threat to our security.

US foreign policy stirs anger in the Muslim world

Prof. Mark LeVine 2012. (professor of Middle Eastern history at Univ of Caif.- Irvine, and distinguished visiting professor at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University in Sweden) 13 Sept 2012 Blowback of the ugliest kind: The lessons no one will learn from Benghazi <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291391347458863.html>

Americans and Europeans are no doubt looking at the protests over the "film", recalling the even more violent protests during the Danish cartoon affair, and shaking their heads one more at the seeming irrationality and backwardness of Muslims, who would let a work of "art", particularly one as trivial as this, drive them to mass protests and violence. Yet Muslims in Egypt, Libya and around the world equally look at American actions, from sanctions against and then an invasion of Iraq that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and sent the country back to the Stone Age, to unflinching support for Israel and all the Arab authoritarian regimes (secular and royal alike) and drone strikes that always seem to kill unintended civilians "by mistake", and wonder with equal bewilderment how "we" can be so barbaric and uncivilised. Russia receives little better grades on this card, whether for its brutality in Afghanistan during the Soviet era, in Chechnya today, or its open support of Assad's murderous regime.Meanwhile, the most jingoistic and hate-filled representatives of each society grow stronger with each attack, with little end in sight.

INTERVENTION – Good

Foreign military intervention to uphold US interests is a tradition of the Founding Fathers

Marion Smith 2011. (graduate fellow in the B. Kenneth Simon Center for American Studies at the Heritage Foundation) The Founders on Intervention: American Military Action Abroad (1783-1860) <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/20/the-founders-on-intervention-american-military-action-abroad-1783-1860/>

While a policy of non-intervention is sometimes appropriate, the doctrine of non-interventionism is an isolationist policy which limits the options available to America. It is a limitation that the Founders clearly did not adopt: in the years 1783-1860, the U.S. engaged in military action nearly sixty times at locations around the globe. Like the Tripolitan War, these military actions in the service of America’s interests and principles were both defensive and, at times, interventionist. The true consistency of American foreign policy is to be found not in its policies, which ought to prudently change and adapt, but in its guiding principles, which should be unchanging and permanent. Those who advocate strict non-interventionism are not representing a traditionally American foreign policy approach; for it excludes the statesmanlike virtue of prudence and ignores many instances in early American history when the U.S. did intervene, even militarily, in order to defend America’s interests and advance its political principles.

Other countries will not step up to replace missing US power, and the world will be more disorderly and less prosperous as a result. Net benefits: Absence of intervention will be worse than too much intervention

Prof. Michael Mandelbaum 2010. (Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) « Overpowered » May/June 2010 FOREIGN AFFAIRS <http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Overpowered.pdf>

The prospect of a reduced U.S. presence around the world does not disturb Matlock, Gallarotti, or Preble. Each is confident that other countries will step forward to fill any geopolitically perilous vacuum that a more modest U.S. foreign policy creates. With the passing of what they regard as the wantonly unilateralist Bush administration, all see great potential for more extensive international cooperation. All believe, that is, that other countries will risk lives and spend money in pursuit of goals they have in common with the United States. Perhaps eventually they will, but the first year of the presumably kinder, gentler, more multilateral Obama administration yielded little evidence of a willingness on the part of others to share the United States' global burdens. If, as Washington pulls back, others do not step forward, the world is all too likely to become both more disorderly and less prosperous. In that case, the verdict on the state of the world in the year 2030 may differ sharply from the judgment these three books pass on the last 20 years. Whereas their common theme is the dangers that arise when the United States has too much power, their successors two decades from now will be chronicling the even worse -- perhaps far worse -- consequences of the United States' having too little of it.

U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids\_friend\_goliath?page=0,1

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

US intervention solves for genocide and nuclear proliferation better than waiting for the UN to act

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

Even critics of the Iraq War should acknowledge that preventive war ought to remain among the strategic options available to the new Obama Administration. Reliance on the United Nations Security Council alone to combat terrorism, halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or intervene to prevent genocide and “ethnic cleansing” would be obvious folly. The Council has proven to be all but hapless in confronting such challenges, and, despite persistent, but unavailing, calls for reform, will remain so.

IRAN - Big Threat

Iran’s non-nuclear capabilities threaten world energy exports and the stability of the global economy

Anthony Cordesman & Alexander Wilner 2012. (Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Wilner - with Center for Strategic & International studies) Mar 2012 “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” <http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf>

While any use of such forces would have far less serious effects than any Iranian use of nuclear weapons, the events of the last year have shown they pose steadily growing risks. Iran has made more and more dramatic threats in response to the fact the US and EU have imposed far more serious sanction, and Iran’s actual use of such forces would be much less provocative than missile or nuclear strikes and is much more probable. This makes this area of military competition critical to the Arab Gulf states, the secure flow of world energy exports, and the stability of the global economy.

Even if Iran has weaknesses, they have built up capabilities for asymmetric and irregular warfare, and would be hard for the US to defeat

Anthony Cordesman & Alexander Wilner 2012. (Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Wilner - with Center for Strategic & International studies) Mar 2012 “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” (“none” was misspelled for “one” in the original) <http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf>

Iran’s conventional weaknesses also need to be kept in careful perspective. Iran has spent two decades building up capabilities for asymmetric and irregular warfare. The end result is still a mix of Iranian forces the US can counter relatively quickly with the large-scale use of its own forces, but no ~~n~~one wants this kind of war and they still give Iran a powerful capability to intimidate its neighbors, and which would be far harder for the US to defeat in a limited war of attrition where the US might not be able to act decisively in striking Iranian forces and targets.

Long list of specific aggressive actions Iran has taken in the recent past

Anthony Cordesman & Alexander Wilner 2012. (Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Wilner - with Center for Strategic & International studies) Mar 2012 “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” <http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf>

Unlike Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, Iran has also proven its capability to use such forces effectively. Iran’s past actions have shown this threat is all too real:   
- Iranian tanker war with Iraq.   
- Oil spills and floating mines in the Gulf.  
- Use of Al Qods Force in Iraq.  
- Iranian use of UAVs.  
- Border and coastal “incidents.”   
- Arms transfers, in cooperation with Syria, to Hezbollah.  
- Pilgrimage “incidents” in Makkah.  
- Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.  
- Missile and space tests; expanding range of missile programs (future nuclear test?).  
- Naval guards’ seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf.  
- Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.  
- Hamas/PIJ arms transfer and their rocket attacks on Eilat, Aqaba in August 2010.  
- Iran regularly practices “swarming” targets in the Gulf with large numbers of small craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, missile-armed aircraft, and increasing support from UAVs/UCAVs.  
- Increasingly arming and supporting insurgents in Afghanistan.

Iran has the capability to threaten its neighbors and threaten Persian Gulf exports

Anthony Cordesman & Alexander Wilner 2012. (Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Wilner - with Center for Strategic & International studies) Mar 2012 “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” <http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf>

These assets include small, mobile, hard-to-detect platforms such as the Qadr-SS-3 midget submarine, high-speed combat boats such as the Seraj-1 and Zolfaqar, the Bavar-2 flying boat, the Kaviran all-terrain vehicle, and the ATV-500 Jaguar, among others, all of which fit into the IRGC’s asymmetric doctrine. These systems, while low-tech and lightly-armed, are not capital-intensive and are intended to offset superior military technology through sheer numbers and high mobility. Iran understands that it cannot reasonably win a fight against the US in a conventional war or direct frontal confrontation, and these assets are designed to strike at vulnerable targets and critical infrastructure, such as Gulf shipping, oil tankers, oil platforms, and coastal desalination facilities. They can be used to “swarm” civilian or military targets, or in slow battle of attrition that pose a constant low-level threat calculated to avoid a massive US or Gulf response. They can be widely dispersed, and can be used in unpredictable attacks. Moreover, they can be concealed away from ports and military bases. Iran can either escalate or drag out a constant crisis, seeking to wear down resistance to its demand or win grudging acceptance of its nuclear problems in the way that India, North Korea, and Pakistan have done. These capabilities include Iran’s ability to threaten and intimate its Gulf neighbors, and threaten Gulf exports.

Iran is developing nuclear weapons, missiles to deliver them, and supporting Al Qaeda

Peter Brookes 2011. (Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense) 13 Sept 2011 “Iran’s Atomic Countdown” <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/09/irans-atomic-countdown>

From all accounts, the various pieces for a nuclear Iran are rapidly falling into place, should the regime decide to cross the atomic threshold: sufficient fissile material, a warhead to put it in and a vehicle to deliver it to a target. And all of this atop other recent troubling tales, such as word that Tehran is facilitating al Qaeda operations, including the movement of operatives, money and (probably) arms into Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iran may have deliverable nuclear weapons in the next 2-5 years

Anthony Cordesman & Alexander Wilner 2012. (Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. Wilner - with Center for Strategic & International studies) Mar 2012 “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” <http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf>

In spite of sabotage, the assassination of some Iranian scientists, and international sanctions — Iran’s nuclear program continues to progress. Iran still claims that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful, but its lack of cooperation with the IAEA – and the growing range of other indicators that it is developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons – make such claims doubtful. It is possible that Iran may acquire deliverable nuclear weapons at some point in the next two to five years.

Iran has enough uranium to produce 2 or 3 bombs

Peter Brookes 2011. (Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense) 13 Sept 2011 “Iran’s Atomic Countdown” <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/09/irans-atomic-countdown>

The “fissile fortress” at Qom -- located on a Revolutionary Guard base and securely tucked into the side of a mountain -- is pretty clearly meant to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for the making of Iran’s first bombs. It’s been estimated Iran already has enough low-enriched uranium on hand to produce enough highly enriched uranium for two to three bombs in relatively short order. And the IAEA (from its own detective work and intel provided by members) has “increasing concern” that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program has a military angle.

Iran makes bombs to kill NATO soldiers in Afghanistan and is a state sponsor of terrorism

Dr. James J. Carafano 2012. ( PhD; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University; served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West PointDeputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) Iran: Truth or Dare for Ahmadinejad 10 Apr 2012 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/10/iran-truth-or-dare-for-ahmadinejad/>

The real problem with Iran, however, is not the empty threats but a foreign policy bent on making serious trouble. Recent reports out of the Britain, for example, claim that Iran is helping fashion bombs to kill NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. It has long been suspected that Tehran set up a pipeline for funneling powerful improvised explosive devises to kill coalition soldiers in Iraq. Iran has also been also been singled out as one of the world’s most active state sponsors of terrorism.

Iran orders assassinations of US diplomats

James Phillips 2012. ( Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; was a Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and a former Joint Doctoral Research Fellow at the East-West Center ; Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from Brown University; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) 2 June 2012 “Iran Targets U.S. Diplomats for Terrorist Attacks” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/06/02/iran-targets-u-s-diplomats-for-terrorist-attacks/>

While the Obama Administration remains wedded to the diplomatic engagement of Iran, Iran remains wedded to terrorism, including plots against U.S. diplomats. *The Washington Post* reported earlier this week that U.S. officials are accumulating mounting evidence that Iran ordered terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomats stationed in Azerbaijan, as well as members of their families. The Azerbaijan plot appears to have been part of a larger Iranian campaign to assassinate foreign diplomats, including Israeli and Saudi diplomats, in at least seven countries over 13 months.

“Iran is Rational” - Response: So what? That doesn’t tell us what they will do

Dr. James J. Carafano 2012. ( PhD; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University; served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West PointDeputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) “Rational or not, Iran is a real danger” CNN 1 Mar 2012 <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/01/rational-or-not-iran-is-a-real-danger/>

During recent congressional hearings, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been trying to explain why he told CNN's Fareed Zakaria that Iran is a "rational actor." He may be right. So what? It doesn't really help answer the question of what to do about Tehran. If you don't understand what factors an opponent weighs as important benefits and what it considers to be worrisome costs, you can't predict what a rational decision might look like to him. Moreover, if you bank on the enemy being rational - without leaving allowances that the enemy might make mistakes, stupid choices, or be at least partially influenced by emotional fervor - your forecast regarding his next steps may be way off base.

If Iran is “rational” the most likely outcome is a nuclear war

Dr. James J. Carafano 2012. ( PhD; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University; served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West PointDeputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) “Rational or not, Iran is a real danger” CNN 1 Mar 2012 <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/01/rational-or-not-iran-is-a-real-danger/>

Once Iran goes nuclear, there is not much hope that rationality will somehow prevail in the region. Rather, the most "rational" response from states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would be to fast-track development of their own nuclear weapons to offset a nuclear Iran's regional dominance. Several years ago, the Heritage Foundation war-gamed this dark scenario. Participants from the Pentagon and several think tanks tried to act "rationally," yet it proved all but impossible to keep a crisis from developing into a nuclear war. So what if Tehran is rational? That in no way makes the Middle East less dangerous or more "manageable" by Washington wise men.

Iran is not a democracy

Michael Singh 2011. (managing director The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) 22 Sept 2011 Open Hearing, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, "Axis of Abuse: U.S. Human Rights Policy toward Iran and Syria, Part II" <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/SinghTestimony20110922.pdf>

Iran also maintains democratic pretensions. Iran holds elections for both the presidency and the parliament, or Majlis. However, in both cases the Iranian system provides for parallel institutions -- the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, respectively -- that are unelected and whose authority trumps those of the elected officials. Even with this authoritarian safeguard in place, however, Iranian leaders feel the need to manipulate elections. The candidate vetting process (through which the clerical Guardian Council weeds out reformists or any others who might express independent viewpoints), the voting process itself, and the ballot counting process are all heavily rigged to ensure that the regime's desired outcomes are realized.

IRAN - NO THREAT

(some evidence in this brief was researched by Michael Bixby)

INHERENCY

A) Iran Weakening

Obama foreign policy working: Iran is weaker than before

Prof. Mark Lynch 2010. (associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, where he is the director of the Institute for Middle East Studies and of the Project on Middle East Political Science) July 19, 2010, “Why put an attack on Iran back on the table?,” Foreign Policy, <http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/19/is_an_attack_on_iran_really_back_on_the_table>

“Compare that to today, 18 months into the Obama administration. While I've been critical of parts of the administration's approach to Iran, overall Tehran has become considerably weaker in the Middle East under Obama's watch. Much of the air has gone out of Iran's claim to head a broad "resistance" camp, with Obama's Cairo outreach temporarily shifting the regional debate and then with Turkey emerging as a much more attractive leader of that trend. The botched Iranian election badly harmed Tehran's image among those Arabs who prioritize democratic reforms, and has produced a flood of highly critical scrutiny of Iran across the Arab media. Arab leaders continue to be suspicious and hostile towards Iran. The steady U.S. moves to draw down in Iraq have reduced the salience of that long-bleeding wound. Hezbollah has been ground down by the contentious quicksand of Lebanese politics, and while still strong has lost some of the broad appeal it captured after the 2006 war. Public opinion surveys and Arab media commentary alike now reveal little sympathy for the Iranian regime, compared to previous years. And while the sanctions are unlikely to change Iran's behavior (even if there is intriguing evidence that highly targeted sanctions are fueling intra-regime infighting), they do signal significant Iranian failures to game the UN process or to generate international support. In short, while Iran may continue to doggedly pursue its nuclear program (as far as we know), this has not translated into steadily increasing popular appeal or regional power. Quite the contrary.”

B) Iran Reforming

Iran is independently progressing towards democracy

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“While Iran continues to suffer from significant and serious internal social, political and economic problems, as a recent Oxford University study points out, “in many regards, there is more progress toward democracy in Iran than in other country in the Middle East, perhaps with the exception of Turkey.”

SIGNIFICANCE

A) General

SecDef: Iran not a direct military threat to the United States in the near term

National Public Radio quoting Sec. of Defense Robert Gates 2008. [Interview w/ Defense Secretary Robert Gates], January 17, 2008 “Gates: No Immediate Military Threat from Iran” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18169391> (brackets added)

“Inskeep: Is Iran the greatest threat that the United States is likely to face in the final year of this administration? [Quoting Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates: Well, I think Iran is certainly one of the most significant challenges. We continue to be concerned about their ongoing enrichment programs, their unwillingness to suspend in the face of broad international pressure to do so. So I think it will continue to be a challenge. Is there a reason you describe them as a challenge rather than a threat? Well, when I think of a threat, I think of a direct military threat. And while the jury is out in terms of whether they have eased up on their support to those opposing us in Iraq, I don't see the Iranians, in the near term, as a direct military threat to the United States.”

B) A/T Nuclear Iran Threat

Iran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

The judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, as voiced publicly by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, is that Iran is retaining the option to build nuclear weapons but has not yet decided to do so. Much diplomatic ground has yet to be explored in searching for a formula that would permit Iran to have a peaceful nuclear program with enough inspections and other safeguards to assuage Western concerns about diversion of nuclear material to military use.

Iran with a bomb wouldn’t be as bad as people assume, and a war to stop it would be really bad

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

There are indeed good reasons to oppose Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and likewise many steps the United States and the international community can and should take to try to avoid that eventuality. But an Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful, and far more costly, than most people imagine.

Iranian leaders are not suicidal, they will not engage in self-destructive behavior, they can be deterred

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

Newt Gingrich speaks in a similar vein about how Iranian leaders are suicidal jihadists, and says “it’s impossible to deter them.” The trouble with this image of Iran is that it does not reflect actual Iranian behavior. More than three decades of history demonstrate that the Islamic Republic’s rulers, like most rulers elsewhere, are overwhelmingly concerned with preserving their regime and their power—in this life, not some future one. They are no more likely to let theological imperatives lead them into self-destructive behavior than other leaders whose religious faiths envision an afterlife.

We can manage Iran’s nuclear weapons just like we did with China

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

Throughout history, it has always been worrisome when a revolutionary regime with ruthless and lethal internal practices moves to acquire a nuclear weapon. But it is worth remembering that we have contended with far more troubling examples of this phenomenon than Iran. Millions died from forced famine and purges in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and tens of millions perished during the Great Leap Forward in Mao Tse-tung’s China. China’s development of a nuclear weapon (it tested its first one in 1964) seemed all the more alarming at the time because of Mao’s openly professed belief that his country could lose half its population in a nuclear war and still come out victorious over capitalism. But deterrence with China has endured for half a century, even during the chaos and fanaticism of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. A few years after China got the bomb, Richard Nixon built his global strategy around engagement with Beijing.

Using force to stop Iran’s nuclear program would have huge negative consequences

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

No one knows what the full ramifications of such a war with Iran would be, and that is the main problem with any proposal to use military force against the Iranian nuclear program. But the negative consequences for U.S. interests are likely to be severe. In December, Secretary Panetta identified some of those consequences when he warned of the dangers of war: increased domestic support for the Iranian regime; violent Iranian retaliation against U.S. ships and military bases; “severe” economic consequences; and, perhaps, escalation that “could consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”

Iranian nuclear weapons development would take years and not be a threat

Dr. John Mueller, 2010. John Mueller (PhD in Political Science from UCLA and professor of political science at Ohio State University), January/February 2010, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=full>

“If the Iranians do break their solemn pledge not to develop nuclear weapons (perhaps in the event of an Israeli or U.S. airstrike on their facilities), they will surely find, like all other countries in our nuclear era, that the development has been a waste of time (it took Pakistan 28 years) and effort (is Pakistan, with its enduring paranoia about India and a growing jihadi threat, any safer today?).”

Iran would have no incentive to use Nuclear weapons

Dr. John Mueller, 2010. John Mueller (PhD in Political Science from UCLA and professor of political science at Ohio State University), January/February 2010, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=full>

“Moreover, Iran will most likely "use" any nuclear capability in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and deterrence. Indeed, as strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling suggests, deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Iran. Such devices, he points out, "should be too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to 'waste' killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action."

C) A/T Threat to Israel

Iran unlikely to attack Israel with nuclear weapons

Dr. Ariel Ilan Roth 2009. (Ph.D in international relations from The Johns Hopkins University and Associate Director of National Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s Krieger School of Arts and Sciences), November 24, 2009, “The Root of All Fears,” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65692/ariel-ilan-roth/the-root-of-all-fears>

“Most observers believe that Israel’s preoccupation with Iran’s nuclear program stems from the fear that Iran would either use a nuclear weapon against Israel or give the bomb to one of its direct proxies, most likely Hezbollah. Given Tehran’s open hostility toward Jerusalem, such foreboding makes sense. But such a scenario is highly improbable. Tehran’s profound dislike of the Jewish state notwithstanding, it is unlikely to attack Israel with a nuclear weapon because Israel’s atomic arsenal is orders of magnitude larger than whatever infant capability Iran could muster in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Israel is believed to possess a secure submarine-based second-strike capability that could devastate Iran.”

Iran unlikely to supply Hezbollah with nukes to attack Israel

Dr. Ariel Ilan Roth 2009. (Ph.D in international relations from The Johns Hopkins University and Associate Director of National Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s Krieger School of Arts and Sciences), November 24, 2009, “The Root of All Fears,” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65692/ariel-ilan-roth/the-root-of-all-fears>

“Nor would Iran readily supply Hezbollah with atomic weapons. No nuclear state has ever turned over its most prized military asset to a subsidiary actor or surrendered its exclusive control over a weapon that it worked so hard to obtain. More important, if Hezbollah were to acquire and use a nuclear weapon against Israel, there would be no doubt about the weapon’s provenance and Iran would immediately face devastating retaliation. An attack on Israel, in other words, would mean the end of Iran.”

Iran a rational actor and its foreign policy goals are not advanced by attacking Israel with nukes

Dr. Ariel Ilan Roth 2009. (Ph.D in international relations from The Johns Hopkins University and Associate Director of National Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s Krieger School of Arts and Sciences), November 24, 2009, “The Root of All Fears,” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65692/ariel-ilan-roth/the-root-of-all-fears>

“Although many analysts question the rationality of the Iranian regime, it is in fact fairly conservative in its foreign policy. Iran has two long-range goals, achieving regional hegemony and spreading fundamentalist Islam, neither of which will be achieved if Iran initiates a nuclear exchange with Israel.”

Israel raises the “Iran nuke threat” to distract from other issues

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

As for Israel, it is impossible to ignore how much, in American politics, the Iran issue is an Israel issue. The Netanyahu government’s own repeated invocation of an Iranian nuclear threat has several roots, including the desire to preserve Israel’s regional nuclear weapons monopoly, the usefulness of having Iran stand in as the region’s “real problem” to divert attention from the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and simple emotion and fear.

Mossad Chief says: Iran nuke would not threaten the existence of Israel

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan described the idea of an Israeli air strike on Iranian nuclear facilities as “the stupidest thing I have ever heard.” Another former Mossad head, Efraim Halevy, and the current director of the service, Tamir Pardo, have both recently denied that an Iranian nuclear weapon would be an existential threat to Israel.

D) A/T: Terrorist Ally

Iran opposed al-Qaeda’s presence in post-2001 Afghanistan and one of the first Muslim countries to condemn 9/11

Scott Ritter 2007. (was chief weapons inspector for the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq, former Major in US Marine Corps where he served as lead analyst for the Rapid Deployment Force concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War), October 8, 2007 “The Big Lie: ‘Iran is a Threat’” Encyclopaedia Britannica Blog <http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2007/10/iran-is-a-threat-the-big-lie/>

“The fact of the matter is that the “Iranian Threat” is derived solely from the rhetoric of those who appear to seek confrontation between the United States and Iran, and largely divorced from fact-based reality. A recent request on the part of Iran to allow President Ahmadinejad to lay a wreath at “ground zero” in Manhattan was rejected by New York City officials. The resulting public outcry condemned the Iranian initiative as an affront to all Americans, citing Iran’s alleged policies of supporting terrorism. This knee-jerk reaction ignores the reality that Iran was violently opposed to al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan throughout the 1990’s leading up to 2001, and that Iran was one of the first Muslim nations to condemn the terror attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.”

E) A/T: Iran is Expansionist

Iran is interested in enhancing its security, not “revolutionary expansionism”

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“Thus, according to Kayhan Bargezar of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Iran’s foreign policy is based on seeking “to enhance its security and create opportunities to proactively shape international political realities according to its national interests.” He adds that “a major part of Iran’s current diplomatic energy and strength have focused on how to react to perceived external threats”, particularly from the US. Nevertheless, on the whole, rather than aiming at revolutionary expansionism, increasingly: “Iranian foreign policy has been primarily geopolitical, oriented at building a secure environment at its borders, for strategic-pragmatic purposes.”

Iran is not a power hungry expansionist with unquenchable ambitions

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“In reality, US military perceptions of Iran as a dangerous power-expander attempting to maximise its regional hegemony are inaccurate. As two senior Iran analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations point out in *Foreign Affairs*, the main obstacle to a resolution of the Iran crisis is “the Bush administration’s fundamental belief that Iran cannot be a constructive actor in a stable Middle East and that its unsavory behavior cannot be changed through creative diplomacy. Iran is not, in fact, seeking to create disorder in order to fulfill some scriptural promise, nor is it an expansionist power with unquenchable ambitions.”

F) Iran’s Military is Weak

Iran’s navy is outdated

Radio Free Europe 2010. 5 May 2010, “Iranian Naval Exercises 'Designed To Show Military Might',” <http://www.rferl.org/content/Iranian_Naval_Exercises_Designed_To_Show_Military_Might/2033665.html>

“Much of Iran's navy is seriously outdated and lacks spare parts. Some ships are more than 40-years old and were built in the United States and Britain before Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution.”

Iran’s military outdated and would not cause much difficulty for the United States

Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI) 2008. FOI (Swedish government defense research agency) March 2008, “Consequences of Military Actions Against Iran,” <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2511.pdf>

“Iran’s military defences would not cause much difficulty for US offensive operations. Tehran’s partly upgraded air defence system would probably have a significant impact only on military operations of other powers, e.g. Israel. Iran’s large standing military force is predominantly outdated.”

Iranian military is relatively outdated

Stars and Stripes 2008. (newspaper published by the U.S. Military), July 18, 2008, “Report says Iran military growing but is still outdated,” <http://www.stripes.com/news/report-says-iran-military-growing-but-is-still-outdated-1.81130>

“The U.S. intelligence community in May completed a major National Intelligence Estimate on Iran that concluded the Iranian military is building up its missile and conventional forces but remains relatively outdated, U.S. officials have told The Washington Times. Intelligence officials familiar with the estimate declined to disclose its details or even its key judgments to the Times, noting that the entire document is classified.”

Iran has an outdated military with limited operational capabilities

Ron Tira 2010. (author of the Nature of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness (2009), a reservist in the Israeli Air Force’s Campaign Planning Department), July 2010, “A Military Attack on Iran?: Considerations for Israeli Decision Making,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 13, No. 1 <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/tira-iran.pdf>

“Iran has an outdated military with limited direct operational capabilities and middling missile and naval capabilities, while its indirect capabilities are not much greater than those already demonstrated by its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon.”

DISADVANTAGES

DA 1. Treating Iran like a threat may turn Iran a serious security threat

Scott Ritter 2007. Scott Ritter (chief weapons inspector for the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq, former Major in US Marine Corps where he served as lead analyst for the Rapid Deployment Force concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War), October 8, 2007 “The Big Lie: ‘Iran is a Threat’” Encyclopaedia Britannica Blog <http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2007/10/iran-is-a-threat-the-big-lie/>

“A careful fact-based assessment of Iran clearly demonstrates that it poses no threat to the legitimate national security interests of the United States. However, if the United States chooses to implement its own unilateral national security objectives concerning regime change in Iran, there will most likely be a reaction from Iran which produces an exceedingly detrimental impact on the national security interests of the United States, including military, political and economic. But the notion of claiming a nation like Iran to constitute a security threat simply because it retains the intent and capability to defend its sovereign territory in the face of unprovoked military aggression is absurd. In the end, however, such absurdity is trumping fact-based reality when it comes to shaping the opinion of the American public on the issue of the Iranian “threat.”

DA 2. An attempt to destroy Iran’s unconfirmed Nuclear program would encourage Iran to develop Nuclear programs in “self-defense”

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“Similarly, a study by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies concluded that: “Such an attack would likely embolden and enhance Iran’s nuclear prospects in the long term. In the absence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program, which IAEA inspectors have yet to find, a preemptive attack by the United States or Israel would provide Iran with the impetus and justification to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent program, without the inconvenience of IAEA inspections. Such an attack would likely be seen as an act of aggression not only by Iran but most of the international community, and only serve to weaken any diplomatic coalition currently available against Iran.”

DA 3. Any attempt to destroy Iran’s Nuclear facilities would elicit “immediate retaliation” involving a “missile counterattack”

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“Iran’s ability to respond in the event of any attack by the US, Israel, or both, has always been known to be far-reaching, with destabilizing consequences for the entire region. Studying the potential scenarios, the Monterey Institute of International Studies concluded that: “Iran is not only capable but very likely to respond to a preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities.” Indeed, a US or Israeli attack, the study argued, will “almost certainly” elicit “immediate retaliation,” including a missile counterattack on Israel and US bases in the Persian Gulf, an attempt to destabilize Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states with significant Shia populations, and rocket attacks on Northern Israel by Hizbullah. Iran also has the military capability to target US bases in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, as well as Israeli cities.”

DA 4. Conflict with Iran would deteriorate global security

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“First and foremost, of course, is the question of whether military intervention would achieve its stated objective of disrupting an alleged covert Iranian nuclear weapons programme (for which there remains no evidence). Expert analysis strongly indicates that military strikes, both ‘limited’ and of a wider nature, would fail completely to achieve this stated objective. On the contrary, it would more likely achieve the opposite. A detailed critical analysis of the prospects for success of a US and/or Israeli military strike on Iran is provided by US physicist and former UN weapons inspector David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS): “An attack against Iran, large or small, is likely to worsen the already dangerous situation in the region and undermine larger US strategic objectives throughout the world.”

ISRAEL - Doesn’t need more U.S. support

INHERENCY

US & Israel have 10-year agreement for increased military aid

Jeremy M. Sharp 2012. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with Congressional Research Service) 12 Mar 2012 “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>

In 2007, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a 10-year, $30 billion military aid package that gradually will raise Israel’s annual Foreign Military Financing grant from a baseline of nearly $2.55 billion in FY2009 to approximately $3.1 billion for FY2013 through FY2018. For FY2013, the Obama Administration is requesting $3.1 billion in FMF to Israel.

Israel is already the biggest recipient of US aid and gets military aid not available to any other countries

Jeremy M. Sharp 2012. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with Congressional Research Service) 12 Mar 2012 “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $115 billion in bilateral assistance. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received significant economic assistance. Strong congressional support for Israel has resulted in Israel receiving benefits not available to any other countries; for example, Israel can use some U.S. military assistance both for research and development in the United States and for military purchases from Israeli manufacturers. In addition, all U.S. assistance earmarked for Israel is delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year, while most other recipients normally receive aid in installments. In addition to receiving U.S. State Department-administered foreign assistance, Israel also receives funds from annual defense appropriations bills for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs.

SIGNIFICANCE/HARMS

Israel no longer needs our charity

Being “pro-Israel” doesn’t mean we have to arm them with our tax dollars

Benjamin Friedman 2011. (research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute; graduate of Dartmouth College and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 8 Feb 2011 “ Rand Paul Is Right about Israel” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rand-paul-is-right-about-israel>

he problem with aiding Israel is not that we are being ideological. We can afford that. The problem is that Israel no longer needs our charity. Israel's backers in Washington talk like it is 1948, when Israel was poor and surrounded by aggressive neighbors. Even in 1970 Israel had almost ten times more GDP per capita than either Egypt or Syria, according to UN statistics. Today Israel has calmer borders, and its vibrant technology sector increases its military superiority over its rivals (Paul says our aid is fueling an Egyptian-Israeli arms race, but Egypt quit racing). Being pro-Israel does not require arming it with our tax dollars forever. Israel can now defend itself and then some.

No need to worry about the Camp David peace treaty (Israel/Egypt, 1979)

Benjamin Friedman 2011. (research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute; graduate of Dartmouth College and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 8 Feb 2011 “ Rand Paul Is Right about Israel” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rand-paul-is-right-about-israel>

After the 1979 Camp David accords, codifying peace between Egypt and Israel, U.S. aid to Israel was supposed to reward peace. But the notion that American largesse, rather than Israeli security concerns, kept Israel from going to war with Egypt was always dubious. And relations between those states have minimal impact on American security. Peace there serves our moral sensibilities, not our safety.

SOLVENCY

Formal / Written security agreement with Israel wouldn’t do much

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Israeli opponents of formal security guarantees argue that they would constrain Israel’s freedom of action while making Israel even more dependent on the United States. Some Israelis also doubt whether a legally binding security commitment would be honored at the moment of truth. They point out that even the execution of a legal obligationis dependent on presidential and congressional political will. Former Israeli ambassador to the United States and retired air force general David Ivri has argued that as long as the United States values the partnership, it will help Israel, and, if it doesn’t, not even a written agreement will be binding. In other words, the uncertainty of the relationship’s trajectory means that a written agreement could ultimately be unenforceable.

**Extending US nuclear protection and offering a bilateral defense treaty: Neither would solve Israel’s strategic challenges**

*Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; spent six years living in Jerusalem, where he worked as a television news producer; bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington in Seattle and a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011* [*http://csis.org/files/publication/110908\_Malka\_CrossroadsUSIsrael\_Web.pdf*](http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf)

Some Americans have argued that extending a U.S. nuclear deterrent to Israel would relieve Israeli anxiety of a nuclear Iran. Others have suggested a bilateral defense treaty. Neither, however, provides solutions to Israel’s strategic challenges, which are a daunting mixture of hard security threats from states and nonstate actors combined with the psychological and diplomatic threat of growing international isolation.

US power to influence the Middle East is eroding - we are an undependable patron for Israel to rely on

Dr. Leon Hadar 2011. (has taught at American University and Mount Vernon College-where he served as director of international studies-at the Institute on East-West Security Studies in New York, and at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland; graduate of Hebrew University in Jerusalem; MA degrees from the schools of journalism and international affairs and the Middle East Institute at Columbia University; Ph.D. in international relations from American Univ.) 3 Jan 2011 “Israel's Post-American Future” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/israels-postamerican-future>

During the Cold War and in the brief Unipolar Moment – from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the fall of Saddam Hussein – Washington was in a position to work with Israeli and Arab moderates in promoting peace. But that window of opportunity for this U.S. role may be closing. The failed attempt by the neoconservative-guided policies to" "remake" the Middle East – while marginalizing the Israel/Palestine issue – ended up weakening American power in the Middle East and strengthening Iran and its allies, marking the start of the end of Pax Americana. So in reality the Obama Administration's current difficulties in setting the global agenda, whether that involves North Korean aggression and China's undervalued currency, Iraq and Afghanistan — or bringing peace to the Holy Land and disabling Iran's nuclear capability – reflect the long-term structural problems that are eroding American power. They are not going to be resolved anytime soon under either Democratic or Republican presidents and could gradually turn the U.S. into Israel's undependable global patron.

US-Israel relationship cannot be improved until Israel makes fundamental commitments toward resolving the Palestinian conflict

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; spent six years living in Jerusalem, where he worked as a television news producer; bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington in Seattle and a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Of utmost importance for strengthening the sense of U.S.-Israeli partnership is a practical strategy to address the Palestinian issue. It is difficult to see how U.S.-Israeli ties can improve without fundamental Israeli commitments toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Reaching an agreement with the Palestinians will neither transform the Middle East nor solve a host of challenges facing the United States and Israel, including extremism, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. An Israeli-Palestinian agreement would, however, relieve one set of grievances out of many in the region. It would also remove a key issue of contention that has complicated U.S. management of the Middle East, which will only become more complicated as populations in the region demand greater representation and an end to authoritarian rule.

US military power cannot provide solutions to Israel’s threats & challenges

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Rather than expect that the United States will neutralize the Iranian threat, Israel will have to adapt and work within a broader U.S. containment security architecture, regardless of the drawbacks of such a framework. Even though many Israelis and Israel’s supporters would like to believe that U.S. military power can solve Israel’s most pressing problems if properly applied, ultimately the United States can only help Israel manage its threats and challenges; it cannot provide solutions.

Without effective leadership, US-Israel alliance will fade into irrelevance

Samuel W. Lewis 2011. (former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; former U.S. ambassador to Israel ) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

However, history underscores my conviction that the relationship between our elected national leaders will play the crucial role in both potential success or potential failure in shepherding the alliance through the coming decade of rising challenge and increasing strain. Achieving a “common mission” may be a bridge too far. But two leaders who understand the difficult corridors our two peoples are passing through, have genuine empathy for the other partner’s travails, and make a special effort to cultivate some personal rapport with each other will be able to keep the alliance on a moderately safe course in a very turbulent sea. Without such leaders committed to that end, the alliance is, I fear, likely to fade slowly into irrelevance

Without common mission & purpose, US-Israeli partnership will have problems

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

As a small country in a constant state of war, Israel’s perceptions, threat assessments, and strategies for pursuing its interests naturally differ from those of a global superpower. Yet, common cause and understandings on key issues are vital for a healthy alliance. Without a common mission and purpose to guide the U.S.-Israeli partnership, the relationship will continue drifting, and disagreements on key strategic challenges will threaten the interests of both allies.

US security guarantee questionable as to whether it would really change anything for Israel

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Indeed, beyond concerns over form and execution, the overarching question for Israelis and Americans is whether a security pact or formal guarantee could actually solve the key problems facing Israel and the United States. U.S. advocates have largely seen a security guarantee as an incentive and solution to Israel’s vulnerability and security challenges, which could cement an Arab-Israeli agreement. Israelis tend to see it instead as a tool to bolster their deterrence and as an insurance policy for preserving long-term U.S.-Israeli ties. It is questionable whether the offer of a security guarantee would actually change either side’s calculations or make each more amenable to the interests and aims of the other.

US nuclear umbrella won’t solve for the Iran threat: Israel must rely on its own capabilities

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

U.S. proponents see extended deterrence primarily as a political and psychological tool that can reassure Israelis and send a clear message to Iran. But Israelis, across the political spectrum both inside and outside of government, overwhelmingly reject the notion that a U.S. nuclear umbrella is a solution to the Iranian threat. They believe the core of Israel’s deterrence must rely solely on their own capabilities, and many believe Israel’s own undeclared nuclear capability is sufficient to deter Iran. For some Israeli analysts, the umbrella idea raises the question of why a reportedly nuclear-armed state requires a nuclear guarantee from another state. This question could lead to a broader debate on Israel’s nuclear capabilities, which most Israeli and U.S. government officials would rather avoid.

DISADVANTAGES

1. US military aid for Israel = motivation for terrorism

Benjamin Friedman 2011. (research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute;.D. candidate in Political Science ; affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Mass. Institute of Technology) 8 Feb 2011 “ Rand Paul Is Right about Israel” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rand-paul-is-right-about-israel>

In recent years, U.S. military aid to Israel has become even less tethered to a strategic rationale. The Israelis know that our domestic politics prevents us from trading aid for concessions to Palestinians. So they take our money but not our advice. What our spending does buy is ill will among Palestine's supporters, including jihadist terrorists. If we did not fund Israel, terrorists would not suddenly love Americans, but it might make some of them less inclined to kill us.

2. Weakens Israel

Link: We need a balance: Some aid is good, but military aid can undermine Israel’s long-term ability to manage its own defense needs

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; master’s degree from Columbia Univ School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Strong military ties and aid also lower the risk that the Israel Defense Forces will take unilateral actions that undermine U.S. interests. Yet under shifting political and geopolitical circumstances, U.S. military and political assistance ultimately undermines Israel’s long-term autonomy and ability to manage its own defense needs. The challenge is to maintain a degree of interdependence that is mutually beneficial rather than a partnership that reinforces Israel’s dependence on the United States.

**Impact: Turn Affirmative’s benefits to stronger Israel**

3. Meaningless Slogan Kritik/Disad: Throwing around slogans like “commitment to Israel’s security” actually increases Israeli anxiety, due to its vagueness

Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; spent six years living in Jerusalem, where he worked as a television news producer; bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington in Seattle and a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf>

Today the depth of U.S.-Israeli military-to-military cooperation is unprecedented. Yet in the current political and strategic climate, vague verbal declarations about America’s “commitment to Israel’s security” have become slogans rather than a formula for practical security arrangements. U.S. politicians and government officials will continue using such mottoes for political gain, but overusing them may exacerbate Israeli anxiety because their vagueness is subject to such wide interpretation.

4. Formal defense agreement with Israel would be bad for US foreign policy

Link: Defense pact with Israel would strain US relations with allies in the Persian Gulf and could lead to military confrontation with Iran

*Haim Malka 2011. (senior fellow and deputy director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; was a research analyst at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; spent six years living in Jerusalem, where he worked as a television news producer; bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington in Seattle and a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs) “Crossroads : the future of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership” July 2011* [*http://csis.org/files/publication/110908\_Malka\_CrossroadsUSIsrael\_Web.pdf*](http://csis.org/files/publication/110908_Malka_CrossroadsUSIsrael_Web.pdf)

A defense pact with Israel could further complicate broader U.S. policy in the Middle East and strain U.S. relations with a number of allies, particularly in the Gulf. More important perhaps, a defense pact could also draw the United States into a military confrontation with Iran or another party. Any treaty also requires Senate ratification and could well entail a political debate that many Israelis and Americans would rather avoid. A formal pact also requires building a force structure to back up security commitments, which could be a contested and sensitive process.

Impact: Conflict with Iran would deteriorate global security

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institute <http://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The_Iran_Threat.pdf>

“First and foremost, of course, is the question of whether military intervention would achieve its stated objective of disrupting an alleged covert Iranian nuclear weapons programme (for which there remains no evidence). Expert analysis strongly indicates that military strikes, both ‘limited’ and of a wider nature, would fail completely to achieve this stated objective. On the contrary, it would more likely achieve the opposite. A detailed critical analysis of the prospects for success of a US and/or Israeli military strike on Iran is provided by US physicist and former UN weapons inspector David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS): “An attack against Iran, large or small, is likely to worsen the already dangerous situation in the region and undermine larger US strategic objectives throughout the world.”

JAPAN MILITARY ALLIANCE/PRESENCE – good

(Matthew Baker researched most of the evidence in this brief)

SIGNIFICANCE

Japan provides $2.4 billion to offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces

Klingner & Cheng 2012. Bruce Klingner (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College) and Dean Cheng (Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center), “U.S. Asian Policy: America's Security Commitment to Asia Needs More Forces,” Heritage Foundation, August 7, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/americas-security-commitment-to-asia-needs-more-forces> (parentheses in original)

“This regional balancing is of such importance that many local states are subsidizing the American presence. Japan, for example, provides funding for virtually every aspect of the American military forces in Japan, from fuel expenditures to maintenance costs. Indeed, under the Host Nation Support agreement signed this past year, Japan will provide 188 billion yen ($2.4 billion) per year over the next five years to offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces in Japan.”

Bases may draw protesters but at least one draws thousands of cultural tourists

Chester Dawson 2012. (Journalist), “One U.S. Base Draws More Tourists Than Protestors,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2012, <http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2012/07/24/one-u-s-base-draws-more-tourists-than-protestors/>

“Once a year, the normally heavily guarded main gate of Yokota Air Force Base in the distant suburbs of Tokyo is flung open to the Japanese public for a weekend event known as the Friendship Festival. While the open house primarily targets locals in the immediate vicinity of the base, one enterprising travel agency is marketing bus tours bringing in thousands of Japanese from as far afield as the opposite coast. Other bases in Japan are expected to draw protests this summer, but Yokota’s festival typically attracts an excess of 100,000 tourists ogling helicopters and jet fighters parked on the tarmac, and patronizing booths selling American fast food and T-shirts. It’s become an annual “staycation” for Japanese families and war game “otaku” alike, curious about what lies beyond the barbed wire fences and tire shredders.”

SOLVENCY / DISAD UNIQUENESS LINK

No other country can replace Japan as a base for US troops

Masami Ito 2012. (Journalist and Staff Writer for The Japan Times), “Location key to region's security: U.S. defense shift keeps Okinawa in strategic mix,” The Japan Times, May 16, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120516f1.html> [ellipses in original]

“But 40 years on, security experts say Japan, including Okinawa, is strategically more important than ever to the U.S., especially amid China's increasing military might and the growing budgetary constraints on Washington. Military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa said Japan is the only country in the area that can offer support to the U.S. geopolitically, financially and technically. "Half of the world, from Hawaii to Cape Town, is being supported by the U.S. military forces in Japan . . . and no other country can replace Japan," Ogawa said. "The Japanese archipelago is the only power-projection platform for the U.S."

DISADVANTAGES

1. Humanitarian Efforts Undermined

Link: Forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan are of life-saving importance, assisting in multiple humanitarian missions

Robert M. Gates 2011. (Former U.S. Secretary of Defense), “Speech,” January 14, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529>

“Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value.”

Link & Impact: Lives saved. U.S. forces in Japan save lives by responding to disasters

Michele Flournoy 2010. (former U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy) “POINT OF VIEW/ Michele Flournoy: U.S.-Japan alliance a cornerstone in a complex world,” Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 2010, <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201007150534.html>

“In addition to providing deterrence in a still uncertain region, the presence of U.S. forces allows the United States and Japan to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters and to save lives. With close logistics and operational support from Japan, U.S. forces quickly responded to crises such as the 2009 typhoons in the Philippines, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma (Myanmar) and the 2007 Cyclone Sidra in Bangladesh. Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are increasingly deploying alongside their American partners to address humanitarian challenges in the region, as they did in responding to the 2004 tsunami. For example, earlier this year, Japan deployed the SDF via U.S. mainland bases to provide critical relief to Haiti following that devastating earthquake. The U.S. Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) have conducted humanitarian civil assistance activities in Cambodia and Vietnam as part of the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2010 operation. Going forward, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cooperation will provide countless opportunities for the U.S.-Japan alliance to contribute to the welfare of the region and the world.”

2. Deterrence Undermined

Link: Presence of U.S. forces in Japan is the bedrock for regional prosperity and deters aggression

Michele Flournoy 2010. (former U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy) “POINT OF VIEW/ Michele Flournoy: U.S.-Japan alliance a cornerstone in a complex world,” Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 2010, <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201007150534.html>

“As President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Naoto Kan recently affirmed at the Group of 20 summit in Toronto, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to be indispensable not only for the defense of Japan, but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region. The positive value of the U.S.-Japan alliance is not lost on other countries in the region; the enduring presence of U.S. forces in Japan is the bedrock for prosperity in the region. The continued U.S. presence provides deterrence against acts of aggression and reassures other nations in the region.”

Link: Deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and Okinawa essential to U.S. China Strategy

Richard C. Bush III 2010. (PhD from Columbia University and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution) “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” The Brookings Institution, March 10, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/03/10-japan-politics-bush>

“The threat environment in Northeast Asia is not benign. North Korea’s WMD capabilities are a matter of concern but will hopefully be a medium-term problem. More attention, however, is focused on China which has gradually developed a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the first island chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However, how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing that China has nuclear weapons? There are also specific points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan, some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hope that China will not seek to dominate East Asia at the U.S. and Japan’s expense, we can’t be sure of their intentions either. Hope is not a policy. The most sensible strategy—for both the U.S. and Japan—is to try to shape China’s intentions over time so that they move in a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japan’s strategy since the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each other’s respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important.”

Brink: There are multiple flashpoints of potential war with China, as Chinese military buildups intensify

Clifford Coonan 2012. (journalist) 23 Apr 2012 IRISH TIMES “China warns US naval exercise may lead to conflict” <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0423/1224315048178.html>

What defence analysts detect in the region are several potential flashpoints, with China at the centre. “What we see is an arms race among Southeast Asian nations looking at China. There is a perceived threat there, in countries like Vietnam and the Philippines,” said one defence analyst, who asked to remain anonymous. China’s efforts to boost its military have been intensified since Washington signalled it was increasing its interests in the Pacific, stationing troops in Australia and boosting alliances with Japan and the Philippines, and boosting ties with its old enemy, Vietnam.

**Impact: China has a plan to use military advantages to start and win a war against US**

Patrick Winn 2008. (Staff writer) 28 Jan 2008, "Hypothetical attack on U.S. outlined by China" AIR FORCE TIMES, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/01/airforce_china_strategy_080121/>

But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds. This is China’s anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy. It’s designed to strike America’s military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other service. In a script written by Chinese military officers and defense analysts, a bruised U.S. military, beholden to a sheepish American public, puts up a small fight before slinking off to avoid full-on war. This strategic outlook isn’t hidden in secret Chinese documents. It’s printed in China’s military journals and textbooks.

3. Broken Commitments. Removing US bases OR removing the security guarantee would break our commitments to Japan

Link: U.S. could not fulfill treaty commitments without Japanese bases

John Roos 2010. (U.S. Ambassador to Japan), “The Enduring Importance of our Security Alliance,” January 29, 2010, <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100129-71.html>

“Under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty, we are required to provide the land, air, and naval forces necessary to defend Japan. In exchange, Japan is responsible for providing bases and areas for U.S. forces to protect Japan and to maintain peace and security in East Asia. This is the basic compact that has served our two nations - and the region - so well over the five decades. The presence of the U.S. personnel in Japan reassures the region of America's commitment to maintaining peace. We could not fulfill this role or our treaty commitments without the bases that Japan provides.”

Link: U.S. military presence in Japan allows the U.S. to fulfill obligations under 1960 Treaty with Japan

Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2012. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs with the Congressional Research Service) and Ian E. Rinehart (Analyst in Asian Affairs), “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy,” The Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf>

“The U.S. military presence in Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Link: 1960 treaty obligates U.S. to respond to attacks on Japan and a military presence in Japan is necessary for the defense of Japan

Tomoko A. Hosaka 2010. (Associated Press Writer). “US, Japan to keep US military base in Okinawa,” The Boston Globe, May 27m 2010, <http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/05/27/us_japan_to_keep_us_military_base_in_okinawa/>

“Under a 1960 security pact, American armed forces are allowed broad use of Japanese land and facilities. In return, the U.S. is obliged to respond to attacks on Japan and protect the country under its nuclear umbrella. The U.S. and Japan "recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for thve defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability," said the statement, which was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa.”

Loss of Credibility Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

4. Stability in Asia undermined

Link: No credible U.S. military presence in Asia without Japan

Dr. Michael Auslin 2010. (Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the American Enterprise Institute Director of Japan Studies) “The U.S. -Japan Alliance,” American Enterprise Institute, January 7, 2010, <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-us-japan-alliance/>

“Ultimately, however, the credibility of the alliance will rest on the combination of military capability and willingness to maintain stability in Asia that each partner possesses. In this regard, then, the Obama administration's moves to cut advanced weapons systems such as the F-22 and to scale back missile-defense plans naturally raise questions about long-term U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific. Will the Obama administration maintain U.S. force levels in Asia at their current strength? Moreover, what are the Hatoyama administration's defense-spending plans? Japan must make decisions regarding its fighter-experimental (F-X) fighter program, but will Japan commit to building more surface ships and the surveillance systems needed to maintain its own capabilities? In this regard, the alliance must continue to rest on a basis of traditional "hard power."Clearly, the two allies should continue to research, develop, and deploy missile-defense systems on land and sea. Moreover, they must keep up their conventional forces, including advanced fighter aircraft, submarines, surface vessels, and intelligence and surveillance systems. This is, and will continue to be, expensive, especially in a time of reduced budgets, but the goal of preserving peace requires a formidable military deterrent to any country that may be thinking of employing force to obtain its objectives or to obtain asymmetric advantages that can negate U.S. and Japanese military superiority. No matter how vigilant and capable the two countries remain, however, peace in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be upheld solely by the United States and Japan. A successful system of regional security cooperation requires the efforts of many states. Indeed, one way to maintain the alliance's importance in coming years is to create some regional trilateral or quadrilateral mechanisms with the U.S.-Japan alliance at the core. Two natural groupings would be Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Australia. These countries already have limited ongoing trilateral discussions and policies, but expanding basic security cooperation, joint exercises, information sharing, and disaster relief, for example, can help build a community of shared interests among liberal allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking such an approach will also help the alliance work together to engage China. Japan and the United States have common economic and political interests with China, and coordinating outreach to China can help set clear benchmarks for progress on many issues, including climate change, confidence building, and trade promotion. It does not make sense for Tokyo and Washington always to deal with Beijing independently given these common interests, although each country will follow its own policies and national goals when talking with China. Given the concerns both the United States and Japan have about China's military buildup or the effects of Chinese industry on pollution, joint efforts to begin dialogues with China or presenting a shared position may be extremely useful. The alliance has served as the cornerstone of Japanese defense and East Asian stability for fifty years. It has done so because of the willingness of both Japan and the United States to bear heavy burdens. Without Japanese support and bases, there would be no credible U.S. military presence in Asia. Without the alliance, there is no assurance that the peace among the major powers in the past fifty years would have continued, nor that they would have been able to develop their economies to the degree they have. For this reason, the alliance should continue and maintain its core focus on defending Japan and maintaining stability in East Asia.”

Link: Bad Signals

Presence of U.S. forces in Japan shows willingness to be engaged

John A. Tirpak 2007. (Executive Editor for Airforce Magazine) “Air Force Alliance fo the U.S. and Japan,” Airforce Magazine, June 2007, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/June%202007/0607japan.aspx> (first set of brackets added)

“The two countries are “committed to credible deterrence” and their partnership, Wright said. The alliance itself is a message to the region, as is the fact that the two countries have prospered to be the top two individual economies in the world, Wright noted. [Brig. Gen. Harold W.] Moulton, the 18th Wing commander, said the “mere presence” of US forces in Japan “provides a statement about willingness to be engaged.” He added, though, that it’s not only about keeping Japan safe. “Our constant physical presence here has a dampening effect on animosities throughout the region. I’m convinced that [while] China has the desire to be the regional power in this region, they’re very comfortable, I think, having us here. We lend a cover over the region so that nothing swings too wildly out of control.”

Forward deployment of U.S. forces serves as tangible symbol of our commitment

John Roos 2010. (U.S. Ambassador to Japan), “The Enduring Importance of our Security Alliance,” January 29, 2010, <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100129-71.html>

“The fundamental role of U.S. forces in Japan is to make those who would consider the use of force in this region understand that that option is off the table. The forward deployment of U.S. forces puts us in a position to react immediately to emerging threats, and serves as a tangible symbol of our commitment. The 49,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in Japan are our front line forces.”

Brink: Today, leadership and involvement by U.S. and Japan needed to address regional problems

Robert M. Gates 2011. (Former U.S. Secretary of Defense), “Speech,” January 14, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529>

“Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North Korea, piracy or natural disasters, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. “

Impact: U.S.-Japan Alliance is linchpin of peace and security in Asia

Barack Obama 2011. “Statement by the President on the Election of Yoshihiko Noda,” August 30, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/30/statement-president-election-yoshihiko-noda>

“For the last half-century the U.S.-Japan Alliance has served as the linchpin of peace and security in the Asia Pacific region and, together, we can ensure that the next half-century enjoys the same stability and prosperity.”

Impact: Strong U.S.-Japan alliance protects prosperity and deters aggression in the region

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“It is important that both the United States and Japan realize that maintaining—and, indeed, strengthening—their alliance best serves their respective national interests. The U.S. military in Asia provides both a shield behind which nations can develop and prosper and a sword whose threat deters those nations that would otherwise try to influence weaker nations through coercive diplomacy or the threat of force.”

5. Japanese Nuclear Proliferation

Link: American presence in Asia reduces our allies’ desire to obtain nuclear weapons

Klinger and Cheng 2012. Bruce Klinger (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College) and Dean Cheng (Research fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center), “U.S. Asian Policy: America's Security Commitment to Asia Needs More Forces,” The Heritage Foundation, August 7, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/americas-security-commitment-to-asia-needs-more-forces>

“In terms of human capital and technological sophistication, and increasingly financial wherewithal, many Asian states, such as Japan and South Korea, have the potential ability to develop their own nuclear deterrent. That they have not done so may be attributed, in part, to the American extended deterrence guarantee. Although often perceived as only a nuclear guarantee, the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence includes “the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.” It is striking how, as American military resources are in decline, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has openly raised the possibility of asking for American tactical nuclear weapons to be reintroduced to the peninsula. Similarly, the American alliance network has obviated the need for member nations to acquire power projection platforms. In the absence of a regional security infrastructure, and with no shared perception of pressing threats, many Asian states would likely have sought a range of capabilities that might be perceived as threatening by their neighbors—the “security dilemma” problem. The American presence, however, negates the need to pursue such potentially threatening capabilities.”

Link: No credible military presence in Asia without Japanese bases

Michael Auslin 2010. (Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the American Enterprise Institute Director of Japan Studies) “The U.S. -Japan Alliance,” American Enterprise Institute, January 7, 2010, <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-us-japan-alliance/>

“The alliance has served as the cornerstone of Japanese defense and East Asian stability for fifty years. It has done so because of the willingness of both Japan and the United States to bear heavy burdens. Without Japanese support and bases, there would be no credible U.S. military presence in Asia.”

Link: A weakening in the U.S.-Japan alliance may strengthen those who want Japan to get nukes

Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin 2009. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs) and Mary Beth Nikitin (Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service), “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” February 19, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

“Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan. U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.” Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability. During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment. These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective. A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity. U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in determining Japan’s strategic calculations, particularly in any debate on developing nuclear weapons. Security experts concerned about Japan’s nuclear option have stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of nuclearization.”

Brink: Japan could make nukes if it wanted them

Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin 2009. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs) and Mary Beth Nikitin (Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service), “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” February 19, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

“Japan’s technological advancement in the nuclear field, combined with its stocks of separated plutonium, have contributed to the conventional wisdom that Japan could produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time. In 1994, Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata famously told reporters that “it’s certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them.” Indeed, few dispute that Japan could make nuclear weapons if Tokyo were to invest the necessary financial and other resources.”

Link: Japanese nukes could weaken U.S. nonproliferation regime

Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin 2009. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs) and Mary Beth Nikitin (Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service), “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” February 19, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

“Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.”

Impact to proliferation: If enough more nations get nuclear weapons, it’s unrealistic to think nuclear catastrophe could be avoided

Henry Kissinger 2006. (former US Secretary of State) The New Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation, <http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/nuclear_proliferation.pdf>

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension. If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

Impact to Japan Nukes: Japan’s development of nukes would destabilize the Asian-Pacific region

Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin 2009. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs) and Mary Beth Nikitin (Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service), “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” February 19, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

“Any reconsideration and/or shift of Japan’s policy of nuclear abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. In this report, an examination of the factors driving Japan’s decision-making—most prominently, the strength of the U.S. security guarantee— analyzes how the nuclear debate in Japan affects U.S. security interests in the region. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would damage the world’s most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan. India and/or Pakistan may then feel compelled to further expand or modernize their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate a lack of trust in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could strengthen China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. All of these ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.”

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES - BAD

By Megan McKinley

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

US military presence shows commitment, assures allies, and allows for quick responses to threats.

Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. 2011. (Assistant commandant of the Marine Corps) “Oct. 27, 2011 - VCSA testimony to HASC Subcommittee on military readiness, budget cuts” <http://www.army.mil/article/68210/Oct__27__2011___VCSA_testimony_to_HASC_Subcommittee_on_military_readiness__budget_cuts/>

With regard to today's forces today, you know, as I eluded to in my opening statement, physical presence matters and physical presence matters for a couple of reasons, you know? Number one, it absolutely shows a sign of our economic and our military commitment to a particular region. It matures potential adversaries. It assures our friends. And as you start moving up the range of military operations, it also allows you to respond in a timely manner to crises. Many times you have hours, if not minutes, to provide the -- to respond to a crisis and you certainly can't do that from the continental United States and Naval forces are there on the scene able to be able to do that. The other thing that it does is it allows you to buy time and space for decision makers. When you have some forces there, they can contain a crisis as the rest of the joint force gets prepared to respond to something that may be a bit larger than the crisis that's being dealt with on the scene. So from my perspective when you look at expeditionary forces, when you talk about responding to today's crisis today, what you really have with four deployed Naval forces, which is what I was talking about, is the ability to turn the (inaudible) up from day-to- day shaping operating, day-to-day engagement with our allies, and the sticker price of that same force, you can then respond to a crisis and the sticker price of that same force you can then enable a joint force to respond to something larger on the seismic contingency.

Overseas bases are necessary to protect US interests, respond to crisis quickly, and reassure allies.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

But while we should carefully review the proper balance of our forward-deployed military assets, our overseas presence is both a fundamental enabler of our national defense policy and a means to safeguard shocks to the international system. Stationing U.S. Army soldiers, Marines, and Air Force and Navy assets forward is the only guaranteed way of protecting U.S. interests, responding immediately to a crisis, and reassuring our allies and friends.

HARMS

Many US allies pay for American bases and want the US to remain in their countries.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

A final myth contends that the United States’ overseas presence isn’t welcome and only generates challenges. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Of course our overseas presence will sometimes create diplomatic strains, but on the whole allies and friends continue to express their desire for the U.S. to remain in the region and actively work to facilitate it. Following America’s withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991, for instance, Singapore stepped in by building a naval base large enough to berth a U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. In Europe, countries like Germany and Italy have helped to pick up the tab for our presence. Japan spends over $2 billion each year to cover the costs of our presence and has been in negotiations with the United States for over a decade – not to eject our forces, but to realign them to find a better balance between domestic demands and strategic priorities. South Korea provides over 40 percent of the total cost of maintaining U.S. forces on its soil and provided $4 billion in construction to better realign forces to the evolving mission. Finally, President Barack Obama recently announced that Australia has offered American troops and ships “permanent and constant” access to their facilities, another major step in our six-decade alliance with Australia.

US has a responsibility to its allies to maintain foreign bases.

MICHAEL HOFFMAN 2010 (Associate Editor at Military.com, formerly an intelligence officer at United States Air Force and a senior staff writer at Gannett Government Media Corporation) August 14, 2010 “Panel Looks At Closing USAF Overseas Installations” DEFENSE NEWS (Brackets and ellipses in original) <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100814/DEFSECT01/8140301/Panel-Looks-Closing-USAF-Overseas-Installations>

Schissler counters the cost-saving argument with a missed-opportunities one. Moving units back to the U.S. would cause airmen to lose out on training and partnership building, he said. "Those forces could go to the United States and rotate over here, but they don't have the types of relationships we enjoy by being over here," he said. "If the [C-130s at Ramstein] go to a country to build relationships [and] get training ... they'll also have a chance to expose our procedures and our habits and ... our professional NCO corps." Besides, Schissler added, the U.S. has a responsibility to its NATO partners to maintain bases in Europe.

SOLVENCY

Closing overseas bases will not necessarily save much money.

MICHAEL HOFFMAN 2010 (Associate Editor at Military.com, formerly an intelligence officer at United States Air Force and a senior staff writer at Gannett Government Media Corporation) August 14, 2010 “Panel Looks At Closing USAF Overseas Installations” DEFENSE NEWS <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100814/DEFSECT01/8140301/Panel-Looks-Closing-USAF-Overseas-Installations>

Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation and a former Senate aide, doesn't think the Pentagon will save much money by reducing its overseas presence. Military construction is expensive whether it's in the U.S. or abroad. "It's expensive to keep them forward deployed, but in a lot of ways it's a sunk cost," she said. "The money has already been spent," Eaglen said. The member of the advisory board agreed. It would be unfair to assume out of hand that it costs more to run a base in Italy or Japan than one in New Mexico or Maryland. Many countries such as Japan pay the U.S. for bases inside their countries, the official said.

Cutting military spending will create only small savings.

Robert Samuelson 2011 (Journalist) October 30, 2011 “The dangerous debate over cutting military spending” THE WASHINGTON POST <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-dangerous-debate-over-cutting-military-spending/2011/10/28/gIQAnPWEXM_story.html>

True, Iraq and Afghanistan raised defense budgets. As these wars conclude, lower spending will shrink overall deficits. But the savings will be smaller than many expect because the costs — though considerable — were smaller than they thought. From fiscal year 2001 to 2011, these wars cost $1.3 trillion, says the Congressional Budget Office. That’s 4.4 percent of the $29.7 trillion of federal spending over those years. In fiscal 2011, the cost was about $159 billion, 12 percent of the deficit ($1.3 trillion) and 4 percent of total spending ($3.6 trillion).

DISADVANTAGES

1. Jeopardize National Security

Link: Foreign bases deter conflict and allow quick responses.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

Deterring regional aggression with forward basing has been central to U.S. military strategy since the end of World War II, when we resolved to never again have to “fight our way in” as we had just done in the Pacific. This strategy remains just as relevant today. Gen. Joseph Dunford, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, recently testified that “being forward deployed and forward engaged allows us to shape the environment as opposed to reacting to the environment.” If a conflict with Iran were to erupt, or North and South Korea found themselves on the brink of war, or China threatened the use of force to acquire Taiwan, the robust regional presence of U.S. forces would have an immediate impact, either to deter escalation or quickly respond to aggression.

**Link: US military strategic goals demand numerous overseas bases.**

MICHAEL HOFFMAN 2010 (Associate Editor at Military.com, formerly an intelligence officer at United States Air Force and a senior staff writer at Gannett Government Media Corporation) August 14, 2010 “Panel Looks At Closing USAF Overseas Installations” DEFENSE NEWS (bracketsw in original) <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100814/DEFSECT01/8140301/Panel-Looks-Closing-USAF-Overseas-Installations>

The overseas basing debate is not simply a dollars-and-cents one, though. U.S. military strategic goals demand base units throughout the world, said Brig. Gen. Mark Schissler, USAFE's director for plans, programs and analyses. Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz listed building partnership capacity on top of his priority list. PACAF and USAFE bases are essential to meeting that goal, Schissler said. "For me it's all about distance," Schissler said. "We're in a place that we can get to [many of our NATO allies] in a day's travel."

Link: Foreign military bases are necessary to protect our national security.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a forward defense presence to better enable regional deterrence. The flexibility afforded to U.S. forces to operate from a network of overseas facilities allows them to quickly respond to any regional crisis as it is emerging. Constraining U.S. forces to a continental posture would undermine this very advantage, placing an insurmountable logistical and geographic burden on them. While the Pentagon is being forced to make tough decisions about how to align itself for the future, our national security policy demands that we remain forward deployed and forward engaged.

Link: Losing key bases in the past drastically reduced the military’s efficiency.

MICHAEL HOFFMAN 2010 (Associate Editor at Military.com, formerly an intelligence officer at United States Air Force and a senior staff writer at Gannett Government Media Corporation) August 14, 2010 “Panel Looks At Closing USAF Overseas Installations” DEFENSE NEWS <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100814/DEFSECT01/8140301/Panel-Looks-Closing-USAF-Overseas-Installations>

Service officials got a view of life without some key USAFE bases in April, when ash from an Icelandic volcano brought air traffic in Europe to a standstill. Air Force transports hauling everything from cargo to wounded soldiers in and out of the war zones remained grounded for six days. Planes scheduled to stop at Ramstein to drop off wounded soldiers at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center had to fly nonstop back to the U.S.

Impact: A continental-based military would be unable to respond effectively to threats.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

Despite these benefits, a number of myths about our overseas presence continue to promulgate. First, critics contend that the U.S. can sustain the same level of deterrence by maintaining sophisticated power-projection capabilities based on U.S. territory. But lost in this argument is the logistics required to overcome the tremendous “tyranny of distance” that separates the American homeland from these regional hotspots. Air Force F-15, F-16, and A-10 jets are inter-theater assets that aren’t designed to deploy across entire oceans. From Pearl Harbor, the Navy would have to sail 6,200 kilometers to Japan or 10,800 kilometers to the Strait of Malacca. The Marines would face an even greater hurdle if forced to deploy from the continental United States. Gen. Dunford testified that “it would take months to move (a force from the Continental United States) to the Western Pacific and seven consecutive miracles in terms of synchronizing the planes, trains and automobiles associated with moving that force.” Faced with these geographic hurdles, a continental-based military would be severely inhibited in its ability to credibly deter regional aggression and reassure American allies.

2. Lost Jobs. Closing military bases would cause thousands of airmen to lose their jobs.

MICHAEL HOFFMAN 2010 (Associate Editor at Military.com, formerly an intelligence officer at United States Air Force and a senior staff writer at Gannett Government Media Corporation) August 14, 2010 “Panel Looks At Closing USAF Overseas Installations” DEFENSE NEWS <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20100814/DEFSECT01/8140301/Panel-Looks-Closing-USAF-Overseas-Installations>

Thousands of airmen would lose their jobs if Congress closed military installations overseas to cut defense spending. Lawmakers as well as the Pentagon itself are reviewing how shuttering some bases in Europe and Japan would affect both national security and the defense budget. The Air Force has 16 installations in Europe and six in Asia. A task force appointed by Congress has already weighed in positively; a Pentagon advisory board is studying the potential cost savings and impact on the U.S. and its allies. “We are looking at [if we can afford overseas bases]," said a board member who agreed to talk with Air Force Times on background.

3. Enemies emboldened

Link: Closing overseas bases will send the wrong message.

Philip Ewing 2011 (Served as Pentagon correspondent for POLITICO. Before that, Phil worked for the Military Times newspapers, covering the Navy. He holds a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Illinois at Springfield.) June 15, 2011 “Gates warns against closing overseas bases” DODBUZZ <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/06/15/gates-warns-against-closing-overseas-bases/> (Brackets added)

[Defense] Secretary [Robert] Gates, counting the hours until he’s sprung from his five-sided dungeon, warned senators on Wednesday about the risks involved with closing U.S. bases overseas as part of potential cuts to the defense budget. For one thing, he said, it would probably cost money upfront, as opposed to saving it, to build headquarters and barracks and other facilities in the U.S. to house the troops who now live in Europe. For another, it might send a dangerous message:

“What kind of signal to do you want to send the rest of the world, as far as America’s role in the world?” Gates asked. “At the same time as we’re cutting the defense budget, we cut State’s budget, and State has fewer assets to deploy aboard, we have fewer assets to deploy aboard — are we basically sending the message to the rest of the world, to China, Iran, North Korea, a variety of others … that the U.S. is closing up shop and going home and headed toward Fortress America again?”

Brink: America’s military withdrawal is noticed and taken advantage of by other countries

Stuart Gottlieb 2012 (Stuart Gottlieb teaches American foreign policy and international security at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he is also an affiliate of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He worked as a foreign policy adviser and speechwriter to two senior Democratic senators) September 19, 2012 “What if U.S. stops policing the world?” CNN <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html?iid=article_sidebar>

Like Great Britain in the 19th century, America since the turn of the 20th century has been the world's pivotal global power. Fair or not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role in the world, the world noticed and reacted. There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways looming opportunists are more obvious today than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. These include al Qaeda and other Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea.

Impact: The US will be forced back into the positions it just vacated.

Stuart Gottlieb 2012 (Stuart Gottlieb teaches American foreign policy and international security at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he is also an affiliate of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He worked as a foreign policy adviser and speechwriter to two senior Democratic senators) September 19, 2012 “What if U.S. stops policing the world?” CNN <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html?iid=article_sidebar>

History shows that in the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World War II and Vietnam -- the American public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting participation in the League of Nations and receding into isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations in world history. And after Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations. But in each case, hopes were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back from the world stage -- Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate post-World War II period and the Soviet Union again after Vietnam. In each case, the United States was forced back into a paramount global leadership role -- in World War II, the Cold War and the military build-up and proxy wars of the 1980s.

4. Increased terrorism. Withdrawing US troops in the past has increased terrorism.

Stuart Gottlieb 2012 (Stuart Gottlieb teaches American foreign policy and international security at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, where he is also an affiliate of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He worked as a foreign policy adviser and speechwriter to two senior Democratic senators) September 19, 2012 “What if U.S. stops policing the world?” CNN <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html?iid=article_sidebar>

Similar effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from global hot spots, as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, was clear. But the withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the narrative of the emerging al Qaeda network that America was a "paper tiger," setting the stage for the escalating terrorist attacks of the 1990s and September 11, 2001.

5. Global economy. US military presence supports the global economy. US retreat makes the world less secure

Prof. Michael Mandelbaum 2010. (Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) THE NEW REPUBLIC 10 Aug 2010 [http://www.tnr.com/blog/foreign-policy/76902/the-downsizing-american-foreign-policy#](http://www.tnr.com/blog/foreign-policy/76902/the-downsizing-american-foreign-policy)

The American military presence around the world helps to support the global economy. American military deployments in Europe and East Asia help to keep order in regions populated by countries that are economically important and militarily powerful. The armed forces of the United States are crucial in checking the ambition of the radical government of Iran to dominate the oil-rich Middle East. For these reasons, the retreat of the United States risks making the world poorer and less secure, which means that the consequences of the economically-induced contraction of American foreign policy are all too likely to be anything but benign.

6. Broken commitment

Link: US bases represent a commitment to our allies.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

The United States’ forward presence also offers numerous diplomatic benefits. The politics of maintaining a presence in foreign nations no doubt comes with challenges. However, it also represents a steadfast commitment to an ally, which provides the basis for a sustained diplomatic partnership and regular military engagement and training with the host nation. For example, six decades of close cooperation between U.S. and Japanese naval forces have built an unrivaled degree of trust and interoperability. The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea has also helped to fashion a close relationship with the government in Seoul that would be vital during a crisis. And in Europe, U.S. forces have trained with NATO allies so that they have the capabilities to operate with us during an operation.

Link: Pulling out of our bases would show our allies we are not dependable.

Rep. J. Randy Forbes 2011 (BA Randolph-Macon College, 1974; JD University of Virginia, 1977, US Representative 4th District VA) December 2, 2011 “Puncturing the U.S. Base Myths” THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/02/puncturing-the-u-s-base-myths/>

Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the United States’ strength and commitment to security in the region that provides regional states the confidence to build their capabilities in the face of China’s decade-long military modernization. Also, at a time when the U.S. should be focused on making and keeping friends in critical regions, ending our overseas presence would send the message that we can’t be counted on as a partner. If we packed up and came home, there’s no telling the damage this would do to perceptions of our leadership, or how these states would respond if we asked to return to these facilities during a future crisis.

Loss of Credibility Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - BAD

Brink: The flood gates could open if a new country gets nukes

Joseph Cirincione 2004. (Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) “A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats,” <http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/wmdcommission/files/No10.pdf>

The danger is not just that the nuclear club could grow from the current eight to nine or ten nations, but that a new breach in the nuclear dam could unleash a flood of new entrants, collapsing global restraints and making every regional crisis a potential nuclear crisis. New nuclear weapon states may be less restrained in their nuclear use doctrines. Further, if North Korea, Iran or other nations in volatile regions develop nuclear weapons production capabilities, they might, willingly or unwillingly, share, sell or otherwise transfer weapons, materials or skills to terrorist groups.

Nuclear proliferation is the biggest danger facing the planet today

UN General Assembly Dept of Public Information 2011. “Nuclear Proliferation ‘Biggest Danger Facing Our Planet’, Says France, Warning In First Committee Debate ‘More Disarmament Will Not Suffice’ to Stop It” 5 Oct 2011 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gadis3431.doc.htm>

Efforts must be redoubled to “counter the biggest danger facing our planet today”, namely, nuclear proliferation, France’s delegate told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today, championing arms non-proliferation as the critical component to strengthening and safeguarding security. He was thinking, in particular, said France’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament as he addressed the Committee during its annual debate, of the “ongoing crises in Iran and North Korea, and of the Syrian nuclear issue that had been transferred to the Security Council”.

Impact: If more nations get nuclear weapons, it’s unrealistic to think nuclear catastrophe could be avoided

Henry Kissinger 2006. (former US Secretary of State) The New Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation, <http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/nuclear_proliferation.pdf>

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension. If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

Nuclear proliferation impact: Higher risk of terrorist group getting a nuke as more countries get nukes

Prof. Paul Rogers 2010. (professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, England) The nuclear-weapons risk, 15 Apr 2010 <http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/nuclear-weapons-risk>

On the first question, there is a small but definite possibility that a determined group could obtain a useable nuclear device illicitly either from a major existing nuclear state or from one of the newer powers. It is impossible to estimate the size of that risk, but it is probably the case that there was a greater danger in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even so, as nuclear weapons slowly proliferate, especially in countries with weaker security controls, then the chances of this outcome grow.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - Not a problem

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE / IMPACT RESPONSES

Nuclear weapons have prevented major catastrophic wars

Prof. Ronald J. Sievert 2010. (Professor, National Security and International Law, Bush School of Government, Adjunct Professor, Univ of Texas School of Law) WORKING TOWARD A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL Vol 34 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=32&ved=0CFEQFjABOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fir.lawnet.fordham.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D2283%26context%3Dilj&ei=A0MYUJbPEZKs8QSpvIHoBA&usg=AFQjCNGdOyxKoV7vfCpUvyTlUpXMWJFJNw>

In addition, a solid case can be made that nuclear weapons have actually continued to prevent major catastrophic wars by, for example, deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, a Chinese assault on Taiwan, or attempts by the Arab states to overrun Israel. NWS, like England, France, and the United States, that might wish to protect themselves and their allies against attack by larger states are simply not financially capable of permanently maintaining huge regular armies that can always deter a highly populous aggressor state by means of conventional weapons only.

The more nuclear weapons spread the less they can be used

Josh Hammer 2010. (International Relations theorist, with expertise in terrorist ideology, American foreign policy, and war / conflict resolution; Master's of Science degree in International Politics from the University of Edinburgh; Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the George Washington University) April 14 2010, "Archives for April, 2010," Foreign Policy Association <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/04/14/in-support-of-nuclear-proliferation/>

“In fact, there are many instances where nuclear proliferation can help increase international stability. Before nuclear weapons, there existed a more classical structure of state-state relations. A strong nation in proximity to weak nations often had dire consequences; most commonly war. Nuclear weapons have equalized that balance of power. Once obtained, they essentially make any nation ‘un-attackable’. The risks associated with attack are simply too great. Because of that stark fact, nuclear weapons can, and will, only be used on countries that do not possess a similar capability. The more these weapons spread, the less they can be used.”

Nuclear Proliferation will create a more secure, stable, and peaceful world

Prof. Todd Sechser 2008. Todd Sechser (Assistant Professor Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics University of Virginia) “Nuclear Weapons” <http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf>

The idea that the United States should aggressively pursue nuclear nonproliferation rests in part on a widespread belief that the spread of nuclear weapons would destabilize international relations. But this pessimistic view confronts one incontrovertible fact: nuclear weapons proliferated to thirteen states during the six decades since the dawn of the nuclear age, yet the world has not witnessed a single preventive or preemptive nuclear war, accidental nuclear attack, or instance of nuclear terrorism. Motivated by this striking observation, scholars known as “proliferation optimists” have suggested that nuclear proliferation may, in fact, exert a stabilizing force on international politics. They argue that nuclear states new and old will be highly motivated to avoid taking actions that might risk nuclear conflict. In the end, I conclude that further nuclear proliferation would probably bolster—not undermine—international stability. If the lessons of the nuclear age are to be believed, a world with more nuclear states is likely to be, on balance, a more stable, peaceful, and secure world than one without.”

More nuclear armed states deters nuclear and conventional conflicts

Erich Marquardt August 2003. Erich Marquardt (Senior Editor with the Combating Terrorism Center, editor-in-chief of the CTC Sentinel,), August 9th, 2003, "Why states want nuclear weapons," Asia Times, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EH09Dh02.html>

“There are diverging opinions over which state of affairs is better for world order: more nuclear-armed states, or fewer nuclear-armed states. In theory, if every state had nuclear capability, countries would be unwilling to attack one another out of fear of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). It is unlikely that states would be willing to use their nuclear weapons if they knew they would be a victim of a retaliatory nuclear attack. This reality caused former US defense secretary Robert McNamara to say that nuclear weapons "are totally useless - except to deter one's opponent from using them". In addition to preventing nuclear attacks, if all states were nuclear-armed it could theoretically limit the amount of conventional conflict, as there would be much more risk to take into account before deciding to attack a rival nuclear-armed state.”

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East wouldn’t damage US interests

Paul Pillar 2012. (teaches in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and was the national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; 28 years as intelligence analyst with CIA) WASHINGTON MONTHLY Mar/Apr 2012, We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril_2012/features/we_can_live_with_a_nuclear_ira035772.php>

Ever since John F. Kennedy mused that there might be fifteen to twenty-five states with nuclear weapons by the 1970s, estimates of the pace of proliferation—like estimates of the pace of Iran’s nuclear program—have usually been too high. Furthermore, it’s not clear that any of this would cause substantial and direct damage to U.S. interests. Indeed, the alarmists offer more inconsistent arguments when discussing the dynamics of a Middle East in which rivals of Iran acquire their own nuclear weapons. If, as the alarmists project, nuclear weapons would appreciably increase Iranian influence in the region, why wouldn’t further nuclear proliferation—which the alarmists also project—negate this effect by bestowing a comparable benefit on the rivals?

There has never been a war between two nuclear states

Jonathan Tepperman 2009. (Newsweek International's first Assistant Managing Editor, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine) August 29, 2009, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb. Newsweek. <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html>

“The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states."”

Nuclear weapons create stability by quelling conventional arms races and making wars less intense and frequent

Todd Sechser 2008. Todd Sechser (Assistant Professor Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics University of Virginia) “Nuclear Weapons” <http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf>

“The historical data presented here suggest that nuclear weapons have had a sobering effect on international politics. They have bolstered stability by quelling conventional-arms races and by making wars less intense and less frequent. Although it is impossible to know what a world without nuclear weapons would have looked like in the decades following World War II, it is reasonable to conclude from these data that the existence of nuclear weapons has restrained some international conflicts and prevented others from igniting altogether .In contrast, despite a sizable number of “close calls” experienced by the United States and other nations, the absence of preventive, preemptive, and accidental nuclear attacks casts doubt on gloomy predictions about the consequences of proliferation.”

“Nuclear Terrorism” Responses:

Most terrorists would not carry out a nuclear attack - high chance of failure may be deterrent

Dr. Michael A. Levi 2007. (PhD in War Studies from King’s College London and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations), April 13, 2007, “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/how_likely_is_a_nuclear_terrorist_attack_on_the_united_states.html>

“Most terrorist groups have little incentive to pursue nuclear terrorism, since mass murder doesn’t serve their political ends—but for some groups, indiscriminate killing is precisely the goal. Most analysts agree that the availability of nuclear weapons and materials, and the utility to terrorist groups of successful nuclear attacks, are the two most important factors in determining the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, even if they disagree over how hard acquiring materials would be or over how many groups might expect to benefit from nuclear terrorism. So let me flag another dimension of motivation that gets too little attention. Even groups that want to and possibly can execute nuclear attacks may decide against them. Why? Because many of the most dangerous terrorist groups hate to fail. Brian Jenkins wrote recently that for jihadists, “failure signals God’s disapproval.” That’s a lot of pressure to succeed. This inevitably pushes the odds of nuclear terrorism down. When we look at our defenses against nuclear terrorism, we prudently notice the holes. When terrorists look at those same defenses, they may be fixating on whatever barriers, however limited, exist. If that’s what’s happening, nuclear terrorism may be much less likely than many expect.”

A rogue state would never give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group

Dr. John J. Mearsheimer 2006. (PhD and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and West Point graduate), 2006, “Conversation in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer,” Part II, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0041.pdf>

“It is highly unlikely that Iraq or any rogue state would give nuclear weapons to a terrorist group like Al-Qaeda. For starters, the rogue could not be confident that the transfer would go undetected, as numerous intelligence services would be watching for such a move. If discovered, the American response would surely be swift and devastating. But even if a rogue state was confident that it could covertly smuggle nuclear weapons to an organization like Al-Qaeda, it would still be unlikely to do so. The reason is that the rogue would lose control over when and where those weapons might be used, and there is good reason to think that Al-Qaeda would use those weapons against American targets. In the event that happened, the rogue could never be sure that we would not incinerate it anyway – even if we merely suspected that it had aided Al-Qaeda. That threat should be more than enough to deter a rogue from giving nuclear weapons to a terrorist group.”

States do not share nuclear weapons with terrorists or other states

Prof. John Mueller 2007. (Department of Political Science, Ohio State University), 24 July 2007, "REACTIONS AND OVERREACTIONS TO TERRORISM: THE ATOMIC OBSESSION," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF>

A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20). Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state—even a close ally, much less a terrorist group—a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently.

SOLVENCY

Nothing we can do. We can’t prevent more countries from getting nuclear weapons, if they are really determined

Steve Kidd 2010. (Director of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association; master’s degree in economics from the University of Cambridge) 23 July 2010 “Nuclear proliferation risk – is it vastly overrated?” NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL <http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931>

It is likely that more countries will foolishly choose to acquire nuclear weapons. If they are really determined to do so, there is little really that the world can do to prevent them—the main effort has to be in dissuading them from this course of action. How many countries will have nuclear weapons by 2030 is hard to say, but there could well be a total of 15 by then. Mueller argues that this increase, in itself, will neither prevent nor cause wars, but will impose substantial costs on the countries concerned. Apart from the costs of weapons programmes diverting needed economic resources away from more productive activities, such countries are likely to be faced with economic sanctions which would create severe economic hardship for their citizens but be unlikely to deter them.

**DISADVANTAGE to worrying about nuclear proliferation**

**1. Increased Appeal. Quest to control nuclear proliferation enhances the appeal of nukes**

**Impact: Quest to control proliferation causes more deaths than WMDs themselves**

Prof. John Mueller 2007. (Department of Political Science, Ohio State University), 24 July 2007, "REACTIONS AND OVERREACTIONS TO TERRORISM: THE ATOMIC OBSESSION," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF>

The likelihood a terrorist group will come up with a nuclear weapons seems to be vanishingly small. However, the obsessive quest to control nuclear proliferation—particularly since the end of the Cold War—has enhanced the appeal of—or desperate desire for—nuclear weapons for some regimes. In addition, the quest has been a necessary cause of far more deaths than have been inflicted by all nuclear—or even all "weapons of mass destruction"—detonations in all of history.

**Sanctions & threats increase incentives for bad guys to get WMDs**

Prof. Harald Muller 2008 (PhD; Professor of International Relations, Goethe-University, Frankfurt, Germany; visiting lecturer at NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy), Spring 2008, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World," WASHINTON QUARTERLY, [www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\_muller.pdf](http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_muller.pdf)

The U.S. inclination to pressure, sanction, threaten, and occasionally attack enemies of its choice, a threat which invariably has a nuclear undertone, contributes to the anxiousness of the paranoids, pygmies, and pariahs to acquire some sort of deterrent, if not nuclear then at least biological or chemical weapons.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM - Not a problem

by Nathan Jones

Nuclear terrorism is science fiction

Dr. Adam Garfinkle 2009. (PhD in international relations, served as a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security), May 2009, Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?" <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html>

There have, of course, been several novels, dozens of action movies, and countless television shows featuring terrorists who had somehow gotten their hands on a nuclear device. But none of these dramas ever explains credibly how a bunch of ragtag dropouts and narcissists get their hands on or figure out how to build a useable nuclear weapon. This is because they can't. It is, to understate the matter, not an easy thing to build a nuclear weapon, given the physics, metallurgy, and engineering involved. It takes a fairly large space, a lot of people with different kinds of specialties, and a fair amount of time and money. The material involved is not easy to hide or move, and it certainly isn't easy to deliver a bomb to a target even if one could be fabricated or stolen. Some of the more imaginative depictions of potential catastrophe would have us believe that terrorists could put a nuclear bomb in a suitcase. This is nonsense. You've got to be very sophisticated technically to get a nuke into a suitcase. If you're al Qaeda working in a cave somewhere, even if you have some metallurgy experts and scientists trying to help you, getting a nuclear device into a suitcase is even less likely than being able to launch Osama bin Laden into orbit.

One-in-a-million to one-in-three-billion chance of success – calculation

Prof. John Mueller 2010. (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), 2010, Terrorizing Ourselves, The Cato Institute, "The Atomic Terrorist?", ISBN: 978-1-935308-30-0, <http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ> (page 152)

One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 8.1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful are less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds of their being able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion - specifically 3,486,784,401. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

Nuclear terrorism risk consistently overestimated

Dr. Bruno Tertrais 2010.(PhD in political science, senior fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies), April 2010, The Washington Quarterly, "The Illogic of Zero", <http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_Tertrais.pdf> (page 128-129)

The risk of nuclear terrorism in particular, which is at the forefront of current U.S. concerns, has been consistently overestimated over the years. Despite the dire previsions of many experts since 1945, no serious, elaborate, and well-funded attempt to organize such an act of terror is known to have ever taken place.

Al Qaeda can't support nuclear terrorism

Dr. Adam Garfinkle 2009. (PhD in international relations, served as a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security), May 2009, Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?" <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html>

So if al Qaeda is capable of strategic reasoning, says it wants nukes, and actually made an effort in 2002-04 to obtain them in cahoots with the A.Q. Khan network, shouldn't we be extremely afraid? No. Just as it would be irresponsible to ignore the threat of terrorism, it is irresponsible to exaggerate it. Thus, for example, contrary to what some believe, al Qaeda is not stronger today, thanks to the supposed recruiting windfall provided by the Iraq war, than it was in 2001-02. It is, not least, nearly broke, or its spokesmen would not be asking for money every time they put out an Internet message. Al Qaeda has been fractured, too, which can cause new problems but which, on balance, is a good thing. It's also vastly more unpopular throughout most Muslim societies because of the arrogant and murderous way it has conducted itself in Iraq and elsewhere.

Requires government assistance to build a nuke

Harvard Law Review, May 2008. "Note: The Incentive Gap: Reassessing U.S. Policies To Secure Nuclear Arsenals Worldwide", 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1864, <http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/121/may08/notes/the_incentive_gap.pdf> (page 1865-1866)

In order for terrorists to launch a nuclear attack on the United States, they must first acquire a completed nuclear weapon or the fissile material necessary to build a bomb from scratch. Both of these options require some state involvement, whether intentional or unwitting. With respect to completed nuclear weapons, nine countries currently control the entire global arsenal: the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In order to obtain one of these weapons, terrorists would have to steal it from state storage facilities or convince a state government to transfer or sell it to them voluntarily. A similar dynamic applies for terrorist groups seeking to build a bomb from scratch. Nuclear bombs require either HEU or plutonium, neither of which occurs naturally. There is widespread consensus among experts that even the best funded and most technically advanced terrorists will not be able to produce HEU or plutonium without state assistance. Both the uranium enrichment and plutonium paths to nuclearization require complicated and costly facilities, sophisticated technologies, "a sizable and scientifically knowledgeable labor force, significant industrial resources, and time," making it "virtually impossible for terrorists to create their own nuclear material, regardless of which ingredient they use." Even if weapons expertise becomes widely available and costs fall due to technological advances, terrorists will still need physical space to build reactors and reprocessing facilities, meaning that a state must either fail to notice or acquiesce to its land being used for these illicit activities.

Nuclear security much improved – nuclear materials have been secured

Dr. Bruno Tertrais 2010. (PhD in political science, senior fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies), April 2010, The Washington Quarterly, "The Illogic of Zero", <http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_Tertrais.pdf> (page 129)

Nuclear stockpiles are also generally much safer than they were 20 years ago. The oldest U.S. and Soviet ''tactical'' weapons, which did not include the most sophisticated security locks, have been retired. Efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program and the 2002 Global Partnership have secured most ex-Soviet materials.

“Easy to make a simple bomb": Actually, it’s very hard - the so-called 'experts' are wrong

Prof. John Mueller 2010. (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), Terrorizing Ourselves, The Cato Institute, "The Atomic Terrorist?", ISBN: 978-1-935308-30-0, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ficnnd.org%2FDocuments%2FMueller\_Terrorism.rtf&ei=AS\_MUN2MDMSzyAHG-4CgBg&usg=AFQjCNHnzUSskb6C8UjiNPeCKxX0yAVujg&bvm=bv.1355325884,d.aWc (page 146)

Los Alamos research director Younger has made a similar argument, expressing his amazement at "self declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," who "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Information is readily available for getting the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive, but none of it is detailed enough for "the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive."

“Stolen nukes": Useless without high-tech maintenance

Prof. John Mueller 2010 (PhD in political science, professor of political science at Ohio State University), Terrorizing Ourselves, The Cato Institute, "The Atomic Terrorist?", ISBN: 978-1-935308-30-0, <http://books.google.com/books?id=HIsLQgAACAAJ> (page 141)

However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become "radioactive scrap metal." Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even nonexistent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Diversion of resources. Worrying about terrorist nukes diverts attention and resources from other problems where they would do more good

2. Terrorists empowered. Exaggerating their capabilities empowers the terrorists by giving them more credit than they deserve

Dr. Adam Garfinkle 2009. (PhD in international relations, served as a staff member of the National Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security), May 2009, Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?", <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html>

So if al Qaeda is capable of strategic reasoning, says it wants nukes, and actually made an effort in 2002-04 to obtain them in cahoots with the A.Q. Khan network, shouldn't we be extremely afraid? No. Just as it would be irresponsible to ignore the threat of terrorism, it is irresponsible to exaggerate it. Thus, for example, contrary to what some believe, al Qaeda is not stronger today, thanks to the supposed recruiting windfall provided by the Iraq war, than it was in 2001-02. It is, not least, nearly broke, or its spokesmen would not be asking for money every time they put out an Internet message. Al Qaeda has been fractured, too, which can cause new problems but which, on balance, is a good thing. It's also vastly more unpopular throughout most Muslim societies because of the arrogant and murderous way it has conducted itself in Iraq and elsewhere. Exaggerating the terrorist threat gives terrorists more credit than they deserve, empowering them as avatars of anti-Western grievances, real and imagined. It also diverts our attention and resources away from other problems where they could do more good. Moreover, the threat of nuclear terrorism is very remote.

OKINAWA - Essential

INHERENCY

U.S. to withdraw 9,000 Marines from Okinawa

USA Today 2012. “U.S. to remove 9,000 Marines from Japanese island of Okinawa,” April 27, 2012, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-04-26/marines-okinawa-japan-military/54570990/1>

“About 9,000 U.S. Marines stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa will be moved to the U.S. territory of Guam and other locations in the Asia-Pacific, including Hawaii, under a U.S.-Japan agreement announced Thursday.”

SIGNIFICANCE

Most Activists at Henoko, Japan, near U.S. Marine base are outsiders and villagers are not dogmatically opposed

Martin Fackler 2012 (Journalist). “Amid Image of Ire Toward U.S. Bases, Okinawans’ True Views Vary,” New York Times, February 14, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/world/asia/okinawan-views-on-us-military-presence-are-nuanced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> [brackets added]

“At first glance, this tiny fishing village [Henoko, Japan] can appear a hotbed of the sort of Okinawan anger that has damaged America’s ties with Japan. Near Henoko’s docks, demonstrators in tents recently marked the 2,850th day of their vigil against construction of a United States Marine airfield. But wander up Henoko’s narrow streets, and the villagers will tell you a different story. They say the activists are outsiders. Most residents, they say, still support the village’s “painful decision” of more than a decade ago to accept the planned air base, with its noise and risk of crashes, in exchange for jobs and compensation payments. “Of course, it would be better not to have the air base, but we are not dogmatic like them,” Masaaki Shiroma, a community association leader, said as he nodded toward the tent encampment.”

Many Okinawans have good relations with U.S. military and many locals have married servicemen

Masami Ito 2012. (Journalist and Staff Writer for The Japan Times), “Location key to region's security: U.S. defense shift keeps Okinawa in strategic mix,” The Japan Times, May 16, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120516f1.html> (brackets added)

“[Manabu] Sato [professor at Okinawa International University] noted that the U.S. military issue in Okinawa is much more complex than just the "antibase sentiment" on the surface. For more than half a century, the Okinawans have had to deal with aircraft noise pollution, both from U.S. military and SDF aircraft, but at the same time, many have developed good relations over the years and share a special bond as many local women have married U.S. servicemen, the professor pointed out.”

Japanese leaders believe Marines in Okinawa are necessary for Japan’s national security

Bruce Klinger 2010. Bruce Klinger ((Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), With Re-Acceptance of Marines on Okinawa, Time to Look Ahead,” The Heritage Foundation, May 28, 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/05/with-re-acceptance-of-marines-on-okinawa-time-to-look-ahead> (first set of brackets added, second in the original)

“The [Democratic Party of Japan] DPJ policy reversal is the result of senior Japanese officials having a belated epiphany on geostrategic realities. They now realize that the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. Foreign Minister Okada affirmed that “the presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japan’s national security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.””

SOLVENCY – Can’t replace Okinawa

Okinawa is the best place in the world to dispatch Marines to deal with natural disasters

Richard C. Bush III 2010. (PhD from Columbia University and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution) “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” The Brookings Institution, March 10, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/03/10-japan-politics-bush>

“Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, recently spoke in Japan about the importance of Okinawa for the mission of the Marines. Among other things, he said that the U.S. Marine Corps is the emergency response force in East Asia. He explained that “The fundamental Marine Corps organizational structure is the Marine Air Ground Task Force, in which war fighting elements of aviation forces, ground combat forces, and logistics forces all operate under a single commander.” The Marine ground forces must train consistently with the helicopters that support them. Lieutenant General Stalder illustrated his point by saying that the “Marine Air Ground Task Force is a lot like a baseball team. It does not do you any good to have the outfielders practicing in one town, the catcher in another, and the third baseman somewhere else. They need to practice together, as a unit.” He went on to say that Okinawa is very important because it is relatively close to mainland Japan, to Korea, to the South China Sea, and to the Strait of Malacca. This geographic location is why, he said, “There is probably nowhere better in the world from which to dispatch Marines to natural disasters” than Okinawa.”

Japan has no credible Marine or Amphibious force and does not intend to assume regional responsibilities of the Okinawa Marines

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“Japan lacks any Marine forces of its own, has ground forces that are less capable than their U.S. counterparts, and has poor combined arms operation capabilities. Nor is there any existing Asian architecture that guarantees the rights or interests of Asian nations. The continued presence of U.S. Marines ensures that Japan’s security limitations do not become liabilities. The Japanese Ministry of Defense responded to growing concerns over China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy by advocating the creation of Japanese ground forces “modeled after the U.S. Marine Corps to strengthen the defense of remote islands in southwestern Japan.” The ministry recommended doubling the 2,000 GSDF troops on Okinawa and developing ground forces capable of conducting amphibious operations to retake islands held by hostile forces. Yet Japanese forces’ amphibious operations capabilities remain in their infancy, and Tokyo does not intend to assume the regional responsibilities of the U.S. Marines on Okinawa.”

Forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and Okinawa essential to U.S. China Strategy

Richard C. Bush III 2010. (PhD from Columbia University and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution) “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” The Brookings Institution, March 10, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/03/10-japan-politics-bush>

“The threat environment in Northeast Asia is not benign. North Korea’s WMD capabilities are a matter of concern but will hopefully be a medium-term problem. More attention, however, is focused on China which has gradually developed a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the first island chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However, how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing that China has nuclear weapons? There are also specific points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan, some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hope that China will not seek to dominate East Asia at the U.S. and Japan’s expense, we can’t be sure of their intentions either. Hope is not a policy. The most sensible strategy—for both the U.S. and Japan—is to try to shape China’s intentions over time so that they move in a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japan’s strategy since the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each other’s respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important.”

DISADVANTAGES

LINK TO ALL THE JAPAN D.A.s FOUND IN THE NEG. JAPAN BRIEF

Big Link: No other country can replace Japan, including Okinawa, for US strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans

Masami Ito 2012. (Journalist and Staff Writer for The Japan Times), “Location key to region's security: U.S. defense shift keeps Okinawa in strategic mix,” The Japan Times, May 16, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120516f1.html> [ellipses in original]

But 40 years on, security experts say Japan, including Okinawa, is strategically more important than ever to the U.S., especially amid China's increasing military might and the growing budgetary constraints on Washington. Military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa said Japan is the only country in the area that can offer support to the U.S. geopolitically, financially and technically. "Half of the world, from Hawaii to Cape Town, is being supported by the U.S. military forces in Japan . . . and no other country can replace Japan," Ogawa said. "The Japanese archipelago is the only power-projection platform for the U.S."

Okinawa hosts disproportionate share of the continuing U.S. military presence in Japan (50% of military personnel)

Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2012. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service) and Ian E. Rinehart (Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service), “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy,” Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf>

“Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island’s key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the continuing U.S. military presence. About 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan and about half of the U.S. military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area.”

1. Humanitarian & Disaster Response Undermined

Link: U.S. presence in Okinawa enables responses to humanitarian disasters

Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2012. Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service) and Ian E. Rinehart (Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service), “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy,” Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2012, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf>

The U.S. military presence in Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific region. The forward-deployed presence of the U.S. Air Force and Navy also allows for response to humanitarian disasters in the region, as demonstrated by the massive response to the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan.”

Link: Okinawa Marines are the primary responders to major disasters in Asia

Impact: Hundreds of thousands of lives saved

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“The Okinawa Marines have routinely been the primary responders to major natural disasters in Asia, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, mudslides in the Philippines, and the typhoon in Taiwan. The Marines have led or participated in 12 significant humanitarian assistance–disaster relief (HADR) missions during the past five years alone, helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in the region.[26] For example, in response to the March 2011 natural disasters in Japan, U.S. military forces in Asia responded quickly and worked seamlessly with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Operation Tomodachi (“friendship”) highlighted the versatility of U.S. forces deployed on Okinawa. During Operation Tomodachi, the proximity of Futenma MCAS to Marine ground and logistics units was critical to the rapid deployment of supplies and personnel. Marine assets on Okinawa began flying to Japan within four hours of being tasked. Helicopter and fixed-wing C-130 aircraft from Futenma were involved in humanitarian operations, as were members of the 31st MEU, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, and 1st Marine Air Wing, all based in Okinawa.”

2. Undermines Deterrence

Osprey aircraft at Okinawa reassure the region and deter potential adversaries

Yuki Tatsumi 2012. (senior associate at the East Asia Program of the Stimson Center) “U.S.-Japanese Tensions Flare,” The National Interest, October 18, 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/us-japanese-tensions-flare-7618>

“The high-speed, intraregional transport capability demonstrated by the Osprey is essential to this end. Ospreys deployed in Okinawa will enable Marines to respond to a diverse set of emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region. From humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to supporting U.S. allies defending territory in the initial phase of an armed conflict, Ospreys will allow Marines to move personnel and assets much more quickly within the region. In peacetime, they will help Marines to engage in various capacity-building efforts. In short, Osprey is critical to sustaining the perception within the Asia-Pacific region that United States remains steadfastly committed to providing peace and stability. Such a tangible demonstration not only reassures U.S. friends and allies in the region—it also discourages potential adversaries from taking action.”

U.S. Marines at Okinawa are essential for Japanese security - they deter aggression

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“U.S.Ambassador to Japan John Roos has explained that the fundamental role of U.S. military forces in Japan is to “make those who would consider the use of force in this region understand that option is off the table. The forward deployment of U.S. forces puts us in a position to react immediately to emerging threats.”[7] The December 2010 Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines underscored Roos’s comments by noting that the presence of U.S. armed forces in Japan gives countries in the Asia–Pacific region a strong sense of security by “functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region.”[8] Foreign Minister Okada affirmed that “the presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japan’s national security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.”[9] History has repeatedly shown that ground troops are necessary to influence an opponent. Removing combat elements of the only rapidly deployable U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India would degrade U.S. deterrence capacity and limit response options.”

3. Taiwan security.

Link: China less likely to attack Taiwan with U.S. forces at Okinawa

Dr. Richard C. Bush III 2010. (PhD from Columbia University and Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution) “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” The Brookings Institution, March 10, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/03/10-japan-politics-bush>

“Taiwan also has concerns. The Marines on Okinawa, plus the U.S. air force, serve to strengthen deterrence in the event of aggression by China against Taiwan. China will be less likely to mount an attack because the U.S. has both ground troops and an air base on Okinawa. If China attacked U.S. installations on Okinawa, that almost ensures a serious conflict. The bases act as a tripwire.”

Link: China wants sovereignty over Taiwan and is willing to use force to get it

Ralph Jennings and Ben Blanchard 2010. (journalists), 30 Jan 2010, REUTERS News Service, "Q+A: How arms sales to Taiwan will impact Sino-U.S. ties" <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60T08820100131>

China has claimed sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan since 1949, when Mao Zedong's forces won the Chinese civil war and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fled to the island. Beijing has vowed to bring Taiwan under its rule, by force if necessary.

Impact: Taiwan war would be a disaster for China and the US.

[PRC=People’s Republic of China]

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2004. ( PhD in Diplomatic History; vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international issues) 10 Aug 2004, "China's Taiwan Policy and America's Difficult Choices" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2778>

And a war in the Taiwan strait would be a disaster for both the PRC and the United States. The mutually beneficial economic relationship (now valued at more than $150 billion a year) would be severed, and America's relations with a major power would be poisoned for decades.

4. Chinese hegemony

Link: U.S. forces in Okinawa deter China and maintain stability

Masami Ito 2012. (Journalist and Staff Writer for The Japan Times), “Location key to region's security: U.S. defense shift keeps Okinawa in strategic mix,” The Japan Times, May 16, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120516f1.html>

“Experts note two of the biggest potential sources of conflict between China and the U.S. are Taiwan and the conflicting territorial claims over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, are competing with China's claims to the territories. Many military experts believe the U.S. military presence in Japan, including the elements in Okinawa, deter China from crossing the line. "The biggest problem would emerge if China tries to demonstrate its control over the waters and threatens the sealanes," said Hiromichi Muromoto, a professor of security issues at Musashino Gakuin University in Saitama Prefecture. "To protect the freedom of navigation, the U.S. will not let China prevent other ships from going through." China has also been acting more aggressively in the East China Sea by sending vessels near the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands. China and Taiwan claim the uninhabited islets. Muromoto, a former official at the old Defense Agency, noted the Self-Defense Forces alone would not be able to cope with the Chinese military, thus the continued presence of the U.S. forces under the mutual security treaty plays the key role of deterrence. "What is important is to show that the SDF exists under the Japan-U.S. security pact and that if China were to (act against Japan), the U.S. military would respond," Muromoto said. "China doesn't want to start a war with the U.S. And so (the U.S. forces) being in Okinawa has enabled the region to maintain stability," he explained.”

U.S. presence in Okinawa deters Chinese hegemony

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“U.S. forward-deployed forces in Asia are indisputable signals of Washington’s commitment to the obligations of its 1960 security treaty with Japan to defend its allies and maintain peace and stability in Asia. The U.S. Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable component of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. The Marine presence is also a clear rebuttal to perceptions of waning United States resolve in the face of a rising and assertive China. Withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Okinawa would only affirm that perception and lead Asian nations to accommodate themselves to Chinese pressure. As a senior U.S. military officer commented, “U.S. dominance is not a given. You have to be on the court to be in the game.”

Impact: China promotes authoritarian repressive ideology in Asia

John J. Tkacik, Jr. 2007. (Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud­ies Center at The Heritage Foundation) 17 Mar 2007, “China's Quest for a Superpower Military” HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Backgrounder #2036 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm>

America could engage and strengthen the cur­rent robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting the democracies of the Americas with their counter­parts along the Western Pacific Rim, or a disengaged America could allow a Sino-centric axis to crystal­lize as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, and eventually Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band­wagon with China. The latter would make Leninist-mercantilist China the rule-maker in Asia, not just for transnational trade and financial structures, but also for a new Asian security architecture and a new ideology of authoritarian state-mercantilism that defends repressive "development models based on national conditions."

5. Korean War II.

Link: U.S. forces on Okinawa play crucial role in Korean conflict scenarios

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, (brackets added) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“The U.S. and South Korea have also developed Concept Plan 5029 to respond to crisis contingencies short of war. MAGTF forces can conduct several military operations in support of those plans, including limited amphibious raids and full-scale amphibious assaults, airfield and port seizure operations, maritime interdiction operations, amphibious advanced force operations, stability operations, and tactical air support.[21] Major General Mark Brilakis, commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa, affirmed that in *all* U.S. contingency plans for Korea, the 3rd MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] plays a major role. In case of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, Brilakis stated, “overnight, I go from being the smallest division in the Marine Corps to being the largest.”[22] According to Japanese media reports, Lieutenant General Stalder commented during a private meeting with Japanese officials that during a Korean crisis, the Marines in Okinawa would be charged with seizing North Korean nuclear weapons.

Link, Brink & Impact: The Marines on Okinawa play a critical role in any Korean contingency, drastically reduce the risk of North Korean invasion

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific> [brackets for quotation marks added, all other brackets and ellipses in original]

Marine forces are capable of conducting a full range of combat operations in Korea. Even the threat of an amphibious invasion would force North Korea to divert ground forces from the front line. General Burwell Bell, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, affirmed that: [“][The Marines on Okinawa] have a critical role in any Korean contingency. They were my deep operational ground maneuver unit. Without them, it would be WWI all over again. When the North Koreans consider the potential for the United States Marines to interdict their logistics sites and fragile supply lines deep in their rear areas, the likelihood of the North seriously considering a sustained ground offensive drops drastically.[16][“]

Impact: Okinawa forces key to keeping Korea at peace

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific> [brackets for quotation marks added, all other brackets and ellipses in original]

“Representative Park Jin, then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the South Korean National Assembly, declared that: [“] [T]he U.S. military bases located in Okinawa play a significant role in keeping the Korean peninsula peaceful and safe. The U.S. Marines in Okinawa are obliged to defend Korea…. Thus, the relocation of U.S. military bases in Japan would affect not only the U.S.–Japan relations but also security on the Korean peninsula. [17][“]

6. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Moving marines out of Okinawa would hinder NEOs

Impact: Directly increases threats to U.S. lives

Bruce Klinger 2011. (Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, M.A. in National Security Strategy from the National War College and M.A. in Strategic Intelligence form the Defense Intelligence College), “ Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” The Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>

“The U.S. Marine presence enables non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Marines, through NEOS, provide physical protection and evacuate U.S. citizens from Taiwan or other Asian nations during a deteriorating security situation or natural disaster. NEOs usually involve “swift insertions of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.”[24] NEOs have typically been a specialty of Marine Expeditionary Units, which have participated in several NEOs worldwide. Implementing an NEO may require forming a joint task force. However, the organic combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of a Marine Corps forward-deployed amphibious expeditionary strike group (special operations capable) are trained and certified to conduct NEOs.[25] The 31st MEU on Okinawa routinely trains for NEOs. Moving U.S. Marines away from Okinawa would hinder protection and evacuation operations, directly increasing the threat to U.S. lives, as well as the lives of America’s allies.”

PIRACY

INHERENCY

European Union is attacking pirate bases in Somalia, and piracy is sharply reduced from a few years ago

NEW YORK TIMES, last updated in May 2012. “Piracy at Sea” last updated 15 May 2012 <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/piracy_at_sea/index.html>

In March 2012, the European Union toughened its antipiracy mandate to allow forces patrolling the Indian Ocean to attack bases in Somalia. Before that, the forces were allowed to pursue pirates only at sea. Though Somali pirates still hold around a dozen vessels and several hundred crew members, that figure is sharply reduced from a few years ago, when the pirates had dozens of captured ships under their control and nearly 1,000 seamen. The combination of strengthened foreign naval patrols, an increase in prosecutions and some progress toward a stable Somali government appears to be hurting the ability of the pirates to operate.

Inherency: Somali public support for pirates is lessening

Non-Military MINOR REPAIR: Fund local radio awareness campaign and infrastructure employment programs

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

The Somali pirates have successfully invoked long-standing local grievances over illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping to create what is effectively an enabling environment for attacks on foreign vessels. The Somali public’s willingness to tolerate piracy appears, however, to be lessening. Local public awareness campaigns have sought to highlight the social, economic, and political costs of piracy, often by engaging local clerics and clan elders as spokesmen. The work of Radio Daljir, a Bossasso-based radio station, has been particularly effective. The United States, potentially via USAID or UNDP, should support these local awareness campaigns, and it could greatly enhance their effectiveness through the creation of employment opportunities for at-risk youth. Infrastructure projects, such as road construction, could provide immediate opportunities.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

Pirate attacks off Somalia have dropped dramatically in 2012

Frank Gardner 2012. (journalist) BBC NEWS, Somali piracy: A broken business model?” 29 Nov 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20549056> (“EU Navfor” = European Union Naval Force)

The statistics show a dramatic reduction in pirate attacks off Somalia.In 2011, according to EU Navfor Somalia, there were 151 verified attacks on sizable ships, with 25 vessels being successfully pirated. So far this year, the number of attacks has shrunk to 31, with just five ships captured, the last one in May.

Harm Response: Pirates are afraid to cooperate with extremists/terrorists

Disad: ...but if we use a disproportionate response, it could motivate them to start cooperating with them

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: http://books.google.com/books?id=Kg7FTorFaTAC&pg=PA33&lpg=PA33

Pirates currently have strong disincentives to cooperate with extremist elements, for fear of being branded terrorists themselves. A disproportionate response could nudge pirates into profit-seeking cooperation with extremist elements, facilitating the flow of arms into the country. In the worst-case scenario, piracy could evolve into maritime terrorism.

SOLVENCY

Solvency: Naval patrols do little to deter pirates. Shipping industry responses are reducing the capture rate

Cross-Apply under Inherency: 4 naval operations are already working against piracy in the Gulf of Aden

(that’s near Somalia). US, European Union, NATO and independent national navies already patrolling

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

A well-coordinated international naval response has done little to deter the attacks, which rose to 214 in 2009. The U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Combined Task Force 151, the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Allied Protector, and independent national navies currently have some thirty ships patrolling the Gulf of Aden. The only good news is that, though the rate of attacks has accelerated, recent measures taken by the shipping industry to beef up on-board security measures have been rewarded with a decrease in the capture rate.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Blowback. Aggressive response to piracy in Somalia would backfire: Increase public tolerance of pirate activities and further radicalize the population

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Whatever the pressures or temptations to adopt an aggressive response to piracy, the United States should be sensitive to how such tactics can backfire. Overwhelming use of force, such as the bombing of pirate strongholds in Hobyo, Haraardheere, or Eyl, could politicize the piracy issue, which would likely increase public tolerance of pirate activities. It could also undermine broader U.S. security objectives by further radicalizing the population.

PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE – not a problem

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / OBLIGATORY QUOTE FROM WINSTON CHURCHILL

Preventive war is a traditional last resort of democracies and didn’t use to be controversial. Just ask Winston Churchill

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo> (brackets in original)

In the past leaders of democracies have not shied away from the prospect of preventive war. Winston Churchill, in his memoirs of the Second World War, found “no merit in [statesmen] putting off a war” when “the safety of the State, the lives and freedom of their own fellow countrymen, to whom they owe their position, make it right and imperative in the last resort.” Yet in the current climate of opinion, such thinking would be controversial—in large part, no doubt, because of the continuing disputes over the normative, strategic, and legal wisdom of what has been called the “Bush Doctrine.”

INHERENCY

Obama is reversing the Bush “preemption” doctrine

Lisa Mascaro and Christi Parsons 2010. (journalists) LOS ANGELES TIMES “Obama calls for a strategy of global cooperation” <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/23/nation/la-na-obama-west-point-20100523>

In coming to the U.S. Military Academy, Obama returned to the location where six months ago he revealed his plan for sending an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. It is also where Bush in 2002 established his own policy by staking out the right to unilateral and preemptive military action against terrorism in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. What became known as the Bush doctrine was widely criticized by those who believed military might without broader international cooperation would not defeat the terrorist threat, especially because interlocking terrorist organizations operate along dangerous frontiers between developing countries. Obama has steadily moved toward a reversal of that approach, first on the campaign trail and now as his presidency articulates a national security strategy grounded in international cooperation.

Best evidence in the round: The Obama 2010 National Security Strategy – it updates the Bush documents and says we’re going to use diplomacy first and get international legitimacy before using military force

Pres. Barack Obama 2010. National Security Strategy, May 2010 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>

Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis. We will draw on diplomacy, development, and international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict, and maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of force. This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the U.S. military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber. It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security. While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

MINOR REPAIR: Don’t abolish preventive action, but set a high intelligence threat estimate threshold before acting preventively

The Boston Term Member group of the Council on Foreign Relations 2004. (hosted three roundtables in the late spring of 2003 to examine the concept of “preemption” contained in the President’s National Security Strategy Report. Panelists included Stephen Walt and Ashton Carter of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Richard Betts of Columbia University, and Michael Glennon of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; paper written by Jon Rosenwasser, a Fellow in International Affairs with Council on Foreign Relations) The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How, Where? 1 Feb 2004 <http://www.cfr.org/world/bush-administrations-doctrine-preemption-prevention-/p6799>

Third, if an American administration believes that the U.S. must act preventively against another state, that administration must make a good faith effort to distinguish “hard” intelligence of intentions and capabilities from more subjective analysis and political judgment of longer-term trends or emerging threats. Well-delivered analysis of long-term trends can be just as influential and credible as hard intelligence: Kennan’s Long Telegram and “X” article in Foreign Affairs together formed the basis for a 45 year strategy of containment. Presidents and their administrations should meet that very high standard of analysis in presenting preventive strategies to the Congress, the American people and the international community.

SIGNIFICANCE

Governments don’t actually follow strategy documents. Preemption doctrine doesn’t guide every decision and Pres. GW Bush, its author, ignored it when he felt like it

Cross Apply under Solvency: It doesn’t matter what the document says if it isn’t binding and we don’t follow it. Affirmative can put anything in the document and it won’t change the behavior of the US federal government, since it’s not binding

Barton Gellman 2003. (journalist with WASHINGTON POST) 29 Jan 2003 FRONTLINE interview with Barton Gellman, Public Broadcasting System <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/themes/assess.html>

I doubt there's any government in the world that guides itself primarily by strategy or conceptual documents or worldview. Anybody who has the reigns of power has to look at practical limitations and tradeoffs and the fact that you can focus at most on one or two things at a time, and that resources are limited and that there are conflicts of interest, for example, between your trade objectives, your human rights objectives, your nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and the desire to make sure you're the toughest kid on the block in every region of the world. And so I see a strong element of pragmatism and realism that is in competition in the Bush White House with the grand strategy of maintaining global hegemony and the grand strategy of preempting the acquisition or development or use of certain classes of weapons by any other state. You saw it in the interception of a North Korean supply ship on the way to Yemen with a load of missiles. If there was any case study in which you'd expect to see the application of a Bush preemption doctrine -- and let's remember, this happened literally on the day that this preemption doctrine is released -- you'd have thought that American policy under this White House would have taken these missiles, either seized them or sunk them on the high seas and said, "We're not going to tolerate North Korean missile exports." And what do they do? They get a very strong protest from Yemen, on which they are depending in another security interest entirely, which is the war with Al Qaeda, and they cave. They say, "Oh, excuse me, we didn't realize it was for you, here are your missiles." So grand strategy can't guide every decision and certainly isn't guiding every decision in the Bush White House.

GW Bush’s National Security Strategy document on pre-emption contained no specific criteria or guidelines

Analysis: Plan to repeal Bush’s doctrine essentially repeals nothing.

The Boston Term Member group of the Council on Foreign Relations 2004. (hosted three roundtables in the late spring of 2003 to examine the concept of “preemption” contained in the President’s National Security Strategy Report. Panelists included Stephen Walt and Ashton Carter of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Richard Betts of Columbia University, and Michael Glennon of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; paper written by Jon Rosenwasser, a Fellow in International Affairs with Council on Foreign Relations) The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How, Where? 1 Feb 2004 <http://www.cfr.org/world/bush-administrations-doctrine-preemption-prevention-/p6799> (brackets and parentheses in original)

A key concept underlying President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS), issued 20 September 2002, is that of “preemption,”[1] defined as “preemptive and preventive action.” The NSS notes that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states have made preemption more attractive as a policy option, but it does not lay out specific criteria or guidelines for determining when the U.S. should carry out preemptive attacks.

Congress, Courts and Constitution all allow strikes against Al Qaeda outside Afghanistan

Eric Holder 2012. (US attorney general) 5 Mar 2012 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, <http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html>

The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war. Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks – fortunately, unsuccessful – against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.

Bush “preventive war” doctrine may be justified in some cases against terrorist training sites, and we may need to modify “Just War Theory” to account for terrorism. Affirmative expert Prof. Dale Snauwaert, who generally opposes the Bush Doctrine, nevertheless admitted in 2004:

Dr. Dale Snauwaert 2004. (PhD, Philosophy of Education; Assoc Professor, Philosophy and Social Foundations of Education, Univ of Toledo), “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory,” ONLINE JOURNAL OF PEACE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION Vol. 6 No. 1 <http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/6_1snau.pdf>

The Bush Doctrine of *“preemption*” is really *“preventive.”* In such cases there is a potential threat rather than an imminent one, and this is the distinguishing factor between “preemption” (imminent threat) and “prevention” (potential threat). The Bush administration argues that the nature of the terrorist threat is such that it is never clear and present -- that it always lurks as potential, and thus the criteria of danger must be adjusted in an age of terrorism. Just War Theory may need to adjust to account for this shift in the nature of danger. In other words, on the face of it, given the nature of terrorism, the Bush Doctrine of “*preventive*” action against terrorist training sites, command and control centers, etc., may be justifiable according to the principles of *jus ad bellum*. In the long run, however, given that terrorism is a tactic linked to political aims, the threat cannot be resolved militarily. Any long-term response to terrorism must resolve the political conflict that is its ultimate cause.

“Caroline Incident” standards of justified intervention aren’t applicable any more

Background: The “Caroline incident” was a British military expedition that invaded New York State in 1837 to attack an American boat, the *Caroline,*  that was supplying Canadian rebels fighting the British government. US Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote letters to the British government protesting the attack and explaining that there should be a higher standard of proof and justification needed to authorize the invasion of another country. AFF would like to use the Caroline standards today, but they’re not valid any more.

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

No doubt there is a valid and useful distinction to be made, analytically and strategically, between preemptive and preventive self‐defense. But other recent commentators are correct in questioning whether criteria imported from the Caroline incident still should be considered dispositive in judging the legality or legitimacy of preventive war. Demanding a standard for lawful anticipatory self‐defense that is all but impossible to meet makes little sense now, at least in cases when preventive action may be necessary to forestall a foreseeable, albeit not imminent, threat from a state or group that is openly committed to the mass killing of civilians.

“Preventive War” is not a new doctrine: John Quincy Adams argued for it in 1818

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

Moreover, the standards for anticipatory action set out in Webster’s 1842 letter were far more stringent than those that regularly appeared in American diplomatic doctrine and practice both before and after Webster’s time. Consider, for example, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams’s communication to the Spanish government on November 28, 1818. Adams’s distinguished biographer, Samuel Flagg Bemis, described this as “[t]he greatest state paper of John Quincy Adams’s diplomatic career.” The episode that Adams addressed arose when General Andrew Jackson, without proper authorization, invaded Spanish Florida in response to a series of attacks across the U.S. border by Creeks, Seminoles, and escaped slaves, whose activities the Spanish authorities in Florida were unable or unwilling to control. Rather than apologize for Jackson’s intervention, Adams warned the Spanish in unequivocal terms that they must take steps to suppress further cross‐border incursions or face the invasion and loss of Florida to the United States. The application of Adams’s doctrine to contemporary circumstances would unquestionably warrant the United States using force preventively against a failed or failing state that was unable or unwilling to take the actions necessary to suppress a terrorist group within its boundaries that was engaging in attacks upon the United States.

Preventive War very common in US history

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo> (brackets in original)

In a fascinating study, historian Marc Trachtenberg concluded that “the sort of thinking one finds in the Bush policy documents is not to be viewed as anomalous. Under [Franklin] Roosevelt and Truman, under Eisenhower and Kennedy, and even under Clinton in the 1990s, this kind of thinking came into play in a major way.” Even more starkly, historian Hew Strachan argues that “[t]he United States has used preventive war regularly since 1945 to forestall revolutionary change. In the 1950s and 1960s, it employed military power once every eighteen months on average to overthrow a government inimical to its interests.”

World War I was a preventive war

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo> (ellipses in original; first brackets in original, final brackets added)

The United States’s decision to enter the First World War was also preventive in character:   
Germany’s announcement of its third campaign of unrestricted U‐boat warfare provided the occasion, the excuse, for the public moral outrage that permitted President Wilson to ask for a declaration of war. However, Germany was not threatening U.S. security in any meaningful sense in 1916 or 191 7 . . . . [T]he United States chose to wage a preventive war as an Associated Power of the Allies. Wilson recognized that a German‐dominated Europe must constitute a serious threat to U.S. national security. 50 [quoting British military strategist Colin S. Gray]

Bush prevention doctrine is consistent with 2 centuries of US historical practice

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

First,the Bush Doctrine was by no means an anomaly, as many of itscritics have alleged. Rather, that Doctrine—whatever its flawsin execution may have been—fell within the broad traditions ofAmerican strategic thought. American diplomacy and militarypractice over the past two centuries, like those of other greatpowers, reveal many instances in which preventive wars orother armed interventions of a preventive kind have been contemplated, openly threatened, or actually conducted.

Kennedy’s naval blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis was an example of preventive military force

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

Later legal scholars have viewed the Cuban blockade as an act of anticipatory self‐defense, although neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba had attacked the United States, was on the verge of attacking it, or had even publicly threatened to attack it. Thus, although not triggering an actual war, Kennedy’s naval blockade is rightly seen as a precedent that lends support to the Bush Doctrine.  This brief account reveals that preventive war has not been uncommon in American history—at least if a preventive war is defined as a war that stems in large part from a desire to prevent a foreseen, but not imminent, threat of particular gravity to the nation’s security.

Not a G.W. Bush thing: Examples of preventive use of force under Kennedy, Johnson and Carter

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo> (brackets in original)

President John Kennedy used force in the Cuban Missile Crisis—a naval blockade of Cuba—to prevent a dramatic change in the balance of power from the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in the Caribbean. President Lyndon Johnson announced in 1965 that “the United States would henceforth prevent by force ‘a communist dictatorship’ from coming to power in the Americas”; he subsequently sent 24,000 troops “to the Dominican Republic to accomplish this task in the political chaos that followed the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo.” President Jimmy Carter also announced a preventive doctrine by declaring that the United States “would regard any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. [to be] repelled ‘by use of any means necessary’—which implied a possible resort to nuclear weapons.”

Nothing uncommon about preventive war – it has been widely accepted under international law for centuries

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

And military strategist Colin Gray writes that “far from being a rare and awful crime against an historical norm, preventive war is, and has always been, so common, that its occurrence seems remarkable only to those who do not know their history.” Indeed, preventive war was widely considered to be acceptable in some circumstances, at least from the time of King Frederick the Great’s 1756 invasion of Saxony to the start of the First World War in 1914, and perhaps even up to 1941. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading European writers on international law acknowledged the existence of a right of preventive intervention.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Can’t fight terrorism

Link: Affirmative cancels preemption for all US military actions

Link: Preemption is necessary for fighting terrorist groups because we can’t wait for them to create an “imminent threat”

Stephen Murdoch 2003. (attorney ) DC BAR magazine, “Preemptive War: Is it Legal?” (brackets in original) <http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/january_2003/war.cfm>

Critics claim that the administration is trying to drop from traditional notions of self-defense the criterion of imminent threat, a key element that helped prevent states from masking aggression in self-protection. Nonetheless, the doctrine of preemption is only truly controversial when applied to sovereign states. International law experts from a range of philosophical viewpoints believe the government may legally strike against terrorists, even without knowledge of a definite, imminent threat, because of their secretive means and proclivity for surprise attacks. According to James Steinberg, vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, “The nature of what [terrorists] do makes it difficult to apply the imminent threat criterion.” Therefore, says Steinberg, most experts agree that the use of force against terrorists—without knowledge of a specific threat from them—can be justified based solely on their doctrines and past practices.

Impact: Mass killing of innocent civilians

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

As the Bush Administration neared its end, there appeared to be a growing recognition that preventive military action was needed to counter the threats posed by the conjunction of transnational terrorism, the greater availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the existence of “rogue” states that may be unresponsive to deterrence or other means of dissuasion. Taken together, these factors pose an unusual risk of mass killings among innocent civilian populations.

2. WMD proliferation

Link: While not the first choice and not appropriate in every case, preemptive or preventive war is sometimes appropriate as a last resort against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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In the fight against WMD proliferation, Ashton Carter argues that war, whether preemptive or preventive, is not the only option and rarely is it the best option. For example, the U.S. has successfully steered most of Europe, Japan and South Korea away from obtaining nuclear weapons not through force but through treaties, provision of nuclear monitoring and early warning systems, and other measures. Likewise, the U.S. has used diplomatic and economic incentives to forestall or reverse the WMD ambitions of countries such as South Africa, Ukraine and Argentina. For these countries, methods like the Nunn-Lugar program, which offers to buy back plutonium, have proven effective without the threat of military force. Only in the case of committed proliferators might preemptive or preventive war prove appropriate, but as a last resort rather than a first choice.

Impact to nuclear proliferation: If enough more nations get nuclear weapons, it’s unrealistic to think nuclear catastrophe could be avoided

Henry Kissinger 2006. (former US Secretary of State) The New Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation, <http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/nuclear_proliferation.pdf>

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension. If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

3. Rigid foreign policy. Some scenarios require preventive war and we shouldn’t make a blanket policy that we’re “never” going to do it.

Link: No single formula for intervention: The decision has to be on a case-by-case basis

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What the U.S. does today will reverberate for decades to come, especially on matters of war and peace. A formulaic approach to such complex decisions, while seemingly clarifying, may in fact create obstacles to realistic assessment of how to best advance America’s interests in specific situations. The U.S. will always retain the option to use military force in defense of its interests. But it may not be the best option given the particular circumstances. Like humanitarian intervention, the decision to embark on a preemptive or preventive war must be context-specific and made on a case-by-case basis.

Link: Iraq War doesn’t justify abolishing Preventive War doctrine – we need to keep it as an option

Impacts if we don’t: We can’t combat terrorism, genocide, ethnic cleansing

Prof. Robert J. Delahunty and Prof. John Yoo 2009 (Delahunty - Associate Professor of Law, Univ of St. Thomas. Yoo - Professor of Law, Univ of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) 32 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy “THE “BUSH DOCTRINE”: CAN PREVENTIVE WAR BE JUSTIFIED?” <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=johnyoo>

Even critics of the Iraq War should acknowledge that preventive war ought to remain among the strategic options available to the new Obama Administration. Reliance on the United Nations Security Council alone to combat terrorism, halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or intervene to prevent genocide and “ethnic cleansing” would be obvious folly. The Council has proven to be all but hapless in confronting such challenges, and, despite persistent, but unavailing, calls for reform, will remain so.

PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS (PMC) - Bad

SOLVENCY

1. Unaccountable contractors.

No way to enforce standards of recruitment and no prosecution of misconduct

Peter Singer 2003. (Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

Even if the firms are scrupulous in screening their hires (which is hard to accomplish, given that few prospective employees would think to include an "atrocities committed" section on their resumes), it is still difficult for them to monitor their troops in the field. Furthermore, if employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for a firm to turn them over to any local authorities. To do so risks scaring off both clients and other prospective employees. This turned out to be the case recently in the Balkans. Employees of Dyncorp, who had been contracted to perform police duties for the U.N. and aircraft maintenance for the U.S. Army, were later implicated in child prostitution rings. Dyncorp's Bosnia site supervisor even filmed himself raping two women. These employees were transferred out of the country, and none were ever criminally prosecuted.

No checks & balances on contractor accountability

Peter Singer 2003. (Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

Besides the fact that extraterritorial monitoring (i.e., of firms operating outside national boundaries) is very difficult, any time a firm finds the regulation too onerous, it can simply transfer to more friendly environs. Moreover, even among firms that stay based in the few countries with the ability and will to regulate, the jurisdiction is still problematic. For example, U.S. criminal law does not apply outside of U.S. territorial and special maritime jurisdictions, so that if an employee of an American military firm commits an offense abroad, the likelihood of prosecution is extremely low. Consequently, other than nonrenewal of contract, there are no real checks and balances on military firms that will ensure full accountability.

2. Capabilities gap. Contracted peacekeepers not as effective at many of the elements required for mission success

Peter Singer 2003. (Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

Thus, the most successful peacekeeping operations (such as experiences in Mozambique, Namibia, and Guatemala) are not simply about placing third-party troops on the ground. Instead, they include a wide variety of "peacebuilding" activities designed to restore torn social fabrics and foster cooperation among local parties. These range from cease-fire monitoring and troop disarmament and demobilization to reconstruction and election monitoring. Thus, U.N. operations are often so unwieldy for the very reason that they must also carry on these essential activities. Private military firms, untrained or uninterested in the culture of peacekeeping, might be ill-equipped to handle them. Moreover, reliance on an outside private force does little to reestablish the local social contract. Instead, it appears more likely to reinforce the idea that power belongs only to those with the ability to afford it.

3. “Highly trained professionals” – Response: Unreal argument. Just being ex-military doesn’t make them professionals

David Isenberg 2012. (former Senior Analyst, British American Security Information Council; former Consultant for the "Business of War" project, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Center for Public Integrity; former analyst at the Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division of DynCorp National Security Programs; former Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC) Negative Views of Civilian and Private Security Contractors 28 Aug 2012 <http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/isn_negative_views_of_pscs.pdf>

Another argument that PMSC advocates make is that because many of their employees had previously served in the military they are already highly professional. There has always been an element of unreality about this argument. One would never find military leaders implicitly basing trust upon their troops simply on the fact that they are soldiers or marines. Instead, military leaders understand that part of professionalism means constantly checking and double-checking as well as (re)training to ensure that personnel act accordingly. Consequently, it is never assumed that once a soldier achieves a certain degree of professionalism that it stays that way without continued effort.

4. No cost savings. Private security contractors are not cheaper, and may be more expensive

David Isenberg 2012. (former Senior Analyst, British American Security Information Council; former Consultant for the "Business of War" project, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Center for Public Integrity; former analyst at the Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division of DynCorp National Security Programs; former Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC) Negative Views of Civilian and Private Security Contractors 28 Aug 2012 <http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/isn_negative_views_of_pscs.pdf>

Defenders of private contracting also recycle arguments that the private sector is more cost-effective than the public sector. In part this is due to the sheer repetition of the belief that government is fundamentally inefficient and unproductive. Yet there has not been a whole lot of empirical evidence to back up the claim. In some cases, such as security contractors working for the State Department, there is limited evidence to suggest that contractors are cheaper. Indeed, with respect to the overall market in private military services, there is reason to believe that outsourcing increases the cost of military functions. There are two major reasons for this. First, a transparent and competitive market is needed, so that clients can pick and choose among different suppliers. Second, contracts must be subject to transparent bidding procedures, competing offers must be systematically compared and the performance of suppliers on the contract terms has to be closely monitored, and, if necessary, sanctioned. In general, the environment surrounding military interventions is not conducive to cost savings and efficiency. Warfare is usually characterized by secrecy, heavy time constraints and the imperative of victory and little time available to partake in complex bidding procedures. Indeed, transparency is often lacking, which, in turn, makes it difficult to assess contract performance.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Mercenaries.

Link: Military contractors function like mercenaries

Damian Lilly 2000. (Programme Manager of the Privatisation of Security Advocacy Programme at International Alert, an international NGO promoting peaceful resolution of violent conflict), “The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities” <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf>

Because private military company personnel are involved in foreign conflicts for essentially financial gain, they may be considered mercenaries in the traditional sense of the word. The UN has repeatedly condemned the use of mercenaries and there is an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Therefore, for its peacekeeping missions and regional operations that the UN Security Council must authorize, to be seen as using mercenary elements would smack of hypocrisy. The UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, has said that private military companies cannot be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status. Nevertheless, until there is greater clarity as to the definition of a mercenary and how private military company personnel might be distinguishable from them, there will be continued unwillingness on the part of the UN and other bodies to hire their services.

Impacts: Mercenaries are bad - commit abuses, can’t be disciplined, and undermine state sovereignty

Ryan Scoville 2006. (Law clerk designate to the Honorable Neil V. Wake, U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona; J.D., Stanford Law School) TOWARD AN ACCOUNTABILITY-BASED DEFINITION OF “MERCENARY” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol 36 <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1287&context=facpub>

To the extent that mercenaries are more likely to commit abuses, it is largely because they operate secretly and separately from the armed forces of a state and are thus relatively immune to the taming inﬂuences of public opinion and national law. The mobility of mercenaries allows them to elude sanction even when states seek punishment, and it mitigates national and cultural ties that might otherwise discipline the use of force. Mercenaries may also be more likely to undermine state sovereignty because no external authority curbs a mercenary’s decision to use force. By contrast, diplomatic relations, institutions such as the Security Council, and international law at least marginally constrain state action in this realm.

Impact to undermining state sovereignty: It’s needed for solving poverty and preventing terrorism

Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Dr. Michael Carnahan 2005. (Dr Ashraf Ghani is Chancellor of Kabul University and was Minister of Finance in Afghanistan (2002-04). Clare Lockhart is a Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute in London. Dr Michael Carnahan is a Visiting Fellow at Australian National University in Canberra) Closing the Sovereignty Gap: How to turn failed states into capable ones, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, July 2005 <http://www.odi.org.uk/opinion/docs/670.pdf>

The deﬁnition of global public interest has changed radically since 9/11. It is now widely accepted that as long as large swathes of the globe are mired in violence, poverty and bad governance, global security will remain a pipe dream. Stable sovereign states are a prerequisite to addressing poverty and insecurity. Only sovereign states can act to prevent creation and export of terror and insecurity. Only sovereign states can create opportunities for their citizens to participate in the economy.

2. No accountability

Link: Contractors are problematic because of lack of accountability

Damian Lilly 2000. (Programme Manager of the Privatisation of Security Advocacy Programme at International Alert, an international NGO promoting peaceful resolution of violent conflict), “The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities” <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf>

There are serious concerns about who would be accountable for the actions of private military companies when used in multilateral peacekeeping operations. While the UN is responsible for its peacekeeping missions, it relies on the accountability of national contingents to their national governments for any wrongdoing. With the use of private companies the lines of accountability are not at all clear. This would make it hazardous for the UN in the design of peacekeeping operations as they would ultimately have to answer if something goes wrong. This is not to say that private military company personnel may not be professional nor that there are not problems with the conduct of traditional peacekeeping forces, but in the absence of proper provisions for accountability there are potential dangers with their use.

Link: Laws don’t apply. Contractors can evade legal responsibility

Peter Singer 2003.(Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

Industry executives counter that U.N. peacekeepers have certainly been involved in crimes of their own in the past, so the risks of human rights violations occurring during peace operations are nothing new. The difference with privatization, though, is that while soldiers in U.N. missions are ultimately held responsible under their national military code of justice, contracted peacekeepers are subject only to the laws of the market. Current international law has been found inapplicable to the actions of the industry, as the firms fall outside of the outdated legal conventions that deal only with individual mercenaries. The only possible regulation must then come either from the law of the state in which the operation is taking place or the law of the state in which the firm is based.

Impact: Contractors go wild and kill people. Example: Iraq

Jonathan Finer 2005. (journalist) WASHINGTON POST, Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, 10 Sept 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/09/AR2005090902136.html>

Private security companies pervade Iraq's dusty highways, their distinctive sport-utility vehicles packed with men waving rifles to clear traffic in their path. Theirs are among the most dangerous jobs in the country: escorting convoys, guarding dignitaries and protecting infrastructure from insurgent attacks. But their activities have drawn scrutiny both here and in Washington after allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight."These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force," said Brig. Gen. Karl R. Horst, deputy commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, which is responsible for security in and around Baghdad. "They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place."

3. Contractor corruption. Security goals conflict with profit seeking

Peter Singer 2003. (Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

The first issue is the contractual dilemmas that arise with privatization. There are obvious market incentives for firms to act in their clients' interests. Any company that does otherwise risks not being hired again. The problem is that market constraints are always imperfect and tend to work only over the long term. In actuality, the security goals of clients are often in tension with the firms' aim of profit maximization. The result is that considerations of the good of the private company are not always identical with the public good. For privatized peacekeeping, the ensuing dangers include all the problems one has in standard contracting and business outsourcing. The hired firms have incentives to overcharge, pad their personnel lists, hide failures, not perform to their peak capacity, and so on. The worry, though, is that these are all now transferred into the security realm, where people's lives are at stake.

4. Easy abandonment. Contractors can quit the mission if the going gets rough, unlike military personnel who are committed by the terms of their enlistment

Peter Singer 2003. (Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings; Special Assistant, International Peace Academy; Doctoral Fellow, Harvard University; Action Officer, Balkans Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense), "Peacekeepers, Inc.", June 2003, The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/06/usmilitary-singer>

The most worrisome contractual dilemma, however, is that outsourcing also entails turning over control of the actual provision of service. For peacekeeping, this means the troops in the field are not part of national armies, but private citizens hired off the market, working for private firms. Security is now at the mercy of any change in market costs and incentives. One example of the resulting danger derives from the nasty habit humanitarian interventions have of becoming more complex over time. A firm hired to establish a safe haven might later find the situation more difficult than it originally expected. The operation might become unprofitable or, due to any increase in local opposition, more dangerous than anticipated. Thus, the company could find it in its corporate interest to pull out. Or, even if the company is kept in line by market constraints, its employees might decide that the personal risks they face in sticking it out in an operation are too high relative to their pay. Not bound by military law, they can simply break their contracts without fear of punishment and find safer, better paying work elsewhere. In either case, the result is the same: the abandonment of those who were dependent on private protection without consideration for the political costs or the client's ability to quickly replace them.

5. Contractors = poor quality work and criminal behavior

Dr. T.X. Hammes, November, 2010. (retired U.S. Marine Corps officer; Senior research fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Univ.)  “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact” <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-260.pdf>

Compounding the problems created by lack of quality control, the government does not control the contractors’ daily contact with the population. Despite continued efforts to increase government oversight of contractor operations, nothing short of having sufficient numbers of qualified U.S. Government personnel accompanying and commanding contractors will provide control. This lack of control usually means we may get poorly wired buildings, malfunctioning computer systems, and unfinished projects. However, too often, it includes incidents of bullying, abuse, intimidation, and even killing of local civilians such as the DynCorp employee who ran a child sex ring in the Balkans or the September 2007 Blackwater shootings in Nisour Square, Baghdad.

6. No staff quality controls

Link: No way to screen out criminals from working for private military security contractors (PMSCs)

Impact: Mission success endangered and warlords engage in murder

Dr. Nikolaos Tzifakis 2012. (PhD politics; Lecturer at Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Peloponnese, Greece) Contracting out to Private Military and Security Companies, July 2012, published by Centre for European Studies (ellipses and parentheses in original) <http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/ces_contracting_out_to_pmscs_july2012.pdf>

As McCoy (2010, 680) explains, the assembling of a global workforce inhibits the effective investigation of the criminal background of every contractor. There is no such thing as a global database of criminal activity. And the domestic legislation of many states does not permit the release of the criminal records of their citizens to third parties. Yet, some PMSCs have gone so far to reduce the cost of their operations that they have endangered the success of their missions. For instance, an investigation of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services (2010, xi) revealed that among ArmorGroup’s contractors in Afghanistan there were ‘warlords . . . engaged in murder, bribery, and anti-Coalition activities’.

Link: No controls on who is recruited as contractor

Impact: Strategic liability for the mission

David Isenberg 2012. (former Senior Analyst, British American Security Information Council; former Consultant for the "Business of War" project, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Center for Public Integrity; former analyst at the Arms Control & Threat Reduction Division of DynCorp National Security Programs; former Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC) Negative Views of Civilian and Private Security Contractors 28 Aug 2012 <http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/isn_negative_views_of_pscs.pdf>

Although it receives less attention than issues relating to cost and effectiveness, using PMSCs may also be a strategic liability. Retired U.S. Marine Corps Colonel T.X. Hammes, for example, identifies inherent characteristics of contractors that create problems for the government. Firstly, despite PMSCs often relying upon former armed forces personnel, the government does not control the quality of the staff that the contractor hires. Moreover, unless the government provides suitably qualified personnel for each project involving PMSCs, it has little control over the contractors’ daily interactions with the local population. This latter point is crucial because populations hold the government responsible for everything that the contractors do or fail to do. Since insurgency is essentially a competition for legitimacy between the government and insurgents, this factor elevates the issue of quality and tactical control to the strategic level.

ADVOCACY RECONSIDERED - Damian Lilly. The evidence in these cards is so old that normally we would not use it. However, if Lilly is cited as an Affirmative source, the Negative can read the rest of what he says and explain his full position the round.

Inherency Reconsidered: Damian Lilly says the “lack of support” trend has reversed and there is now wider support for peacekeeping.

Damian Lilly 2000. (Programme Manager of the Privatisation of Security Advocacy Programme at International Alert), “The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities” <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf>

There are a few clear reasons that help to explain the receding popularity of the concept of using private military companies within peacekeeping contexts.  
GROWING COMMITMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PEACEKEEPING  
The principal reason is perhaps the renewed commitment of the international community to deploy peacekeeping troops that has been witnessed in the last few years. The high profile cases of private military companies performing peace-enforcing roles in Angola and Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s has arguably served as a wake-up call to the UN and other multilateral organizations to boost their efforts and capabilities for responding to emerging crises. In large part this has been a question of political will. As Funmi Olonisakin has argued in reference to the use of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, “the decisive use of force offered by private security companies is not beyond the capability of multinational armies if given the political backing.” Although the number of UN peacekeepers declined substantially up until 1998, there has been a reversal in this trend in the last two years. In April this year the number of UN peacekeepers in the field reached its highest level since 1995 with missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor and another planned for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN and other peacekeeping forces are now either present or are in greater numbers in countries in which private military companies have been active in the past, including Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea.

Advocacy Reconsidered: Damian Lilly says - New trends toward regional peacekeeping make the concept of privatization redundant.

Damian Lilly 2000. (Programme Manager of the Privatisation of Security Advocacy Programme at International Alert, an international NGO promoting peaceful resolution of violent conflict), “The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities” <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf>

The emergence of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms (usually led by a specific regional hegemonic power) and the consequent devolution of peacekeeping responsibilities away from the UN has produced alternative peacekeeping capabilities. These factors combined have essentially rendered private military companies redundant in a number of contexts.

Advocacy Reconsidered: Damian Lilly says contracted peacekeeping is redundant and has numerous problems

Damian Lilly 2000. (Programme Manager of the Privatisation of Security Advocacy Programme at International Alert, an international NGO promoting peaceful resolution of violent conflict), “The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities” <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf>

Although private security and military companies emerged in the 1990s as an option for the UN and other multilateral organizations to perform peacekeeping operations, a greater willingness on the part of the UN to deploy peacekeeping troops in the last two years has rendered their services redundant in a number of contexts. Additionally, there are numerous problems associated with their use in terms of their capacity to perform peacekeeping missions, the mercenary character of their activities and lack of accountability such that they are unlikely to receive greater acceptance in the near future.

PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS - Good

SIGNIFICANCE

All those hundreds of thousands of overseas contractors? Forget it: Only 4-6% of them are actually “Security” contractors (Analysis: the rest of them are doing things like cooking meals, driving cars, filing papers, etc.)

Congressional Research Service 2008. (written by: Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Moshe Schwartz, Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Kennon H. Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 29 Sept 2008 “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues <http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RL32419.pdf>

Some government officials and industry experts also attribute part of the drop in the number of PSC employees working in Iraq to DOD’s improved ability to accurately track PSCs. Generally, private security contractors constitute a relatively small portion — approximately 4-6% — of the over 160,000 strong contractor workforce working for DOD in Iraq. DOD was unable to provide data on how much was being spent on PSCs in Iraq.

INHERENCY

QDR reforms. Contracting abuses have led to new trends away from unlimited contracting and new reforms are being applied in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR – the official manual of US Defense Department policies)

Aaron Ettinger 2011. (Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University) Canadian Political Science Association May 16-18, 2011, Waterloo, Ontario “Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Private Military Industry” <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/ettinger.pdf>

The period between 2006 and 2010 transformed Pentagon thinking about the operations of the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Iraq war, contracting abuses had been exposed to public scrutiny. Largely unaccountable cost-plus incentive contracts led to billing scandals and calls for increased oversight. (US Government Accountability Office 2006a; US Government Accountability Office 2006b) More significant, however, was the increasing notoriety of armed security guards operating in Iraq and especially the highly publicized killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007 by Blackwater contractors. (Broderx and Risen 2007) Sensitive to the changing dynamics of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2010 *QDR* reassessed the role of private contractors and conveys the strategic need to reconfigure the way contractors are integrated into US war efforts. Much more cautious and circumscribed, the language of the 2010 *QDR* calls for a more systematic approach to Defense partnerships with the private sector. Quite unlike the unqualified calls for outsourcing and privatization of the previous reviews, the Pentagon in 2010 took a much more interventionist and managerial view of wartime contractors and contracting. In the document, DoD’s strategic direction on contracting recommends action on four issues. The first pair involves slowing the unchecked process of outsourcing that had characterized the previous two review periods. The second pair of issues involves intensifying the role of the Pentagon as a facilitator of public- private partnerships that reach deeper into the civilian institutions and networks of American society.

UCMJ applicability. Uniform Code of Military Justice (the legal system for US military personnel) also applies to all civilian contractors in working with the military in conflict situations

Aaron Ettinger 2011. (Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University) Canadian Political Science Association May 16-18, 2011, Waterloo, Ontario “Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Private Military Industry” <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/ettinger.pdf>

In October 2006, US Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to bring civilian contractors under its purview, with the intention to extend military jurisdiction to civilian contractors operating alongside US forces. Historically, civilians were only subject to UCMJ in combat zones during formally declared periods of war. Article 2(a)(10) now reads, “[I]n time of declared war or a *contingency operation*, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.” (Masterton 2009, emphasis added) Contingency operations include military operations that are “designed by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force.” (Masterton 2009; 72) By expanding jurisdictions to contingency operations, the UCMJ now covers any civilian contractor operating alongside US forces in any context.

Blackwater was prosecuted. Blackwater/Iraq scenario was prosecuted under existing law. Melissa Brickell, who generally favors better oversight of PMCs, admitted in 2010:

Melissa Brickell 2010. (American University Washington College of Law), "Filling the Criminal Liability Gap for Private Military Contractors Abroad: U.S. v. Slough and the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010," Legislation and Policy Brief: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 3. 24 Sept 2010 American University Washington College of Law, <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=lpb>

One of the most negatively publicized incidents during the war in Iraq was a disputed Baghdad shooting in September 2007, which involved a convoy of U.S. PMCs. These PMCs, part of the Blackwater Tactical Support Team, were contracted by the DOS to provide back-up fire support to other Blackwater personal security details in Baghdad. On September 16, the convoy took up positions at a traffic circle in Nisoor Square to secure an evacuation route for American and Iraqi officials after a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated near the compound at which they were meeting. Soon after, a shooting incident occurred, which the PMCs claimed was a self-defense response to an insurgent attack. The U.S. government, however, maintained after its investigation that the violence was unprovoked and that the victims were unarmed. Prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) ultimately culminated in indictments for voluntary manslaughter and firearms violations, but the indictments were dismissed in December 2009 in the closely watched case *U.S v. Slough* because of evidentiary taint from prosecutorial case mismanagement.

SMTJ – Special Maritime & Territorial Jurisdiction rules: CIA contractor was prosecuted under SMTJ

Congressional Research Service 2008. (written by: Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division; Moshe Schwartz, Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Kennon H. Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 29 Sept 2008 “Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues <http://wlstorage.net/file/crs/RL32419.pdf>

U.S. contractor personnel and other U.S. civilian employees in Iraq are subject to prosecution in U.S. courts under a number of circumstances. Jurisdiction of certain federal statutes extends to U.S. nationals at U.S. facilities overseas that qualify as part of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the United States. For crimes involving a U.S. national as a perpetrator or a victim, the SMTJ includes:

(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities. Criminal statutes that apply within the SMTJ include maiming, assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault or contact, murder and manslaughter. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for prosecuting crimes in this category. A CIA contractor was convicted under this provision in 2007 for the assault of a detainee in Afghanistan.

DOD Oversight Plan. Dept of Defense (DOD) already has contractor oversight plan

Moshe Schwartz 2010. (Congressional Research Service, Specialist in Defense Acquisition) June 22, 2010, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145576.pdf>

DOD has also taken a number of steps to specifically improve management and oversight of PSCs. In July 2009, DOD issued an Instruction, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, establishing policy and procedures for managing private security contractors during contingency operations. DOD also released an interim rule modifying the Code of Federal Regulations that lays out policy regarding the use of private security contractors in war zones. The interim rule includes policies and procedures for selecting, training, equipping and overseeing private security contractors. DOD established Contractor Operations Cells in Iraq and in Afghanistan to coordinate the movement of PSCs, and it established the Armed Contractor Oversight Division to receive serious incident reports involving PSCs and to ensure that all of the incidents are reported, tracked, and investigated.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lose war in Afghanistan

Link: US cannot execute the mission in Afghanistan without PMCs (private military contractors)

Christian Kjelstrup 2011. (master’s degree candidate) “ NATO and Private Military Contractors” Master Thesis - Department of Political Science, Univ. of Oslo, Norway 23 May 2011 <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/123456789/13142/Kjelstrupx2011x_Master.pdf?sequence=1>

Although the US may possess the strongest firepower, both in conventional and nuclear weapons, it has nevertheless privatised huge parts of its logistical military functions, thereby arguably reducing its overall firepower because it cannot implement its full strength and size without the inclusion of PMCs. Also when it comes to coercive services does the US increasingly rely on PMCs. According to US government officials, both the DoD and Department of State would be unable to execute their mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the support of PMCs (Avant, 2005:115; CRS Report for Congress, 2011a:5).

Impact: Global terrorism

Fawzia Koofi 2012. (a woman candidate for the Afghan presidential elections in 2014) April 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Dark Days If the U.S. Left Now <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/dark-days-would-return-if-the-us-left-now>

If the West abandons Afghanistan once again our country will become a playground for global terrorism and a risk to the world. I understand the pressure on President Obama to pull out of an unpopular war at a time of economic crisis. But by pulling out now we risk undoing all the fragile gains of the last 11 years.

Impact: Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan means attack on another big Western city

Dr. Frederick W. Kagan 2012. (PhD in Russian/Soviet military history; former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; resident scholar and the director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute) 3 Apr 2012 Al Qaeda Allies Remain Strong, NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/al-qaeda-allies-remain-to-be-defeated-in-the-east>

Ryan Crocker, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, recently told The Telegraph, “Al-Qaeda is still present in Afghanistan. If the West decides that 10 years in Afghanistan is too long then they will be back, and the next time it will not be New York or Washington, it will be another big Western city.”

2. Lose Political flexibility. Using contractors allows us to have military influence without committing US forces

Link: Private contracting was key to winning a battle that led to the Dayton Accords, which resolved the Balkan civil war

Prof. Allison Stanger and Prof. Mark Eric Williams 2011. (Stanger – Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. Williams - Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College) Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security Yale Journal of International Affairs <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/062101stanger-williams.pdf>

Providing military assistance via a PMC allowed Washington to strengthen Croatia’s military posture without publicly “taking sides” in the conflict. By April 1995, the first Croatian Army officer had graduated from MPRI’s Democracy Transition Training program. Four months later, Croatia launched Operation Storm, a stunningly successful attack on Serbian-held Krajina. Employing typical American tactics, the four-day assault completely dis placed the Serbian forces as well as some 150,000 Serbian civilians. Croatia’s military success ultimately brought the Serbs to the negotiating table, and in November 1995, Washington brokered the Dayton Peace Accords—an outcome made possible in large part by MPRI’s services.

Impact: Conflict resolution without American casualties. Example: Croatia

Prof. Allison Stanger and Prof. Mark Eric Williams 2011. (Stanger – Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. Williams - Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College) Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security Yale Journal of International Affairs <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/062101stanger-williams.pdf>

Croatia’s military success ultimately brought the Serbs to the negotiating table, and in November 1995, Washington brokered the Dayton Peace Accords—an outcome made possible in large part by MPRI’s services. In this case, U.S.-sponsored military training for Croatia clearly tipped the balance of power in Croatia’s favor, and set the stage for the Dayton Peace Accords negotiations. Moreover, Washington achieved this goal without significant public or congressional support and without committing its own ground forces or incurring significant U.S. casualties.

3. Weaker military preparedness

Link: Private contractors improve US military readiness

Prof. Allison Stanger and Prof. Mark Eric Williams 2011. (Stanger – Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. Williams - Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College) Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security Yale Journal of International Affairs <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/062101stanger-williams.pdf>

Outsourcing permitted the United States to allocate military resources more efficiently, thereby enhancing the military’s overall agility. To cite just one example, Washington could have implemented its Andean counternarcotics policy without DynCorp or MPRI simply by deploying U.S. special forces, colonels, pilots, and uniformed aircraft mechanics to train Bolivians, Colombians, and Peruvians in counternarcotics tactics and aircraft maintenance. Doing so, however, would have left vacant key posts in the U.S. Southern Command, military training institutions, and combat divisions—a pattern of resource allocation adverse to overall military preparedness.18 By contrast, employing PMCs enabled Washington to implement its Andean policy without undermining America’s own military readiness by placing a larger reservoir of talent at Washington’s disposal without straining its all-volunteer force.

Impact: Reduced American military power is bad – the world would be poorer and less secure

Prof. Michael Mandelbaum 2010. (Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) THE NEW REPUBLIC 10 Aug 2010 [http://www.tnr.com/blog/foreign-policy/76902/the-downsizing-american-foreign-policy#](http://www.tnr.com/blog/foreign-policy/76902/the-downsizing-american-foreign-policy)

The American military presence around the world helps to support the global economy. American military deployments in Europe and East Asia help to keep order in regions populated by countries that are economically important and militarily powerful. The armed forces of the United States are crucial in checking the ambition of the radical government of Iran to dominate the oil-rich Middle East. For these reasons, the retreat of the United States risks making the world poorer and less secure, which means that the consequences of the economically-induced contraction of American foreign policy are all too likely to be anything but benign.

PTSD PURPLE HEART – not needed, won’t work, may backfire

(PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder)

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY: I sure don’t want to offend one of those guys

Barrie Barber 2012. (journalist) Purple Hearts for PTSD debated 17 June 2012 DAYTON DAILY NEWS <http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/purple-hearts-for-ptsd-debated-3/nPgwh/>

Vietnam veteran Ricky A. York said he’s had combat-related PTSD, but isn’t sure a Purple Heart should be given to soldiers who carry wounds, as he did, inside them. For 43 years, the former cavalry soldier avoided talking about Vietnam to his family before he wrote a book about it. “I can tell you I have injuries, but they aren’t physical,” said York, 66, of Kettering, a retired General Motors autoworker. “That’s a pretty big distinction to actually be physically wounded. There’s some ongoing suffering and pain with having PTSD, but I don’t know if I’d agree it’s the same as being shot or stepping on a mine. “I just think personally if I said I deserve a Purple Heart and there’s a veteran there with one arm or a leg missing, I don’t know how he would look at it,” he said. “I sure don’t want to offend one of those guys.”

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Veterans say: Purple Heart not appropriate for PTSD

Barrie Barber 2012. (journalist) Purple Hearts for PTSD debated 17 June 2012 DAYTON DAILY NEWS <http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/purple-hearts-for-ptsd-debated-3/nPgwh/> (brackets added, parentheses in original)

Medals aren’t awarded for illness or disease, but for “achievement and valor,” said Joseph E. Davis, a VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars, a national veterans’ association] national spokesman in Washington, D.C. “The Purple Heart is awarded for a physical wound received while engaged with an enemy force,” he said in an email to the Dayton Daily News. “PTSD is considered an illness and not an injury.” He noted soldiers who suffered Gulf War syndrome, and Korean War veterans who had frostbite in the freezing depths of Korean winters, also didn’t qualify for the award. “Not to diminish the illness or effects of PTSD, but it is the VFW’s belief that awarding the (Purple Heart) for PTSD is not consistent with the original purpose and would denigrate the medal,” he wrote.

TOPICALITY

1. Meets none of the key terms of the resolution: PRESENCE or COMMITMENT.

Link: No change to foreign military commitment. The Affirmative plan doesn’t change any commitments we have made with regard to our military serving in foreign places or defending foreign countries

Link: No change to foreign military presence.

“Presence” means “4: one that is present: as a : the actual person or thing that is present b : something present of a visible or concrete nature”(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2012. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/presence?show=0&t=1352228706>)

Violation: Nothing in the plan changes the actual person or thing that is present in a foreign country. Soldiers who are overseas will still be there, and soldiers who return home will still be returning home. What’s changing is how they are treated after they return home.

Impact: No Affirmative team. Since no one is affirming the Resolution in today’s debate round, no matter who wins, you should vote Negative.

SIGNIFICANCE

“Post traumatic stress” is a pseudocondition and not equivalent to physical injury.

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

The objectification of understandable distress or misery as a pathological entity apart (“trauma”) - a technical problem to which short term technical solutions like counselling apply - is a serious distortion and for the vast majority “post traumatic stress” is a pseudocondition. This is not of course to play down what people may suffer, but suffering is not psychopathology. There is little evidence that those affected anywhere in the non-Western world have seen their mental health as an important issue apart, and wanted treatment specifically for this. The fundamental relativity of human experience, even in extreme conditions, and the primacy of the subjective appraisal and social meaning, means that there can be no such thing as a universal trauma response. Human responses to aversive experience are not analogous to physical trauma: people do not passively register the impact of external forces (unlike, say, a leg hit by a bullet) but engage with them in an active and problem-solving way. Suffering arises from, and is resolved in, a social context, shaped by the meanings and understandings applied to events (and which may evolve as the context evolves). It is subjective appraisal that determines what a stressful event means: one man’s trauma is another’s heroic sacrifice.

PTSD diagnosis is not a good indicator of a need for psychological treatment

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

Thus the process by which the answers to a doctor’s questions are rendered up as “symptoms”- potential contributors to a psychiatric diagnosis- is as much the product of the mindset of the doctor as of the patient. It does not follow that the asylumseeker’s attitude to or handling of his mood, sleep or edginess when at home, or at the refugee community centre, would be the same as it is formulated in the clinic. In a psychiatric interview the doctor is looking for patterns, and especially if he is primed by the assumption that survivors of traumatic events generally carry psychological effects (a cultural assumption, as outlined above), he is likely to find what he is looking for. For my part I found that a diagnosis of PTSD in particular was poorly predictive of an individual’s capacity to pay the psychological costs of what had happened, to function well despite hardship and to keep going, nor a reliable indicator of a need for psychological treatment.

No proven link between exposure to war and mental illness

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

Medicalised constructions of the experience of war posit an unduly mechanistic view of human experience, one that suggests that the traumatic effects of war are to be found inside a person (between his or her ears), and that a person recovers as if from an illness. In fact there is a singular dearth of data suggesting that mental health morbidity is higher in populations exposed to war or other complex emergencies than in those not exposed. One interesting example is Northern Ireland, since it is one war zone where comprehensive health records covering the last 30 years of civil conflict are available. During this period there has been no evidence of significant impact on referral rates to mental health services (Loughrey,1997). Indeed several million civilians in Europe were exposed to events during World War Two which would have rendered them liable to “post-traumatic stress” by the standards applied in Bosnia, Rwanda and other conflict zones, let alone Western civil society in recent years. So where did this veritable epidemic go to?

Reason PTSD doesn’t qualify for the Purple Heart: The injury isn’t caused by the enemy

David F. Burrelli and Fenwick Gilroy 2012. (Burrelli - Specialist in Military Manpower Policy. Gilroy - Research Associate. Both are with Congressional Research Service) 7 Sept 2012 The Purple Heart: Background and Issues for Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42704.pdf>

Army guidance emphasizes “the degree to which the enemy caused the injury” when determining eligibility and places PTSD in a column of non-eligible injuries. The Marine Corps defines PTSD as a “severe combat stress injury” and says that combat stress injuries are “not directly caused by the enemy’s intentional use of an outside force or agent,” and thus do not qualify.

INHERENCY

Traumatic brain injuries are now eligible for Purple Heart

David F. Burrelli and Fenwick Gilroy 2012. (Burrelli - Specialist in Military Manpower Policy. Gilroy - Research Associate. Both are with Congressional Research Service) 7 Sept 2012 The Purple Heart: Background and Issues for Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42704.pdf>

The large number of veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the Department of Defense (DOD) to reevaluate Purple Heart eligibility for traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and mental conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). DOD considers some TBIs eligible for the Purple Heart, as many of those injuries can be diagnosed using brain scans and other objective medical tests.

SOLVENCY

1. Inconsistent diagnoses #1: New labels for old conditions. Even the Affirmative team isn’t sure what would qualify for a Purple Heart after the plan is enacted.

CROSS-EX QUESTIONS:

If a soldier came home from a conflict and had a drinking problem, and the doctor didn’t label it PTSD, would that qualify for the Purple Heart?

What if he came home with schizophrenia and the doctor didn’t label it PTSD – does he get a Purple Heart?

If the answer is No, understand that these are examples of symptoms that actually define PTSD. Veterans had these problems a generation ago, and nobody called it PTSD. Although PTSD symptoms are real, the “disease” is merely a different label for other psychiatric diagnoses or lifestyle problems. If someone with schizophrenia is denied a Purple Heart but someone whose schizophrenia is labeled “PTSD” gets one, then there is no scientific basis for determining the qualifications.

PTSD is a new label for old symptoms like schizophrenia and substance abuse

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2001. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry. ) The invention of post-traumatic stress disorder and the social usefulness of a psychiatric category, 13 Jan 2001 BMJ <http://www.bmj.com/content/322/7278/95>

The diagnosis is a legacy of the American war in Vietnam and is a product of the post-war fortunes of the conscripted men who served there. They came home to find that they were being blamed for the war. Epithets like “babykiller” and “psychopath” were thrown at them by some who had watched on television the US military's atrocities against defenceless peasants. This reception was a primary factor in the well publicised difficulties—such as antisocial behaviour—that some military personnel had in readjusting to their peacetime roles. Those who were seen by psychiatrists were diagnosed as having an anxiety state, depression, substance misuse, personality disorder, or schizophrenia; these diagnoses were later supplanted by post-traumatic stress disorder.

2. Inconsistent diagnoses #2: Unreliable mental health science.

Diagnosis and definition of mental illness is unreliable in general.

[“Gerrymandered” means artificially modified to make it come out the way you want it]

Dr Hanna Pickard 2009. (PhD philosophy, Oxford; Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Clinical Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics) Chapter 4 ‘Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth’  Psychiatry as Cognitive Science: Philosophical Perspectives, <http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/11608/MIIM.pdf>

The reliability of diagnoses for mental illness is not high. A reliability study of diagnosis of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder for DSM-III [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association] where conditions were idealized, places the reliability of diagnoses at 0.6 (Williams et al., 1992). A more recent study in non-idealized conditions places it at 0.65 (McGorry et al., 1995). Meanwhile, the further criteria and complications introduced in DSM-IV make the categories of mental illness themselves appear increasingly gerrymandered (Kutchins and Kirk, 1997). Of course, lack of reliability is not conclusive evidence. Clinical training and procedures vary. Humans are fallible. However, reliability is nonetheless a general indication or guide to stable and objective categories. When a category is scientifically valid and a procedure for identifying the category standard, it is reasonable to expect reliability to be good.

Mental health diagnoses are “gerrymandered”: They change the rules all the time, without objective scientific justification. [DSM=Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. It’s the “official” medical definition of mental illnesses.]

Dr Hanna Pickard 2009. (PhD philosophy, Oxford; Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Clinical Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics) Chapter 4 ‘Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth’  Psychiatry as Cognitive Science: Philosophical Perspectives, <http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/11608/MIIM.pdf>

A salient form of gerrymandering is the use of exclusion rules to ensure the uniqueness of diagnosis in DSM-IV. For instance, a person cannot be diagnosed with schizophrenia if he or she meets the criteria for schizoaffective disorder, major depression, or mania. Similarly, a patient cannot be diagnosed with bipolar disorder if his or her symptoms fit a different diagnosis better. In a large-scale study funded by the American National Institute for Mental Health involving over 18 000 patients, it was found that 60% of people who met the criteria for one disorder equally met the criteria for another disorder if the exclusion rules were suspended (Robins et al., 1991). This level of co-morbidity is higher than chance. It is also higher than we might expect even taking into account the potential causal interaction between different categories of mental illness. It seems likely that it reflects a failure of the DSM-IV categories to capture objectively real and distinct scientific kinds.

Psychiatric definitions of mental illness are subject to political, social and legal pressures and influenced by culture. It isn’t science like atomic physics

Dr Hanna Pickard 2009. (PhD philosophy, Oxford; Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Clinical Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Neuroethics) Chapter 4 ‘Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth’  Psychiatry as Cognitive Science: Philosophical Perspectives, <http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/11608/MIIM.pdf>

However, it is worth emphasizing that psychiatry has had a complicated history, and has been more subject, than many disciplines, to political, social, and legal pressures. Decisions about how to demarcate psychiatric categories have clear practical human import, in a way that decisions about how to demarcate sub-atomic particles do not. It is also worth remembering that mental illnesses befall people who then come to think of themselves as a particular kind of person, with a particular sort of problem. Ways of conceptualizing symptoms can then become less tractable, and can also spread through cultural transmission.

3. No functioning definition of “trauma”

Dr. Jolande Withuis 2001. (PhD; sociologist; Senior Researcher at NIOD, a Dutch institute that studies the effect of war and genocide on individuals and society) “Does PTSD really exist?” ICODO-Info vol.18 nr.3-4 (dec), p.5-18 (originally published in Dutch in 2001, this quote is from the 2004 English translation at the website listed) <http://www.niod.knaw.nl/documents/publicaties/NIODWithuisPTSD.pdf>

A diagnosis of PTSD is based on several criteria: continuously reexperiencing the event (through nightmares or flashbacks, for instance); persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma (not having the TV on if German can be heard) or even complete numbing; and a persistently increased arousal, resulting in sleeplessness, for example. To qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD, a person would have to suffer from a number of these problems; moreover, these manifestations would have to persist for more than a month. Besides these problems, the diagnosis calls for a demonstrable ‘traumatic experience’. Though this would seem to be obvious, it is actually the trickiest part of the definition. The point is, how do we know what constitutes a ‘traumatic’ experience? We usually think of rape or a brush with death, but subjective (both in a personal and a sociocultural sense) factors play a major role in how a ‘trauma’ is experienced. What constitutes an unbearable shock or amount of tension for one person under certain circumstances will be fairly easy for another to cope with. In consecutive versions of the DSM, we see that the compilers have also grappled with this problem. Initially, trauma was described as an event that is outside the range of usual human experience, and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone; this phrase was left out of a later version, DSM-IV (1994). On the other hand, the concept of trauma has continually been expanded in practice, even to the point of becoming trivialized. All in all, it has more or less become a diagnosis that can be proven after the fact. You become traumatized by event X, and X constitutes a trauma because you turn out to have been traumatized by it – a clear case of circular reasoning.

4. Wrong treatment model.

The PTSD model is based on numerous problematic assumptions

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

I have critiqued at length elsewhere the assumptions underpinning the globalisation of “trauma” as a supposedly valid and relevant framework for capturing and addressing human response to extreme events (Summerfield,1999a). Put briefly, these assumptions are that the experience of war routinely generates not just suffering or misery but “post-traumatic stress”, a pathological condition affecting large numbers of those exposed and who need attention for this; there is basically a universal human response to such events, captured by the PTSD model; Western mental health technologies are universally valid, and victims do better if they “work through” their experiences; timely intervention can avert later mental disorders, violence and wars. All these assumptions are highly problematic and the last one is preposterous.

PTSD is wrong diagnostic focus – we should focus on rehabilitation of specific dysfunction, not paying people to be sick

Dr Charles Figley 2012. (PhD; director of the Tulane Traumatology Institute in the School of Social Work, Tulane University) 1 May 2012 “D2I: From Disorder to Injury » <http://figley.blogspot.fr/>

It is time to recognize that PTSD does not adequately capture the full spectrum of trauma reactions and service requirements; that it is a blunt instrument for classifying the traumatized as having or not having PTSD. The traumatized require and deserve a far more nuanced and sophisticated category of recovery than PTSD. The recent discoveries in the neurobiology of memory is close to guiding us in a far more effective way of helping the traumatized manage their memory not unlike physical brain damage requires speech therapy. The focus on injury is rehabilitation toward functionality. The same should be true for traumatic stress injuries. With hindsight we can all see that it was a mistake approving a syndrome like PTSD that would be compensable. In the case of veterans, they are being paid because of their illness not their dysfunction that can be fixed with a program of rehabilitation.

5. No evidence that counseling will solve

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Medicotherapeutic ways of seeing assume moral and political neutrality. But all suffering evokes questions of values and morality, and the experience of war and social upheaval is bound up with notions of responsibility, accountability and restitution. Medicotherapeutic interventions will not work when a morally blind technical fix is besides the point. There is no evidence that victims of such events, even in Western cultural contexts, do better if they undergo counselling to emotionally ventilate their experiences (Wessely et al, 1998). The very idea of Western talk therapy or counselling, with its focus on detached introspection, is alien in most non-Western cultures.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Greater focus on trauma = greater injury to the victim.

Link: Affirmative tries to raise awareness and get more veterans to view themselves as victims

Impact: Increased focus on victimization increases risk to well-being of the victim. Pronouncements of “trauma” become self-fulfilling prophecies – the diagnosis makes the condition worse

Analysis: Dr Summerfield is not saying “rape isn’t so bad” – he’s saying that the more often you repeat and emphasize public awareness of “trauma,” the more you increase the suffering of the victim. It changes “expectations of recovery.” If they think it’s something so horrible recovery is impossible, they may not try.

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There is nothing quintessential about a particular traumatic experience. The attitudes of wider society (which may change over time) shape what individual victims feel has been done to them and the vocabulary they use to describe this, whether or how they seek help, and their expectations of recovery. The more a society sees, for example, the trauma of rape (which generally refers not to physical trauma but emotional trauma) as a serious risk to the present or future health and well-being of the victim, the more it may turn out to be. In other words, societally constructed ideas about outcomes, which include the pronouncements of the mental health field, carry a measure of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Real Life Example: Welsh coal mining disaster 1966. Getting back to normal life as quickly as possible, without focus on victimization and counseling, was the best outcome for the survivors.

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It is because medicalised and psychologised thinking is now so embedded in popular constructions of “common sense”, and in the aesthetics of expression, that not to automatically use the language of trauma can make it sound as if what someone has gone through is being minimised. Thus it is instructive to review responses to a disaster a few decades ago in the light of what would have happened today. In 1966, in a tragedy that shook the nation, a coal waste tip engulfed a school in a Welsh village called Aberfan, killing 144 schoolchildren and teachers. There was no counselling and the surviving children resumed school 2 weeks later so that their minds would be occupied. There were no demands for compensation and the victims’ relatives refused to pursue a prosecution against the National Coal Board or Government because this would have seemed vengeful. A child psychologist noted some months later that survivors appeared normal and well-adjusted, and newspaper reports commended the villagers for rehabilitating themselves so admirably with little outside help. After such an incident today, the assumption would be that survivors were inevitably deeply traumatised- some for life-and needed the expert intervention of an army of counsellors and other professionals (Furedi, 2004).

2. Erosion of the social fabric and loss of faith

Link: PTSD diagnosis promotes social trends toward feelings of entitlement and erodes religious faith, leading to disillusionment

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

On the one hand the “modernisation” of society has seen a loss in the binding properties of its fabric, and on the other there has been a promotion of personal rights and the language of entitlement. This climate fosters a sense of personal injury and grievance, and a demand for restitution, in situations that would formerly have been experienced as bad luck and the ordinary trials of life. It has been argued that the concept of honour (which is oriented outwards towards social roles and community) has given way to the concept of dignity (oriented inwards towards an autonomous self). There has been a withering of our belief in the comfort of religion or other transcending meaning systems, including politics. Has this eroded our belief in a coherent and ordered world, and left us feeling on our own? If so, unpleasant experiences, which we now label “traumatic”, may be more likely to leave us shaken and doubting. PTSD seems a tailormade diagnosis for an age of disenchantment or disillusionment. (Summerfield, 2001; Bracken, 2002)

Impact: Bitterness, loss of faith, and the devastation of the human soul

Dr. Michael Eigen 2006. (Associate Clinical Professor of Psychology in the Post Doctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis at New York University, and Senior Member of the National Psychological Association of Psychoanalysis) Sept 2006 interview with Regina Monti <http://www.sydneypsychologist.com.au/favourite-articles-and-media/faith-and-disillusionment-an-interview-with-dr-michael-eigen.html>

As you know, a person sours in face of injury. Disillusionment can lead to cynicism, an embittered personality, an embittered soul. One hardens. We’ve learned that even fragmentation can harden. Diffusion can harden. Personality dispersal can become a chronic defense, a self-hardening. And if one touches it, one finds injury. A baby faith devastated. Often devastation one never recovers from, not fully.

3. Psycho-Pharmaceutical Industrial Complex. PTSD is a scheme to make money for the drug industry

Link: Affirmative wants to increase diagnoses of PTSD

Link: PTSD diagnosis is a money-making scheme. Increasing diagnosis of PTSD in the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual (DSM) isn’t medically realistic, but rather a scheme by the pharmaceutical industry to create more business

Dr. Derek Summerfield 2004. (M.D.; honorary senior lecturer at London's Institute of Psychiatry and a member of the Executive Committee of Transcultural Special Interest Group at the Royal College of Psychiatry ) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies, “Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suffering.” <http://www.instituteofideas.com/transcripts/AllDys_Summerfield_medicaln.pdf>

In Britain the number of prescriptions written for anti-depressants rose from 9 million to 21 million during the 1990s, yet can anyone seriously argue that this merely reflects better recognition of a true epidemic of depression? (Double, 2002). The rise is even greater in USA- a near doubling in the last 5 years- mirroring the production and marketing of SSRI anti-depressants. The first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, in 1952, carried 104 psychiatric categories; the fourth edition of 1994 had 357. In this edition the stressor criterion for PTSD was widened so that second hand shocks now counted and many more people were diagnosable. It has been argued that as many as 1 in 4 of the US population could at any time be diagnosed with one or another DSM category: is this remotely meaningful? DSM categories are the products of vested interests, a major use being communication with insurers and other third parties. The American Psychiatric Association reportedly makes US$60 million per year from selling DSM.

Impact 1: Wasted money. Pharmaceutical influence drives unnecessary spending on health care that gives no benefit

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There is persuasive evidence that the pharmaceutical industry is in a position to set research agendas and to promote expensive treatments for non-diseases. Industry strategies include casting ordinary processes as medical problems (eg baldness), casting mild functional symptoms as portents of serious disease (eg irritable bowel syndrome), casting personal or social problems as medical ones (eg social phobia), casting risk factors as actual diseases (eg osteoporosis), and using misleading disease prevalence estimates to maximise the size of a medical problem (eg erectile dysfunction) (Moynihan et al, 2002). Some commentators see the pharmaceutical industry as having influential segments of the psychiatric profession virtually in its pocket. For example, there is a clear association between sponsorship and reported findings in research on anti-depressants. Published studies sponsored by the manufacturers of SSRI anti-depressants favoured these over other (and much cheaper) anti-depressants significantly more often than did studies sponsored in other ways (Baker et al, 2003). How much extra “health “ or “mental health” have these endeavours produced? Are there as yet uncounted costs? Clinical iatrogenesis is the injury done by ineffective or toxic treatments: a 1999 US Institute of Medicine report estimated that about 100,000 Americans a year died from preventable errors in hospitals. But this is not all. In a brilliant and prophetic analysis, Illich (1975) described the pervasive but largely unrecognised consequences of what he called social and cultural iatrogenesis. Health care consumed an ever growing proportion of the national budget, and with unclear benefits for patients or society as a whole.

Impact 2: More mental illness. Telling people they cannot deal with their problems and need mental health care reduces people’s ability to cope with life, and drives them to seek mental health care

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In a brilliant and prophetic analysis, Illich (1975) described the pervasive but largely unrecognised consequences of what he called social and cultural iatrogenesis. Health care consumed an ever growing proportion of the national budget, and with unclear benefits for patients or society as a whole. Above all, he pointed to the implications of a longer term destruction of time honoured ways of dealing with pain, sickness and death. Can we observe this today? The more the mental health field promotes its technologies as necessary interventions in almost every area of life, the more people pick up that they are not expected to cope through their own resources and networks, the more that socioculturally constructed ways of enduring and coping may wither. As more resources are provided for mental health services, more are perceived to be needed - an apparently circular process. Has the mental health industry become as much a part of the problem as of the solution?

4. PTSD distracts attention from real health issues, like millions starving

[Possible Counterplan / Minor Repair: Take every dollar in the Affirmative team’s plan and donate it to the UN World Food Programme for famine relief. More lives will be saved and more good will be done.]

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The psychiatric literature on the application of quantitative research methods to nonWestern settings largely founders on the rocks of what Kleinman (1987) called a category fallacy. The fallacy is the assumption that because phenomena can be identified in differing social settings, they mean the same thing in those settings. The histories of terms like “depression” or “post-traumatic stress disorder” (PTSD), and the particular meanings (and responses) they mobilise in contemporary Western culture, are simply not straightforwardly reproduced elsewhere. There is no equivalent to these terms in many cultures (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999). The history of depression reveals the gradual incorporation of the Western cultural vocabulary of guilt, energy, fatigue, and stress (Jadhav, 1996). Thus depression or PTSD as they stand simply cannot be universally valid diagnostic categories. Yet the World Health Organisation (1996) is claiming that “depression” is a worldwide epidemic that within twenty years will be second only to cardiovascular disease as the world’s most debilitating disease. This is a serious distortion, which could serve to deflect attention away from what millions of people might cite as the basis of their misery, like poverty and lack of rights. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation says that the number of chronically hungry people in the world is rising by 5 million a year. The one clear-cut beneficiary would be the pharmaceutical industry, with its vested interest in the biologisation of the human predicament.

5. Wrong treatment model.

Link: “Sickness” label hampers recovery and isn’t in the patients’ best interests.

Dr. Jolande Withuis 2001. (PhD; sociologist; Senior Researcher at NIOD, a Dutch institute that studies the effect of war and genocide on individuals and society) “Does PTSD really exist?” ICODO-Info vol.18 nr.3-4 (dec), p.5-18 (originally published in Dutch in 2001, this quote is from the 2004 English translation at the website listed) <http://www.niod.knaw.nl/documents/publicaties/NIODWithuisPTSD.pdf>

This brings us to a second question that keeps reappearing throughout the entire twentieth century with regard to ‘traumatic neurosis’: the possible ‘secondary gain’. Sometimes, being labeled as ‘sick’ offers advantages that hamper recovery, such as attention or exemption from duty. According to Shephard, statistics show that symptoms often disappeared as soon as a patient knew that he did not have to go back to the trenches. This does not make the disorder mere affectation, but it does raise the question of whether pensions, benefits, and exemptions are really in the patients’ best interests.

Impact: Turn the harms. PTSD diagnosis creates more dependency and more problems – moves the veterans further away from recovering a normal life

Dr. Jolande Withuis 2001. (PhD; sociologist; Senior Researcher at NIOD, a Dutch institute that studies the effect of war and genocide on individuals and society) “Does PTSD really exist?” ICODO-Info vol.18 nr.3-4 (dec), p.5-18 (originally published in Dutch in 2001, this quote is from the 2004 English translation at the website listed) <http://www.niod.knaw.nl/documents/publicaties/NIODWithuisPTSD.pdf>

Indeed, Vietnam was a war in which little actual fighting took place. After a raid, the soldiers returned to their base camps, where they were provided with all manner of little pleasures. Once back in America for good, however, they proved unable to pick up where they had left off. Unemployment, alcohol, drugs, violence, murder, and suicide were frequent among the ones who came home. Often, their wives or girlfriends had not waited for them or had turned into anti-war activists (as in the movie Coming Home starring Jane Fonda and Jon Voight, which was felt to be a deeply moving film at the time). Well-meaning psychiatrists stood up for the veterans, often motivated by a general anti-war attitude. As a result of the concerted lobby of veterans and therapists, PTSD was included in the diagnostic manual of psychiatric disorders. Now it was established that ‘normal’ persons can develop a psychiatric disorder from abnormal experiences. This recognition was advantageous at the time but, according to Shephard, eventually proved detrimental. The problem was not a lack of funds or good intentions but the absence of effective methods of treatment. The lessons of 1918 and 1945 had been forgotten, as Shephard does not tire of repeating. One of these lessons was to give immediate treatment and to focus that treatment on getting back to work and normalcy. Fighting for recognition of a ‘disease’ that nobody knew how to cure, says Shephard, created an army of chronically ill, chronically complaining veterans. They were often out of work, sometimes violent, and mostly addicted to drink, drugs, and the dole, as well as to a newly created identity – the identity of a ‘trauma victim’. Furthermore, this pseudo-success was adopted as a model by other organized victim groups that were claiming their right to ‘recognition’. After the initial negligence of the veteran issue, the tender pole gained ground from the tough approach, though at the expense of the goal of helping people get back to normal and take part in society again.

6. Culture of complaint

Link: Promoting “trauma” creates a culture of complaint

Dr. Jolande Withuis 2001. (PhD; sociologist; Senior Researcher at NIOD, a Dutch institute that studies the effect of war and genocide on individuals and society) “Does PTSD really exist?” ICODO-Info vol.18 nr.3-4 (dec), p.5-18 (originally published in Dutch in 2001, this quote is from the 2004 English translation at the website listed) <http://www.niod.knaw.nl/documents/publicaties/NIODWithuisPTSD.pdf>

This mental transformation brings us back to the position taken by Summerfield. He believes that people are no longer capable of accepting ‘normal human suffering’ and sorrow as something that is part of life. What happened to the stiff upper lip – the mentality that sent the boys to the front and ensured that after they had fallen for the sake of their fatherland their next of kin got on with life and did not complain? That has indeed disappeared. As we have been able to observe after Dutch peacekeeping missions, that kind of self-sacrificing mentality no longer exists. Also Shephard, in his much more subtle analysis, makes a link to the changes in mentality that occurred between roughly 1945 and 1975. My own literature study (of Maandblad Geestelijke volksgezondheid) points in the same direction. What has turned the victim role into a ‘culture of complaint’? The notion that ‘being tough’ and staying silent is the wrong recipe was reinforced by the democratization and assertiveness of those same years. The timid victim turned into a whining citizen who demands happiness – an articulate claimant of compensation. Being sick changed from something to be ashamed of into something some groups consider to be an appealing attribute. This is particularly true for the concept of ‘trauma’. That is why I have introduced the term ‘trauma culture’, inspired by the Dutch sociologist J.A.A. van Doorn, who recently described his observations on all kinds of claims by referring to a ‘culture of complaint’ and ‘victimitis’.

Impact: Real victims get overlooked, while everyone else is whining about their victimization

Dr. Jolande Withuis 2001. (PhD; sociologist; Senior Researcher at NIOD, a Dutch institute that studies the effect of war and genocide on individuals and society) “Does PTSD really exist?” ICODO-Info vol.18 nr.3-4 (dec), p.5-18 (originally published in Dutch in 2001, this quote is from the 2004 English translation at the website listed) <http://www.niod.knaw.nl/documents/publicaties/NIODWithuisPTSD.pdf>

We would be making a dangerous conceptual error to suppose that the vague and varied problems that characterize PTSD and its predecessors constitute a closely circumscribed disease that a person must get after a shocking experience. As the doctors at the front already knew in 1914 and 1940, not everyone becomes traumatized by a disaster. Shephard concludes that it is not a question of tender or tough but that a dialogue between these two poles should influence the medical and social attitudes toward afflictions such as neurasthenia, shell shock, combat fatigue, and PTSD. Besides offering understanding and help in finding meaning, the goal should be to treat the problems and integrate the afflicted again in normal life with its normal range of responsibilities. Most of all, we should guard against the invalidating tendency to turn the victim role into a social identity. We should not lose sight of what has been gained: that recognition (by the victims themselves and by those close to them) of the suffering would end the psychological fixation on the past so that the individuals, liberated to some degree, could once again take control of their lives and go on to develop an identity other than that of a victim. The rise of ‘victimitisation’ provokes aversion and cynicism. This might mean that we would again start telling victims they should stop whining. If so, then the overassertive pseudo-victims will have spoiled things for the real ones, who in fact usually suffer in silence.

SOFT POWER - Bad

SOFT POWER THEORY - WRONG

The very concept of soft power is ethnocentric and condescending - it assumes American culture is superior, which is the root cause of many world problems

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

Nye’s notion of soft power is largely ethnocentric and condescending as it is based on false assumptions of that American culture is superior and should be liked and adopted by other nations and that western values and culture that will continue to define the rules of the world (The Guardian, 2004). Western core values of democracy, liberty and consumerism, no matter how attractive or even admirable at first sight, may not necessarily be suitable (Hunter, 2006) or achievable in other countries. To many people around the world, the US self-perception of the superiority of American way of life is very much the root cause of troubles in the world.

Soft power is a bogus theory proven wrong by historical experience

Prof. Ilha Niaz 2010. **(**Assistant Professor of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad) 10 Jan 2010 “The mirage of soft power in a globalized world” <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/67345>

One thing that soft power is a testament to is the ability of the human race to delude itself. It is remarkable that a hypothesis as intellectually bogus and empirically fragile should be projected as a legitimate new way of looking at old problems. The soft power world view is substantially invalidated by historical experience, events and trends of the contemporary era (1990-present) and future possibilities arising from historical experience and the dynamics of contemporary issues. Historically, a country`s soft power is a consequence of it having, or having had at some time in the past, great amount of hard power. The global penetration of the English language, for instance, is part of the British imperial legacy, which includes the birth and rise of the United States of America, and the resultant dynamism of the North Atlantic economy.

Soft Power theory was refuted during its first year of existence

[“Nye” in this context is the expert on “soft power” theory Prof. Joseph Nye]

Abe Greenwald 2010. ( policy adviser and online editor with the Foreign Policy Initiative in Washington) July/Aug 2010 “THE SOFT-POWER FALLACY” <http://www.think-israel.org/greenwald.softpowerfallacy.html>

Like Francis Fukuyama's essay "The End of History," soft-power theory was a creative and appealing attempt to make sense of America's global purpose. Unlike Fukuyama's theory, however, which the new global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye's was basically refuted by world events in its very first year. In the summer of 1990, a massive contingent of Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. Although months earlier Nye had asserted that "geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important," the fact is that Saddam invaded Kuwait because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil reserves. Despite Nye's claim that "the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force," months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw. In the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in liberating Kuwait.

Soft power theories are stretched so far that they mean almost nothing

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? (parentheses and ellipses in original) <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

With more examples added Nye seems to miss the point as to what soft power exactly is as the concept has been so stretched that the term comes to mean almost everything and therefore almost nothing (Hoagland, 2004). In all these examples given by Nye resources, sources (cause) and impact (effect) are mixed up. It is important to note sources and resources are not power per se but potential for power. The owners of these resources have to convert them into power.

Soft power = confusion: It confuses individual emotional ties with international diplomatic influence

Nye’s theories are flawed: Soft power is impossible to use in any organised fashion

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) , “Soft power: Powerof attraction or confusion?” May 2008 <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pb/journal/v4/n2/full/pb20084a.html>

Despite its popularity, soft power remains power of confusion. This paper examines the concept, with a special focus on the nature and sources of soft power. Nye's notion of soft power is largely ethnocentric and based on the assumption that there is a link between attractiveness and the ability to influence others in international relations. This poses two problems: First, a country has many different actors. Some of them like the attraction and others do not. Whether the attraction will lead to the ability to influence the policy of the target country depends on which groups in that country find it attractive and how much control they have on policy making. Secondly, policy making at the state level is far more complicated than at the personal level, and has different dynamics that emphasise the rational considerations. This leaves little room for emotional elements, thus significantly reducing the effect of soft power. Given the nature of soft power being uncontrollable and unpredictable, it would be impossible to wield soft power in any organised and coordinated fashion, as Nye suggested. Furthermore, the relationship between two countries is shaped by many complex factors. It is ultimately decided by the geopolitics and strategic interests of nations, in which soft power may play only a limited role.

Soft power is confusing: Professor Nye doesn’t give a simple definition, and the concepts are not clearly applicable to nations

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? (parentheses and ellipses in original) <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

Soft power, on the other hand, is a rather confusing concept. Nye does not give a simple definition. Instead, he describes soft power variously as (Nye, 2004a):  
- ...the ability to shape the preferences of others (p5).  
- ...the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence (p6)  
- ... the ability to get others to want the outcome you want because of your cultural or ideological appeal (p11)  
- A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries –admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness –want to follow it (p5)  
- A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries –admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness –want to follow it (p5)  
- …a key element of leadership. The power to attract –to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda (Nye, 2004b).  
A person is said to have power due to having one of the following attributes or a combination of them: status, authority, reputation, money, knowledge and beauty (Davies, 1991). Individuals such as Nelson Mandela or Mother Teresa have soft power because of their reputation. However, a nation is far more complicated than a person. It is unclear how attraction or attractiveness leads to power or influence in the context of a nation.

SOFT POWER SOLVENCY FAILURES

Islam appeals to people who don’t want a “McWorld” - Let’s not assume other people want American culture; they already have a culture, they don’t need to import ours

Dr. Payam Akhavan 2012. (Professor of International Law at McGill University, first Legal Advisor to the Prosecutor’s Office of the International Criminal Tribunals at The Hague) 7 June 2012 “A Candid Discussion with Payam Akhavan” <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/06/07/candid-discussion-payam-akhavan/>

We should also bear in mind that the appeal of Islam is also partially a response to the cultural excesses of what Professor Barber calls “McWorld”. As people struggle to come to terms with modernity, they must determine how to define themselves culturally, how to maintain spiritual and communal values that were long forgotten in most Western cultures. People do not sacrifice their lives for freedom merely so they can enjoy consumer capitalism and the cultural and spiritual wasteland that it leads to. There shouldn’t be an assumption that just because Muslim people want freedom, that they also want to import wholesale American culture, that they have no civilization and culture of their own, or that such heritage cannot be adapted to the modern world.

Soft power is utterly meaningless in today’s world due to multiple big problems it cannot solve

Prof. Ilha Niaz 2010. **(**Assistant Professor of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad) 10 Jan 2010 “The mirage of soft power in a globalized world” <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/67345>

Large parts of the world, including South Asia, are experiencing administrative breakdown and gross socioeconomic inequities. Other parts of the world are likely to spend the next generation coping with the fallout of US imperial misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq. On an overpopulated, resource-starved, economically imbalanced, and environmentally degraded planet, soft power will be utterly meaningless. Those powers that possess the requisite ruthlessness, military capability, material superiority, effective administration and political will, are likely to prevail. Those powers that are deficient on these and other indices of hard power are likely to perish or be marginalised.

Presidents Jimmy Carter and Obama both tried “soft power” and both failed: Our adversaries view it as a sign of weakness

Dr. James Carafano 2011. ( PhD; leading expert in defense affairs, intelligence, military operations and strategy, and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. and fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College) 30 Jan 2011 More Carter Redux in the Middle East <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/30/more-carter-redux-in-the-middle-east/>

From the outset of the Obama presidency and the emergence of the Obama Doctrine, the similarities between this Administration and that of Jimmy Carter have been striking. Like Obama, Carter trumpeted soft power and international institutions as the means to solve the most perplexing foreign policy problems. The programs of both Presidents hinged on the cooperation of adversaries who interpreted the U.S. initiatives as signs of weakness, and in the second half of their presidencies, both faced the prospect of sharp reversals.

Obama unable to gain results using "soft power" with Iran

Dr. James Carafano 2009. (PhD; leading expert in defense affairs, intelligence, military operations and strategy, and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. and fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College) 27 Oct 2009 Exclusive: Soft Power Slump [www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.4616/pub\_detail.asp](http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.4616/pub_detail.asp)

Obama’s week finished with a soft power slump. The U.S. had high hopes for two meetings with Iranian officials on their suspect nuclear programs. Early in the week the administration prematurely and foolishly started crowing that the Iranians were willing to negotiate. Soft power, they proclaim, had triumphed. A Washington Post article described the deal as “providing a major boost for the Obama administration” in engaging with the Islamist government in Tehran. The high-fives proved premature. By the end of the week, Iran walked away without signing.

Soft power cannot be exploited in any coherent way

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

As soft power rests on attraction, the "power" lies not in the hand of the party who possesses it, but in the response and reaction of the party who receives it. Because of this unique nature of soft power, a nation‟s soft power over another nation is not a factor that can be exploited purposely in any coherent way (Blechman, 2005). Next, given the nature of the concept – intangible, uncontrollable and unpredictable, it would be impossible to wield soft power in an organised and coordinated fashion as Nye (2005) suggested.

Not successful in all contexts. Though he advocates for Soft Power, Professor Joseph Nye admits in 2010 that the success of Soft Power depends on particular contexts and does not always produce the desired outcomes.

Prof. Joseph Nye 2010. (Harvard professor, advocate for and originator of the term “soft power”) 4 Mar 2010 testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Testimony-of-Joseph-S-Nye-mar-04-2010.pdf>

Sometimes skeptics complain that soft power and attraction do not always produce the outcomes we seek. That is true. Soft power is unlikely to get Kim Jong Il to give up his nuclear weapons, and President Obama’s popularity did not divert the Dutch government from its plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Particular events like this have multiple causes, but this is true of all types of power, not just soft power. The conversion of power resources into preferred outcomes always depends upon particular contexts.

Soft Power doesn’t matter without Hard Power

Prof. Ilha Niaz 2010. **(**Assistant Professor of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad) 10 Jan 2010 “The mirage of soft power in a globalized world” <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/67345>

With US hard power in decline following a decade of imperial misadventures, flawed domestic policies and strategic overextension, there is little doubt that Washington`s ability to influence the global village is also going to decrease. But that doesn`t mean that people will stop wearing jeans or listening to rap music or eating at Pizza Hut. Soft power just doesn`t matter strategically or diplomatically unless backed by hard power.

AFF CAN’T ACHIEVE SOFT POWER

Being more "attractive" is not soft power: Have to define what policy objectives we're trying to get other nations to follow

Analysis: Unless AFF defines which country they want to influence and what they want that country to do, we will never know if they have achieved soft power with their plan

Dr. Yasushi Watanabe 2006. PhD (Professor at Graduate School of Media & Governance, Keio University, Japan), 2006, "Revisiting Soft Power," http://city.udn.com/53732/2863217?cate\_no=0&pno=2&tpno=0&f\_ORDER\_BY=O

First, the main point of soft power is that it lowers the costs (what systems theory calls transaction costs) of accomplishing policy objectives; it is not just about the promotion of “soft content” industries. Perhaps because of the use of the term “attractiveness” in discussing soft power, or perhaps because of a kind of snobbism, there seems to be a tendency to call anything “attractive” soft power. Attractiveness enriches life, but attractiveness on its own is not soft power. More precisely, attractiveness can be a source of soft power, but whether it can become soft power depends on the policy objective itself, of course, and also policy aims and context and the methods employed.

SP=communication, foreign aid, economic reconstruction, and talking to the people

Analysis: If these aren't in the AFF plan mandates, then they aren't generating soft power

Anne-Katrin Arnold 2009. (consultant to the World Bank Communication for Governance & Accountability Program; also a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication) Aug 2009, "Soft Power: Talking to the People" <http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/soft-power-talking-people> (italics and parentheses in original)

At the core of soft power are strategic communication, foreign aid, civic action, empowerment, and economic reconstruction and development. In essence (and simplified) it's about working with the people in country A to make them support country B and demand from government A to work with government B. It involves *talking to the people*: engaging foreign publics, winning public opinion.

One policy not enough – we need multiple factors to regain soft power

Analysis: If these other factors aren’t in the AFF plan, then Soft Power advantages don’t happen

Dr. Richard Bush 2009. (PhD, Columbia Univ.; former Director for Minority Liaison, U.S. House Committee on International Relations; Director of Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, “On the Eve of Obama's Inauguration: American Soft Power in Asia” Jan 2009 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/01_asia_bush.aspx?emc=lm&m=221447&l=56&v=20759>

Nor will it be easy or quick to restore the United States to a position where Asian countries will be inclined to accept U.S. proposals on major issues out of respect for what America is and what it has done. When, for example, will Asian economic leaders listen to—much less take—American advice on financial liberalization after the sub-prime mortgage scandal, the credit freeze, and the government takeover of American financial institutions? How long after Abu Ghraib will it be before the Chinese government takes seriously the entreaties of U.S. diplomats that it end torture? Creating influence through attraction is not going to be easy for a while. It will take time to regain the legitimacy to lead through soft power, which is the best way to lead. The United States therefore needs to consider what should be done to restore its soft power. Whether we want to do so is another question that bears on the question of domestic support. I would argue that our stakes in the stability and prosperity of the global system are still too great for us to not play a role in future agenda-setting, whatever other countries do. Some of the steps for rebuilding soft power have nothing to do with Asia, since the creation of our soft-power deficit was the result of policies outside the region. As Ashley Tellis says, it has to do with redefining the U.S. role in the world. It has to do with rebuilding our national strength and competitiveness, particularly economic. It has to do with reaffirming our core values in a meaningful way, particular those that were called into question by the conduct of the war in Iraq. It includes having a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” that is, accepting that the views of other states will set limits on U.S. action even as we seek to shape those views in an active way. In that regard, two capabilities of the U.S. government are badly in need of renovation. The first is classical diplomacy, instead of the current mode of “stating positions and then restating positions.” The second is public diplomacy, instead of “a pedestrian propaganda mill that is neither effective nor credible.” With respect to Asia, rebuilding our soft power first of all means showing up. On the one hand, senior officials up to and including the president should make every effort to attend those meetings in Asia that their counterparts attend.

DISADVANTAGES - Soft Power is Bad

1. Soft Power Turn: Attempting to increase soft power results in reduced US respect abroad

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

Nye believes that anti-Americanism led to the decline of American‟s soft power. But in fact the opposite is true. Anti-Americanism is not just the result of the US foreign policies but a response to the ubiquity of its culture. The "over-success" of American’s soft power has brewed resentment and increased anti-Americanism. This is evidenced by the fact that even in European countries – American’s traditional allies – a majority of people regard the spread of American culture as a bad thing (The Pew Research Centre, 2002). Because of this confusion over cause and effect, the solution offered by Nye to enhance US soft power is in fact a part of the cause of the problem.

2. Soft Power emphasis enables our enemies

Link: Foreign policy retreat. SP empowers our enemies to undermine US interests

Dr. James Carafano 2009. PhD (leading expert in defense affairs, intelligence, military operations and strategy, and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation; former Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. and fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College) 26 Oct 2009, "Why 1978 was a very bad year," (brackets added; parentheses in original) <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Why-1978-was-a-very-bad-year-8437331-65944932.html>

In fact, Obama has already outdone President Carter, winning a Nobel Prize before rather than after he has done anything. Of course, this merely places additional pressure on the administration to continue relying on the tools (arms control agreements, the United Nations and such) lauded by the Nobel judges. Sadly, warning signs that others will use the administration's "soft power uber alles [above all]" strategy to undermine U.S. interests are already cropping up.  
 **»** The Russians are demanding more and more at the strategic-arms negotiating table, while giving their U.S. counterparts less and less.  
**»** Iran and North Korea are running out the clock, sending diplomats into the umpteenth round of talks while their scientists toil feverishly advancing their nuclear and missile programs.  
**»** In Latin America, socialist dictators continue to outmaneuver the White House.  
  
Meanwhile, new al Qaeda-related or -inspired plots appear to be popping up every day. Three in the United States were thwarted last month. A Boston-based plot was thwarted just last week. Turkey uncovered another network the week before that. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is on the march. And the year is not over yet. The rhetoric of soft power is inspiring and ever hopeful. But unless the nation seems firmly committed to backing that soft power with some hard muscle, those with no love of America will interpret the rhetoric as the vapid mooings of a nation in retreat.

Impact: Threatens stability of international order

Mark Silverberg 2009. (attorney with a Masters Degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Manitoba, Canada. A former member of the Canadian Justice Department, He has lectured extensively on subjects of counterterrorism, jihadism, homeland security issues and intelligence matters) Nov 2009 "Dealing with the Devil " <http://www.marksilverberg.com/>

The assumption that the Obama administration’s diplomatic initiative to our enemies will enhance America’s image in the world and increase our security is becoming more questionable with each passing day. What we have learned is that dialogue and accommodation with messianic, apocalyptic Islamic regimes like Iran are not only pointless, but threaten the stability of the international order.

3. Backlash and Backfire

Soft power can make enemies, breeds resentment and bitterness

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

Power has always given rise to the dichotomy of attraction and repulsion, whether soft or hard (Opelz, 2004). Soft power too can breed resentment and bitterness. Even Nye (2004b) himself admits that no country likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. Power is power, no matter if it is soft or hard, there is no difference in terms of its utility: influencing people‟s mind and behaviour to achieve one‟s objectives. Soft power is still power and it can still make enemies (Joffe, 2006a).

Backfire: Soft power may be counterproductive

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? (parentheses and ellipses in original) <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

Even Nye (2004a) has to admit, what soft power can influence is not the policymaking itself but only the “environment for policy”. Soft power may be counterproductive because societies react differently to American culture, the working of which are extremely complex, not least because of the diversity, as Fehrenbach and Poiger point out, in the “processes by which societies adopt, adapt, and reject American culture” (Opelz, 2004).

Backlash: Excess soft power breeds resentment and rage

Dr. Ying Fan 2008. (senior lecturer in marketing at Brunel University, West London, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy) May 2008 SOFT POWER: POWER OF ATTRACTION OR CONFUSION? (parentheses and ellipses in original) <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

In a context dominated by hard power considerations soft power is meaningless (Blechman, 2004). The dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage (Joffe, 2006b).

SPACE WEAPONS / OUTER SPACE TREATY

Notes: Alex Englehart could be cited as the advocate for the Affirmative plan to modify the Outer Space Treaty. It's important to point out what the Affirmative expert says about their plan in our Solvency evidence.

OPENING QUOTE / NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Negative Net Benefits: We should leave the Outer Space Treaty alone

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

The specific question that this paper was invited to address is “What progress could be made at a possible OST RevCon and how should a possible RevCon unfold?” The answer to the question as framed is, with serious trepidation and extreme caution. However, the question contains the assumption that a revision conference for the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) ought to occur. The response to that assumption is, at this point in time, to leave the Outer Space Treaty alone. Regardless of how compelling or meritorious the reason for revising the Outer Space Treaty may appear to be, the fact is there is much more to lose than there is to gain.

SIGNIFICANCE / JUSTIFICATION RESPONSES / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Risks of Treaty modification outweigh all but the most immediate threats

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Finally, no treaty revision occurs in a legal vacuum. It must occur within the framework of the entire prevailing legal system, related agreements and general principles of law. This presents an infinite number of paths that a treaty revision conference can be made to take, increasing the likelihood of delay and uncertainty to an unquantifiable degree. Unquantifiable uncertainty ought to be risked only for the most menacing and most immediate of threats. Taking a long look backward at the history of humanity, it becomes quickly evident that it is folly to say that anything should never change, even the Outer Space Treaty. However, for the foreseeable future, the Outer Space Treaty should be left alone. Opening it for revision now is a case of “be careful what you wish for”.

Threat not sufficient to justify change to the Outer Space Treaty. Decades of debate and negotiations would happen while the technology would advance beyond the negotiations.

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Is there a clear, present and credible threat that justifies the disruption that will inevitably occur by attempting to revise the Outer Space Treaty? In the 1960s, the nations of the world were brought to the negotiating table because both the former Soviet Union and the United States had successfully and pragmatically proven that they had existing and substantial launch and weapons capabilities. Existing rockets could have been either transportation vehicles for scientific experiments or weapons delivery systems. Existing payloads could have been scientific instruments or weapons. Does the current geopolitical landscape provide an analogous situation today? Are there any nations that now have both an independent, robust, long-term launch capability and proven advanced space weaponry that create a situation dire enough to risk the stability that the Outer Space Treaty provides? Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that there is an existing space threat analogous to the former Soviet Union–United States Cold War capabilities: will it last as long as the time required to negotiate revised or amended treaty terms? The United Nations was first asked to consider the legal issues associated with space activities in 1958. The Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967. Even with the extreme pressures of the Cold War, it took nearly a decade to complete and activate the Outer Space Treaty. Nine years is definitely fast in terms of international treaty negotiations, however, the more significant fact is that at that time, space technology development was still in its early stages and less likely to outpace the speed of negotiations. Today, the intense, focused, urgent pressures of the Cold War have given way to a diverse, multipolar array of forces and space technology has advanced. Today, the likelihood is that discussions would be less focused and more wide ranging; and once opened, attempted revisions could lead to decades of debate and negotiations. At the same time, the ability to implement already developing technologies could outpace negotiations.

Space is not weaponized

Thomas Graham, Jr. 2005. (former special representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. In this and other senior capacities, he participated in every major arms control and nonproliferation negotiation in which the United States took part from 1970 to 1997) 8 Dec 2005 "A Pearl Harbor in Outer Space? Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War" <http://www.counterpunch.org/graham12082005.html>

Pursuant to the initiative of President Dwight Eisenhower, who at the time of his establishment of NASA made it clear that it was U.S. policy to keep space weapons-free, space remains free of weapons of all kinds. Space has long been militarized-early warning systems are military systems-but it has never been weaponized.

SOLVENCY

1. Requires multi-national agreement.

Link: Affirmative can only change US Federal Government policy. It's in the resolution

Link: The Outer Space Treaty requires a majority vote of its 98 members to amend

Prof. Todd Barnet 2009. (Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Pace University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; A.B., University of Southern California) A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF 2006 <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=todd_barnet>

The Outer Space Treaty, on the other hand, has been ratified by 98 states. The suggested course now is for the OST member nations to follow OST procedures and complete a simple majority vote in favor of an amendment to the OST.

Impact: No solvency. Since Affirmative can't make 49 other countries agree to their plan, the plan is simply a non-binding suggestion, not an actual plan that achieves any benefits.

2. Forgot to include China

Link: Their mandates do not include any negotiations with China.

Impact: we can't achieve US national security interests on space weapons without coming to an understanding with China

Alex B. Englehart 2008. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Jan 2008 University of Washington School of Law, COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY: EXTENDING THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY TO RECONCILE U.S. AND CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/568

China sees U.S. military space activities as a threat and, along with Russia, has pushed hard in recent years for a ban on all space weapons. So far, the United States has been unwilling to negotiate on the subject, claiming that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty-which bans weapons of mass destruction in space, but not other weapons-is sufficient. Pursuing space weapons without coming to an understanding with the Chinese does not serve U.S. national security interests.

Rebuttal evidence: Plan must include US + Russia + China

Alex B. Englehart 2008. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Jan 2008 University of Washington School of Law, COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY: EXTENDING THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY TO RECONCILE U.S. AND CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.debatecoaches.org%2Ffiles%2Fdownload%2F1260&ei=0cXMUO\_ALIiqywG\_2YDAAQ&usg=AFQjCNGcPrXyknJmVn5a7x4bkUtGtGa54g&bvm=bv.1355325884,d.aWc

Today, the United States, China, and Russia should look to this past experience as a guide to the potential benefits of constructively updating the Outer Space Treaty. The United States and China are at a crossroads-they can either throw themselves into a destabilizing arms race involving space-based weapons and ASATs, or they can come to the table and rethink the aging Outer Space Treaty.

3. Not what China & Russia are asking for

Link: China & Russia want an entirely new treaty, not just amending the Outer Space Treaty

Alex B. Englehart 2008. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Jan 2008 University of Washington School of Law, COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY: EXTENDING THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY TO RECONCILE U.S. AND CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fddi11.wikispaces.com%2Ffile%2Fview%2FSS%2BDOE-Solice%2Bv.%2BRS%2BPaulson-Kaul%2BRound%2B1.doc%2F244744125%2FSS%2520DOE-Solice%2520v.%2520RS%2520Paulson-Kaul%2520Round%25201.doc&ei=J8bMUKHRGcT\_ygGGwoGYCQ&usg=AFQjCNFS\_kyG1QR\_FObuP03EEuTTcooAow&bvm=bv.1355325884,d.aWc

China and Russia have been pushing for such negotiations for a long time, but their insistence thus far on broad, sweeping treaty language and, in fact, an entirely new treaty, as opposed to a simple amendment to the Outer Space Treaty-has kept the United States from even beginning negotiations. A compromise is in order.

**Impact/Analysis: Affirmative cannot fiat that China & Russia will compromise. In fact, they've never read any evidence that China or Russia will change their policies and accept the Affirmative's proposed amendments. Note that "A compromise is in order" is Englehart's wishing for China, Russia and the US to find a compromise, not a statement that China and Russia actually will agree to it.**

4. No clear definition of space weapons

Michael Krepon 2008. (Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of thirteen books and over 350 articles. Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Rep. Norm Dicks; masters degree from School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ) 14 Feb 2008 "Russia and China Propose a Treaty Banning Space Weapons, while the Pentagon Plans an ASAT Test " <http://beta.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=568>

Proponents of a treaty banning space weapons have been stymied in the past because so many devices designed for other purposes could be used as space weapons, such as lasers, jammers, and missile defense interceptors. It would be impossible to capture all of these devices in a treaty banning space weapons, and a treaty limited to “dedicated” space weapons or those “specially produced or converted” would be woefully insufficient, especially if there are no means to investigate whether such weapons have been produced or secretly deployed.

5. No effective enforcement

Link: The Affirmative plan says 'who' will enforce but not specifically "how" they will verify compliance.

Impact: Leaving verification to be determined later is extremely unwise because of circumvention issues. Michael Krepon in 2008 discussed this issue in context of the Russia/China proposed space weapons ban treaty that they want the US to agree to - but of course, the Affirmative plan has the same problem:

Michael Krepon 2008. (Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of thirteen books and over 350 articles. Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Rep. Norm Dicks; masters degree from School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ) 14 Feb 2008 "Russia and China Propose a Treaty Banning Space Weapons, while the Pentagon Plans an ASAT Test " <http://beta.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=568>

The proposed treaty has several significant weaknesses. First, its scope is limited only to weapons based in space. It does not cover ground- and sea-based means that could be used to harm satellites, such as the Chinese ground-based anti-satellite weapon tested a year ago. Second, even the proposed ban on space-based weapons is of limited scope, since it applies only to devices “specially produced or converted” to become space weapons. If a device is designed to have multiple purposes, its owner could claim that it is not covered under the treaty. Another major weakness in the draft treaty is its relaxed approach to verifying compliance with its provisions. Earlier presentations by its sponsors left a verification protocol for consideration after the treaty negotiations – an extremely unwise approach. Without an ability to monitor implementation, the treaty’s proposed executive organization would not have much authority.

Impact: ASAT restrictions must be effectively verified -- and may not be possible to devise a verifiable treaty that does not infringe on valid US interests

Ross Liemer and Prof. Christopher F. Chyba 2010. (Ross Liemer examined anti-satellite weapons policy as an undergraduate at Princeton University, has spent the last year at Tsinghua University in China; Christopher F. Chyba is professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University, where he directs the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School) "A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons" <http://www.twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_LiemerChyba.pdf>

Any agreement to limit space debris by restricting ASAT use would need to be carefully drafted and effectively verified. The George W. Bush administration argued that it is not possible to devise a verifiable space arms control treaty that does not infringe on valid U.S. interests. For instance, how could ‘‘anti-satellite weapons’’ be defined without including all maneuverable satellites-- any of which has the ability to collide with a target?

6. ASAT circumvention. Anti-Satellite systems could be launched with other payloads or in hidden form

Ross Liemer and Prof. Christopher F. Chyba 2010. (Ross Liemer examined anti-satellite weapons policy as an undergraduate at Princeton University, has spent the last year at Tsinghua University in China; Christopher F. Chyba is professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University, where he directs the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School) "A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons" <http://www.twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_LiemerChyba.pdf>

Banning research and development on ASAT weapons could preclude, for instance, the further development of automated transfer vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station; these could be portrayed as a proxy for the development of ASAT guidance, navigation, and control systems. Attempts to carve out exceptions for such cases could lead to severe verification challenges. Furthermore, ASAT systems could be launched within other payloads, or in the form of satellites that hid their weaponized nature until the operator decided to break out from an arms control regime.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Net benefits: The threats could go away during the negotiations and be replaced by new problems that would not have happened if the treaty had not been opened up to negotiation

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Also to be considered is that the original perceived threat that catalyses a revision conference could be readily overcome by more dynamic economic and political events including cyclical elections, changes of administration, changing foreign policies and national fiscal and budgetary constraints. Moreover, the original threat could be supplanted by a new, unforeseen one that might not have been activated but for the opportunity presented by the ongoing negotiations and the uncertain status of the treaty during that time.

DISADVANTAGES 2 and 3:

The Big Link: In order to accomplish the Affirmative's plan, there would have to be a process started in which the Outer Space Treaty (OST) would be formally opened to modifications. The disadvantages below are linked to what happens when the amendment process is opened. It will become a free-for-all and lots of good things in the OST will be in jeopardy. Understand this carefully: These disadvantages link to the OST amendment process opened up by the Affirmative, not to their mandates. It will not be a sufficient response for them to say that these changes aren't in their mandates. These are unexpected consequences that follow merely from opening up the treaty to amendment, which is definitely in their mandates.

Link: When the Affirmative opens the treaty for their amendments, all other provisions in the treaty become vulnerable to change

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Because the Outer Space Treaty functions like a constitution, opening it for revision means that all of its provisions will be vulnerable to change. These provisions include some of the most important and fundamental principles in international space law. They include that the exploration and use of space is to be for the benefit and interests of all countries; space is the “province of all mankind”; all states are free to explore, use and scientifically investigate space; state appropriation of space is prohibited; nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are prohibited; military bases, installations, fortifications, weapons testing and military manoeuvres are “forbidden” on the Moon and other celestial bodies; states are responsible for all space activities undertaken by national and non-governmental entities; and states can be held liable for damage caused by their space objects. All of these would be at risk in a revision conference.

Additional Link evidence: The amendment process opens up all treaty provisions to change or elimination

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

The International Law Commission, when considering the question of whether or not there is a difference between the two, “saw no essential legal difference in the processes of amendment and review, regarding amendment as including review”. Without a clear legal demarcation between “amendment” and “review”, the true force that will be at play in an Outer Space Treaty revision conference is politics. A politically motivated revision process will guarantee no guarantees. All treaty provisions will be susceptible to change or elimination.

Link: Space treaties are interrelated. Opening the OST to amendment will bring other treaties into question as well

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf> (brackets added)

In addition to interest groups and nations that advocate a new, single space agreement, another indicator that an Outer Space Treaty revision process will inevitably expand to the entire space treaty regime is the treaty drafters’ intention that the space treaties be interrelated. “The Outer Space Treaty … provides a framework for a number of limited accords between individual countries and intergovernmental organizations as well as [the] subsequent [space] treaties.” The Astronaut Rescue Agreement is specifically based on Article V27 of the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention is based on Article VII28 and the Registration Convention is based on Article VIII.29 Together, these treaties create an interrelated legal framework that creates a legal whole that is greater than the sum of its parts—a rare condition in international law. [“]The type of interrelation that exists among these treaties is unusual in international law, except in the case of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, both of which are incorporated by reference into the Outer Space Treaty.[“]30 [quoting George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., 1986, Envoys of Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the Governance of Space Societies, Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press] Opening the underlying provisions of the Outer Space Treaty upon which the latter treaties are based will, of necessity, bring their status into question as well.

2. Risk of Space nuclear weapons ban being overturned

Link: See the Big Link above. Opening the treaty to the Affirmative's amendments would also open it to other amendments

Link: The space nuclear weapons ban could be eliminated if OST is opened for amendment

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Current events include rapidly developing situations in the constantly shifting geopolitical landscape that provide evidence that the nuclear regime is under stress. Developed and developing nations are realigning regarding what are considered permissible nuclear activities. Ostensibly controlled nuclear access is now emerging in tandem with non-proliferation. The long-standing dichotomy between nuclear capable/developed nations and the non-nuclear capable/developing nations is shifting, as is the dichotomy between developed nation/spacefarer and developing nation/non-spacefarer. Nuclear and space activities are being rearranged. In light of the changes in the terrestrial nuclear regime, it is not at all clear that the Outer Space Treaty’s nuclear weapons ban in space would survive a revision conference.

Impact: Nukes anywhere anytime without warning

Thomas Graham, Jr. 2005. (former special representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. In this and other senior capacities, he participated in every major arms control and nonproliferation negotiation in which the United States took part from 1970 to 1997) 8 Dec 2005 "A Pearl Harbor in Outer Space? Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War" <http://www.counterpunch.org/graham12082005.html>

Where would we be without the Outer Space Treaty? Nuclear weapons could be orbiting the Earth with the capability to strike anywhere, anytime without warning.

3. Risk of all space treaties being eliminated

Link: See the Big Link cards above. Opening up the OST means the entire treaty can be changed by outside interests.

Link: Treaty amendment process will be used by interest groups to try to amend the treaty to

1) establish property rights in space; 2) eliminate all space treaties

Prof. Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz with UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2006. (Director, National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center and Research Professor of Law at Univ of Mississippi, J.D., Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law.) CHAPTER 11 - THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND ENHANCING SPACE SECURITY, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31 March 2006, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf>

Interest groups are another force that will be activated in a treaty revision process. Some interest groups are seeking to change the Outer Space Treaty for their own reasons, including clarifying and establishing property rights in space. If the Outer Space Treaty were opened for any reason, these groups would welcome the opportunity to introduce their own purposes into the process and would bring political pressure to open it up. Another force that will work to expand a revision conference is those nation-states in the current geopolitical environment that advocate eliminating all of the space treaties and beginning anew with one, single, comprehensive agreement.

Link: Space treaties important for preventing arms race in space

Jayantha Dhanapala 2002. (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations) THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AT THIRTY-FIVE, Opening Remarks <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2002/2002Oct14_NewYork.pdf>

The treaties have been successful so far in ensuring that weapon systems with strike capabilities remain de facto, if not de jure, banned from space. While the regime by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it plays, however, a significant role in achieving that end. Yet, it is obvious that we must proceed beyond this. The issue of preventing an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the United Nations, and the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, for many years.

Impact: Turn the affirmative's harms. Space weapons arms race would have big consequences

Jayantha Dhanapala 2002. (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations) THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AT THIRTY-FIVE, Opening Remarks <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2002/2002Oct14_NewYork.pdf>

Space weapons bear a high price tag, both politically and financially. Deployment of weapons in space by one country will spur others to follow. The resulting arms race would lead to incalculable consequences for development and human security and could very well deprive humanity of all the benefits of the peaceful use and exploration of space.

START TREATY - good

HARMS/SIGNIFICANCE

No cheating: START has verification process

Ellen Tauscher April 2010. Ellen Tauscher (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at US Dept. of State) 21 Apr 2010 Remarks at Atlantic Council Panel Discussion, <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/04/22/new-start-ratification/>

Although telemetry from missile flight tests is not required to verify the limitations of the New START Treaty, the Treaty includes provisions for the exchange of telemetry as a means of enhancing transparency. Telemetry broadcast during missile flight tests will be exchanged on an agreed equal number of flight tests each year, up to a maximum of five. This verification regime will help build trust and prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations. It will provide both sides the confidence that the other is upholding its obligations.

No Cheating: US and Russia have been cooperating well on START inspections

US State Department 2012. New START Treaty Implementation Update 17 May 2012 <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183335.htm>

The U.S and Russia have been implementing the New START Treaty for over one year and the process so far has been positive and pragmatic. The good working relationship we established during the negotiations in Geneva continues today. We are in constant communication with the Russians, which helps to make the process precise and efficient. The United States and Russia kept pace with each other on inspections in 2011, each conducting 18 inspections– the maximum number allowed under the Treaty each year. In 2012, the United States and Russia have each conducted 5 inspections.

No Cheating: Detailed information is available and it’s verified by hi-tech monitoring

US State Department 2012. New START Treaty Implementation Update 17 May 2012 <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183335.htm>

The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing a very detailed picture of U.S. and Russian strategic forces, and the inspections enable each side to confirm the validity of that data. The Treaty’s verification regime is backed up by each side’s own national technical means (i.e., satellites and other monitoring platforms).

START Treaty doesn't block missile defense

Ellen Tauscher April 2010. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at US Dept. of State) 21 Apr 2010 Remarks at Atlantic Council Panel Discussion, <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/04/22/new-start-ratification/>

I want to say a word about missile defense because that is where the most vocal critics have focused their energy. While the Treaty’s preamble acknowledges the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems, that is nothing new. The New START Treaty is about strategic offensive arms. The New START Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. The United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Russia’s unilateral statement on missile defenses is not an integral part of the New START Treaty. It’s not legally-binding. It won’t constrain U.S. missile defense programs. As the administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our budget plans make clear, we will deploy the most effective missile defenses possible, and the New START Treaty does not impose any additional cost or inconvenience to those efforts.

Missile Defense doesn’t matter anyway: It would weaken national and global security.

Dr George N. Lewis & Dr. Theodore Postol 2010. (Lewis - Ph.D. in experimental physics; associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell Univ. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan May 2010 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol>

he central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase or modernize their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible defense against this weaponry. The planned Block II interceptors in the latter phases of the PAA threaten to provoke Russia’s exit from New START, in addition to possibly restarting a nuclear arms race – while providing no credible defense against possible future Iranian or North Korean missiles hosting simple countermeasures. Russia and China might increase their arsenals, end future arms reductions talks with the United States, and decrease their assistance with worldwide counter-proliferation efforts. Such a result would diminish U.S. – and global – security and would be at odds with President Obama’s vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lost strategic relationship

Link: START builds a stable, cooperative relationship with Russia

US State Department 2012. New START Treaty Implementation Update 17 May 2012 <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183335.htm>

When the New START Treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. Further, the limits on deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, and heavy bombers that can carry nuclear weapons will be well below previous limits. This Treaty represents a significant step forward in building a more stable, cooperative relationship with Russia.

Link: Russia is counting on START for a strategic relationship with the US

Voice of America News quoting Dr. David Holloway in June 2010. VOA News quoting David Holloway (PhD, Professor of International History at Stanford Univ.) 3 June 2010 US Senate Ratification Hearings on New START Treaty Underway <http://www.voanews.com/content/us-senate-ratification-hearings-on-new-start-treaty-underway-95534989/174130.html>

But experts such as David Holloway believe if the Senate rejected the treaty, the consequences would be far more devastating. "I think that would torpedo President Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and it would be a serious setback to the U.S.-Russian relationship as well," he said. "Because Russia would feel that this seemed to be not a very far-reaching treaty but one that in some sense codified the strategic relationship - and if you can't even do that with the U.S., what does it mean the U.S. really wants? Is it aiming for some kind of ultimate superiority over Russia?"

Impact: National security harmed. Vital security interests at stake if we lose relationship with Russia

Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, March 2009. Commission on US Policy Toward Russia (co-chaired by former senators Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart), March 2009 "The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia" published by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, <http://marshallfoundation.org/documents/TheRightDirection.pdf>

Protecting and advancing America’s national interests in the decades ahead requires a strategic reassessment of the United States’ relationship with Russia with an emphasis on exploring common interests. A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States’ ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. If left unchecked, the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations will begin to seriously damage our ability to achieve objectives across these interests.

2. Lost strategic nuclear balance. Reduced security, because START was maintaining strategic nuclear balance

Ellen Tauscher April 2010. Ellen Tauscher (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at US Dept. of State) 21 Apr 2010 Remarks at Atlantic Council Panel Discussion, <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/04/22/new-start-ratification/>

Having dedicated much time and effort to working through the tough issues with our Russian counterparts; and having served in the Congress and worked on a few deals there; I know what a good bipartisan agreement looks like. In my experience, such agreements enhance our national security and that is what the New START Treaty will do. It will ensure and maintain the strategic balance between the United States and Russia at lower weapons levels. And it will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability over the life of the Treaty. Meanwhile, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force to protect ourselves and our allies.

3. Accidental use of nuclear weapons. START reduces risk of accidental nuclear weapon use

Dr. MORTON HALPERIN June 2010. Dr. Morton H. Halperin (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; worked on strategic arms control matters in the Nixon and Clinton Administrations; co-chair of the advisory board of the New America Foundation Nuclear Strategy and Non-Proliferation Initiative; served on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States) 24 June 2010 statement before the SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE On the NEW START TREATY <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Halperin,%20Morton%20H..pdf>

Perhaps most directly relevant to the evaluation of the New START Treaty, I served on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. As the Committee knows, the Commission, composed of individuals with, to say the least, very divergent views on nuclear issues reached consensus on every issue but the CTBT. That consensus included very clear and precise recommendations on what we thought the next strategic arms control treaty should look like. The Obama Administration clearly took those recommendations very seriously. The Treaty now before the Senate conforms in every material way with the recommendations of the Commission. I thus support ratification for the same reasons that led me to join the consensus on the Commission. In short, I believe that the limitations placed on Russian and American forces will contribute to strategic stability and reduce the risk of unintended or accidental use of nuclear weapons by either nation. At the same time it will permit the United States to maintain a strategic arsenal which is more than sufficient to deter a deliberate attack on the United States or its allies and partners by Russia or any other state possessing nuclear weapons.

4. Increased defense costs. The START treaty saves money in the Defense Budget, as we’ll explain in our Link card below. If we vote Affirmative, the defense budget will have to be cut from other areas to make up for the extra costs introduced by this plan, since the Affirmative added no funding in their plan.

Link: START = Less costly US nuclear strategy through better insights into Russian activities

General Kevin Chilton, June 2010. (Commander of US Strategic Command, US Air Force) 16 June 2010 Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chilton,%20Gen.%20Kevin%20P.pdf>

Third, New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments over the life of the treaty. Such access and predictability contribute to our ability to plan confidently our own force modernization efforts and our hedging strategy. Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own force requirements. Further, we would be required increasingly to focus low-density/high demand intelligence collection and analysis assets on Russian nuclear forces.

Link & Brink: Nothing left to cut: Defense programs have already been reduced, plucked, stomped and crushed. More defense cuts will cause decline of America as the world’s greatest power.

Ernest Istook 2011. (was a U.S. Congressman for 14 years and served on the National Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee) 31 May 2011 “The Constitutional Charge to Defend America” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/The-Constitutional-Charge-to-Defend-America> (ellipses and brackets in original)

Rather than arbitrary cuts in the nation’s readiness, a proper course is to demand greater efficiencies in the defense budget but use those savings to apply toward other urgent military priorities. The Heritage Foundation has documented how this approach could undo the damage of recent downsizings of America’s army, navy, and aerial fleet that have occurred even as China and others have been beefing up their militaries. The Pentagon is already telling Congress that the U.S. is not prepared for China’s aggressive buildup. The alternative is to acquiesce in the decline of America as the world’s greatest power. As the Associated Press recently reported: Defense spending is about to enter a steep decline that may force the Pentagon to abandon some military missions, shrink the armed forces and perhaps limit America’s role in the world, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said.… [Gates] said he has already reduced or eliminated spending in the most obvious areas. “The ‘low-hanging fruit’—those weapons and other programs considered most questionable—have not only been plucked, they have been stomped and crushed,” he said. Policymakers should avoid the temptation to design America’s national security to meet an arbitrary budget and instead find the budget to meet its security needs.

Impact: Risk of global conflicts. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

5. More warheads pointed at us. START promotes national security by reducing the number of warheads pointed at the United States. Note that the advocate for START here is the US Air Force General in charge of strategic nuclear forces. He says the impact to having more warheads pointed at us is reduced national security

General Kevin Chilton 2010. General Kevin P. Chilton (Commander of US Strategic Command, US Air Force) 16 June 2010 Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chilton,%20Gen.%20Kevin%20P.pdf>

New START will enhance the security of the United States of America, and I support its ratification. Our nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty than without it. Let me briefly explain why, from the perspective of the combatant commander responsible for planning and executing strategic deterrence and nuclear operations. First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits without a New START treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so.

TAIWAN SUPPORT - good

SOURCE INDICTMENT

Logan & Carpenter

Analysis: Affirmative sources Logan & Carpenter in a 2007 article cited by Affirmative, claimed that Taiwan’s inadequate defense spending justifies US withdrawal of military commitment, because it’s a blueprint for disaster. We’re now 5 and a half years later and no disaster occurred – either they were wrong about their prediction of disaster, or else conditions have changed that stopped the disaster from occurring and their 2007 evidence is no longer valid.

Justin Logan & Dr. Ted G. Carpenter 2007. (Logan - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; master's degree in international relations from the Univ of Chicago. Carpente - senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from Univ of Texas), CATO Policy Analysis no. 600,”Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War” 13 Sept 2007 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA600.pdf>

Taiwan’s political leaders are creating the worst possible combination: the provocative cross-strait policy of President Chen Shui-bian and the opposition-dominated legislature’s irresponsible policy on defense spending. That is a blueprint for disaster. The People’s Republic of China has already deployed nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles across the strait from Taiwan, and Beijing’s military modernization program appears to be oriented toward credibly threatening military action if Taipei’s moves toward independence continue.

TOPICALITY

1. No US military commitment. The US has no military presence in Taiwan, so the only topicality issues remaining are our commitment to militarily defend Taiwan and our arms sales. We’ll see that the Affirmative fails on both of these.

**Standard:** “Commitment” means “2a **:** an agreement or pledge to do something in the future;” *(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2012* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commitment*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commitment)*)*

Reasons to prefer our standard: Simple – we have a clear brightline.

If the US has made a promise of military defense, then read that promise as evidence in the round and we’ll debate it. Negatives can easily prepare because our promises of military defense are written down in treaties and agreements. We can find all of them and prepare to debate them.

Violation: We have no such agreement with Taiwan.

Affirmative plan advocates Logan & Carpenter say one of the reasons they advocate reducing US support for Taiwan is because the US has no military commitment: The Taiwan Relations Act requires the President to notify Congress if anything happens to Taiwan. We challenge the Affirmative team to read anything in the Taiwan Relations Act that says we have a “pledge to do something in the future” to defend Taiwan.

Link: Affirmative advocates say we have at most a vague and conditional defense obligation with Taiwan

Justin Logan & Dr. Ted G. Carpenter 2007. (Logan - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; master's degree in international relations from the Univ of Chicago. Carpenter - senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from Univ of Texas), CATO Policy Analysis no. 600,”Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War” 13 Sept 2007 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA600.pdf>

In testimony before the House International Relations Committee in February 2004, political science professor John Copper typified that view, stating simply that “the TRA commits the United States to defend Taiwan against any military threat.” The reality is more complex. The TRA merely asserts that “efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” would be “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” It further directs the chief executive to “inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” Such provisions imply, at most, a vague and conditional defense obligation.

“Commitment to sell arms to Taiwan” – Responses:

1. Taiwan arms sales are not a military defense commitment. Affirmative plan advocates Logan and Carpenter admitted in 2007:

Justin Logan & Dr. Ted G. Carpenter 2007. (Logan - director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; master's degree in international relations from the Univ of Chicago. Carpente - senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from Univ of Texas), CATO Policy Analysis no. 600,”Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War” 13 Sept 2007 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA600.pdf>

Similarly, it is a leap to say that the provision of the TRA pledging the United States to sell defensive arms to Taiwan represents a firm commitment to defend the island with U.S. military forces. Those are entirely separable issues. Washington could adopt a policy of extensive arms sales to Taiwan but not shield the island with the U.S. military.

2. The arms sale commitment was revoked 3 years after the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In 1982, President Reagan promised the People's Republic of China that we would reduce and ultimately end arms sales to Taiwan.

Analysis: A pledge to eliminate arms sales is Status Quo policy. Eliminating arms sales to Taiwan is not a change in our commitments because we already committed to doing it in 1982.

Ambassador Harvey Feldman 2007 (helped plan President Richard Nixon’s historic first visit to China as a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council; later served as Director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs; Distinguished Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation) 2 Oct 2007 "President Reagan's Six Assurances to Taiwan and Their Meaning Today" <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/10/President-Reagans-Six-Assurances-to-Taiwan-and-Their-Meaning-Today>

In the spring of 1982, the PRC began threatening to severely downgrade its relationship with the U.S. unless something was done about the arms sales, and some in Beijing were discussing "playing the Soviet card." Then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig was convinced that, "in the last quarter of the twentieth century, China may well be the most important country in the world" in terms of American interests. He pressed hard and successfully for some form of accommodation with Beijing, although his ultimate recommendation that the U.S. agree to cease arms sales to Taiwan was not accepted. The result was the communiqué signed on August 17, 1982--almost two months after Haig had left office. In it, the U.S. government stated "that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."

Impact: Letting Affirmatives choose untopical plans leads to abuse of policy debate.

Even if you like this plan and think it’s reasonable, by voting for it, you will be sending the signal that it’s OK for Affirmative teams to bend the rules. You’ll be telling the debaters today that even though there is no US commitment to Taiwan, it’s ok for the Affirmative to choose that as the subject for this debate round. By doing that, you will open the doors to all manner of strange Affirmative cases that can’t possibly be debated because Negatives can’t prepare for a debate round once Judges begin ruling that the Resolution doesn’t matter. It’s time to take a stand against this here and now with a Negative ballot. The Resolution has to mean something, and we’re counting on you, Judge, to enforce that meaning.

ALTERNATIVE CRITERION FOR VOTING: Peace & Stability

Taiwan/PRC peace & stability are the only worthy goals: All proposals should be judged by this standard

Alan D. Romberg 2008 (Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center; spent 20 years as a US Foreign Service Officer; former principal deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning staff ; former director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, member of the Policy Planning staff for East Asia, and staff member at the National Security Council for China) 26 Mar 2008 U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time for a Change? [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf)

As we think about what adjustments in implementation might work, we should keep in mind that maintaining peace and stability is the fundamental American goal, just as it is a fundamental goal of Taiwan and the PRC. So all proposals should be judged against the standard of whether they would contribute to maintaining and strengthening peace and stability or not.

Status Quo is the best policy for maintaining peace and stability

Alan D. Romberg 2008 (Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center; spent 20 years as a US Foreign Service Officer; former principal deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning staff ; former director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, member of the Policy Planning staff for East Asia, and staff member at the National Security Council for China) 26 Mar 2008 U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time for a Change? [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf)

Thus, powerful new reasons emerged to work to avoid a forceful resolution of cross-Strait relations. Those reasons were not so strong that we should contemplate restoring diplomatic relations with Taipei or reversing our position of “not challenging” the PRC’s claims re sovereignty (even though we do not accept them). Nor do they tell us what an American president would do if and when confronted with an actual situation. But they do argue persuasively for a continuing U.S. role based on current policy to maintain the status quo of peace and stability—and to deepen that situation -- until some outcome more acceptable to the two sides emerges.

Current US policy is designed to preserve peace and stability until a long-term peaceful settlement can occur between PRC/Taiwan, and that’s where we should keep it

Alan D. Romberg 2008 (Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center; spent 20 years as a US Foreign Service Officer; former principal deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning staff ; former director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, member of the Policy Planning staff for East Asia, and staff member at the National Security Council for China) 26 Mar 2008 U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time for a Change? [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf)

One of the questions posed to the panelists was whether U.S. policy is designed to “kick the can down the road” until circumstances change on one side of the Strait or the other— or both—in a way that allows for peaceful and non-coercive “unification.” I would accept the notion of temporizing, but I would rephrase the goal. I think U.S. policy is designed to preserve peace and stability until some longer-term, peaceful, non-coercive settlement is feasible, whatever that might be. And because this could take a very long time— probably measured in decades—I think it is important that U.S. policy continues to play a vital role in doing just that.

Status Quo is great: We protect the well-being of Taiwan and we have a productive relationship with PRC. Any change in policy would lose these benefits

Alan D. Romberg 2008 (Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center; spent 20 years as a US Foreign Service Officer; former principal deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning staff ; former director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, member of the Policy Planning staff for East Asia, and staff member at the National Security Council for China) 26 Mar 2008 U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time for a Change? [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf)

The “one China” policy has helped to maintain a robust comprehensive relationship with Taipei as well as to preserve the security and well-being of the people of Taiwan. At the same time, it has allowed the United States to develop an increasingly productive relationship with the PRC across virtually the entire range of human activity. Were we to promote one outcome or another for Taiwan—unification or independence, or something in between—we not only would be arrogating to ourselves a right that is not ours, but we would inevitably end up supporting one side or the other on key issues. The only predictable result would be that the benefits American policy has achieved so far would be out the window.

HARMS

Status Quo US support for Taiwan is not likely to draw us into a war with China

Michael Mazza 2011. (participated in Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; M.A. in international relations from Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ; program manager for American Enterprise Institute's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy) 18 Nov 2011 “Don’t Ditch Taiwan” THE AMERICAN (online magazine of the American Enterprise Institute) (ellipses in original) <http://www.american.com/archive/2011/november/dont-ditch-taiwan/>

Kane unintentionally makes this case as well. He argues that “the status quo is dangerous” because “if Taiwanese nationalist politicians decided to declare independence … America could suddenly be drawn into a multitrillion-dollar war.” But Taiwan is a democracy; its elected politicians are representative of its people. Taiwanese leaders would be unlikely to make such a declaration unless they had solid public support; indeed, a declaration of independence would likely only follow a public referendum on the topic. If there is ever any risk of Taiwanese politicians declaring independence (a risk which at present is all but nonexistent), it will be because of the legitimate, democratic demands of their constituents.

Status Quo risk of China-Taiwan war unlikely: China’s relationship with the US means they have too much to lose by starting a war over Taiwan

Dr. Lowell Dittmer 2011 . ( Ph.D. from Univ of Chicago; professor at Univ. California-Berkely; teaches courses on contemporary China, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim) The Changing Dynamics of the Relations among China, Taiwan, and the United States, Chapter 2: WASHINGTON BETWEEN BEIJING AND TAIPEI: A TRIANGULAR ANALYSIS, <http://www.c-s-p.org/flyers/978-1-4438-2681-5-sample.pdf>

China must balance any interest in acquiring Taiwan too precipitously against its interest in the US. China has acquired a very large economic stake in the US, which is China’s second largest national trading partner and market for Chinese exports (the 27-member EU has surpassed the US as a trading bloc). This relationship would surely be jeopardized should Beijing opt to use force to achieve reunification (leaving aside for the moment whether the use of force would succeed). Disruption of that economic relationship would be painful for both partners, but particularly for the PRC. Strategically considered Beijing also has a major “negative interest” in the US, in the sense that the PLA must plan for the possibility of Sino-US war — a war which, given the current balance of forces, China would probably lose. Thus Beijing must balance its high and growing interest in reunification against its also high economic and negative strategic interest in its relationship with the US.

Status Quo policy: As long as China threatens Taiwan, US will sell arms to Taiwan. And China understands it

Prof. Jonathan Pollack 2011. (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; professor of Asian & Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College; research associate in the National Asia Research Program of the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 17 Oct 2011 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING AND EAST ASIAN SOCIETY <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/10/17%20east%20asia%20defense/20111017_east_asia_defense>

So, I think that for now I’m not surprised by the Administration’s decision. I think it was a clear signal to China that as long as China continues to sustain its direct military threat to Taiwan, they should anticipate the continuation of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. It’s not a solution, these things never are, but it suggested to me careful planning, careful consideration, and not being overly concerned about how China might react to it. Indeed, when Chen Bingde, the Chinese Chief of Staff was in the United States in the spring, he even acknowledged in an open speech at the National Defense University that, well, a lot would really depend on what kinds of arm sales would there be for Taiwan. It was almost a tacit acknowledgement that, okay, we know the United States is not abiding by the precise character of the ’82 Arm Sales Communiqué, but maybe it was a small indication at one level of a bit more of a grown up response to what is admittedly a very, very complex situation. But, you know, frankly, I think this was an appropriate decision under the circumstances and we proceed from there.

Arms sales to Taiwan should only be cut off if Taiwan tries to move away from China

Shirley A. Kan 2010. (Specialist in Asian Security Affairs) 16 Feb 2010 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990" <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf> (ellipses in original)

James Lilley, former ambassador in Beijing and representative in Taipei, warned in April 2004 that: The implicit American premise was that a secure and stable Taiwan would be a more willing and successful partner in dealing with China. Judicious arms sales to Taiwan were part of this formula and in the past it has worked.... If elements of this broader formula are disregarded by the current Taiwan authorities, however, then the successful historic pattern has been broken. U.S. military support and arms sales cannot be used by Taiwan to move away from China—they were meant to make Taiwan feel secure enough to move toward accommodation with China.

Arms deals seem significant, but they aren't: China accepts the status quo with Taiwan

Sam Black 2007. (research analyst at Center for Defense Information, a non-profit organization that provides expert analysis on various components of U.S. national security, international security and defense policy) 26 July 2007, "Arms sales to Taiwan: A means to what end?" <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=53572>

Because of the inevitable outcry from China, an arms deal with the United States might seem like a very significant event. However, though China objects, small arms deals may be the least of its Taiwan-related fears. China's "anti-secession" law of 2005 is an indicator of the way China views the situation with Taiwan. That Chinese President Hu Jintao's government seems to accept the status quo is evidenced by the fact that the final name of the law is subtly different from its earlier iterations, during which it was referred to as a "reunification" law.

US can provide Taiwan with defensive weapons while maintaining good relations with China

Ed Ross 2009. (formerly held following government positions: Principal Director, Security Cooperation Operations, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Affairs; and Senior Director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ) 22 Oct 2009, "The Future of US-Taiwan Defense Cooperation," JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35634&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=44f5a05af8>

Taiwan’s first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in March 2009 sets forth ambitious goals for improving Taiwan’s military capabilities and transformation of the Taiwan armed forces to an all-volunteer force. It provides for a defensive posture the Obama administration can support while maintaining good relations with China so long as the United States stands firm on its obligations under the TRA. Assistant Secretary Campbell hit the nail on the head: the challenge for both the United States and Taiwan is to find the optimal environment that is conducive to Taiwan’s continuing peaceful engagement with China while providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of U.S. support in its interactions with China. Responsibility for success rests with both Washington and Taipei.

SOLVENCY

“Finlandization” of Taiwan requires actions by Taiwan and China – outside the scope of Affirmative plan and extra-topical under this year’s Resolution

Dr. Bruce Gilley 2010. (Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton Univ; Asst Professor of Political Science at Portland State Univ), “Not So Dire Straits How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security” Jan/Feb 2010, (brackets added) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol 89, No. 1, <http://www.web.pdx.edu/~gilleyb/Gilley_TaiwanFinlandization.pdf>

Although it is still early,Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization. Under such a scenario,Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing’s fears about the island’s becoming an obstacle to China’s military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party] rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.

PRC/Taiwan reconciliation won’t happen soon nor easily

Ed Ross 2009 (formerly held following government positions: Principal Director, Security Cooperation Operations, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Affairs; and Senior Director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy )22 Oct 2009 The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation, China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 21 <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35634&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=44f5a05af8> (brackets and parentheses in original)

China-Taiwan “reconciliation,” however, will likely not happen quickly. Despite recent improvements in Taiwan-China relations, fundamental differences between the systems of government in China and Taiwan, and a lack of broad-based public support in Taiwan for near-term reconciliation will inhibit progress (NowNews [Taiwan], October 20). Furthermore, no one should assume the gains made to date are irreversible. History never moves in a straight line.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Increased risk of PRC/Taiwan war

Link: Larger imbalance in Taiwan/PRC forces increases likelihood that force will be used

Randall Schriver 2008. (founding partner of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; masters degree in public policy from Harvard) 26 Mar 2008 "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan" <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Schriver.pdf>

While all of the factors above are troubling, the greatest concern is the growing military capabilities of China, and the resulting gap in capabilities between China and Taiwan. This should give policy makers the most worry because intentions can shift very, very quickly (it’s the capabilities that require a great deal of time to develop), and the option to use force becomes more and more attractive when the military equation reaches a great imbalance.

Link: China wants sovereignty over Taiwan and is willing to use force to get it

Ralph Jennings and Ben Blanchard 2010. (journalists), 30 Jan 2010, REUTERS News Service, "Q+A: How arms sales to Taiwan will impact Sino-U.S. ties" <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60T08820100131>

China has claimed sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan since 1949, when Mao Zedong's forces won the Chinese civil war and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fled to the island. Beijing has vowed to bring Taiwan under its rule, by force if necessary.

Brink: US military technology is critical to deterring Chinese attack on Taiwan

Ed Ross 2009 (formerly held following government positions: Principal Director, Security Cooperation Operations, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Affairs; and Senior Director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ) Sept 2009, US-Taiwan Business Council Defense Conference, <http://www.ewrossinternational.com/taiwan_c4isr.pdf>

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) improvements are absolutely necessary to the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of any attempts by China to reunite Taiwan with the Mainland by coercion or military force. As unlikely as that may appear at present, China has never rejected the use of force to resolve the “Taiwan issue” and has never been shy about using military force to achieve political ends. Taiwan has made great strides in C4ISR over the past decade and deserves credit for what they have accomplished. The Po Sheng (“Broad Victory’) program, Taiwan’s principal C4ISR effort, is providing Taiwan with significant C4ISR capabilities. Much remains to be done, however, to achieve an optimum level of joint C4ISR integration and continued US assistance is critical to achieving that goal.

Brink: US military technology is key to Taiwan’s defense

Ed Ross 2009 (formerly held following government positions: Principal Director, Security Cooperation Operations, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Affairs; and Senior Director for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy )22 Oct 2009 The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation, China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 21 <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35634&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=44f5a05af8>

Taipei requires continued U.S. assistance with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to bolster its military capabilities across the board and to achieve an effective missile defense. It is unclear when or if the Obama administration will permit Taiwan to submit a Letter of Request for 66 new F-16C/D fighters. Taiwan cannot maintain a minimal air-defense capability in the coming years without them.

Impact: Taiwan war would be a disaster for PRC and US. Affirmative plan advocate Dr. Ted Carpenter admitted in 2004:

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2004. ( PhD in Diplomatic History; vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international issues) 10 Aug 2004, "China's Taiwan Policy and America's Difficult Choices" <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2778>

And a war in the Taiwan strait would be a disaster for both the PRC and the United States. The mutually beneficial economic relationship (now valued at more than $150 billion a year) would be severed, and America's relations with a major power would be poisoned for decades.

2. Extinguishing a Beacon of Democracy

Link & Impact: Abandoning Taiwan sells America’s soul and crushes Taiwan’s democracy

Michael Mazza 2011. (participated in Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; M.A. in international relations from Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ; program manager for American Enterprise Institute's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy) 18 Nov 2011 “Don’t Ditch Taiwan” THE AMERICAN (online magazine of the American Enterprise Institute) <http://www.american.com/archive/2011/november/dont-ditch-taiwan/>

*“By tackling the issue of Taiwan, Mr. Obama could address much of what ails him today, sending a message of bold foreign policy thinking and fiscal responsibility that would benefit every citizen and be understood by every voter.”* It is not clear that voters would understand this move in the way Kane envisions. The deal he proposes—which amounts to abandoning Taiwan to the predatory urges of an autocratic Beijing—would be contrary to both U.S. strategic interests and to America’s nature as a freedom-loving, freedom-defending nation. It is one thing to prop up autocratic regimes that ally themselves with the United States—as Washington did during the Cold War—but quite another to sell out an ally that is already democratic, knowing full well that its democracy will be crushed. In sealing such a deal, President Obama would have to sell his soul, and America’s along with it.

Impact: Moral obligation to uphold Taiwan as a beacon of democracy

Michael Mazza 2011. (participated in Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; M.A. in international relations from Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ; program manager for American Enterprise Institute's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy) 18 Nov 2011 “Don’t Ditch Taiwan” THE AMERICAN (online magazine of the American Enterprise Institute) <http://www.american.com/archive/2011/november/dont-ditch-taiwan/>

Moreover, America does have an interest in Taiwan’s continued de facto independence. The United States, since its founding, has seen an interest in the spread of liberal democracy. This is in part for moral reasons; Americans believe in universal rights, and those are best protected by representative governments. Only by living in freedom can people truly flourish. But it is also because Washington regards democratic governments as inherently legitimate and more trustworthy than autocracies, which makes for healthier, more productive international relationships. Given these American beliefs, Taiwan plays an important role in East Asia. Taiwan’s existence as a democracy disproves Beijing’s assertions that democracy is not suited to Chinese culture and society, and also serves as a beacon for those in China yearning to be free.

Impact: Status Quo is the policy that gives Taiwanese people safety, prosperity and democracy

Alan D. Romberg 2008 (Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center) 26 Mar 2008 U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan: Time for a Change? [www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/romberg.pdf)

So, while we should remain ready to be helpful if called upon by both sides to contribute, and we should make unambiguous our support for rapprochement across the Strait—as President Bush has now done, I would urge that the United States not take initiatives designed to drive toward a particular interim or long-term outcome. Does all of this add up to a situation in which people in Taiwan can exhale and feel satisfied that they have achieved the status and recognition they merit for their achievements? No, it doesn’t. Does it give Beijing satisfaction that its deeply held conviction about the sovereignty of “one China” is respected by the United States? No, again. But it allows the people of Taiwan to live in safety in an increasingly prosperous and democratic society.

3. Sea lanes jeopardized

Link: If China annexes Taiwan, China could threaten flow of resources through the South China Sea

*Michael Mazza 2011.* (participated in Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; M.A. in international relations from Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ; program manager for American Enterprise Institute's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy) 18 Nov 2011 “Don’t Ditch Taiwan” THE AMERICAN (online magazine of the American Enterprise Institute) <http://www.american.com/archive/2011/november/dont-ditch-taiwan/>

There are also military-strategic reasons that Taiwan’s continued de facto independence is favorable to the United States:   
1. An annexed Taiwan would provide China with greater strategic depth and allow it to more easily project power directly into the Pacific Ocean. China’s extra strategic depth would be gained at the expense of America’s own.  
2.    By annexing Taiwan, China would make defending the islands of southern Japan much more difficult both for Japanese Self-Defense Forces and for the U.S. military.  
3.    An annexed Taiwan would allow China to more easily exert control over the Luzon Strait, which connects the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea. With such a position, the People’s Liberation Army could threaten the flow of resources to Japan, South Korea, and even the United States.

Link: China takeover of Taiwan would risk the security of sea lanes vital to the economies of East Asia and North America

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

Were China to control Taiwan, China’s ability to project naval and air power into the Western Pacific would be unlocked. China is currently constrained by the offshore island chain of US allies encompassing Japan in the north, Taiwan and the Philippines in the center, and Australia in the south. The weakest link in this offshore barrier to Chinese power projection is Taiwan, given the intensity of the China’s targeted military buildup against the island and the political priority Chinese leadership attaches to reunification. A Chinese occupation of Taiwan would lead to a rebalancing of naval, air, and missile power in the Western Pacific that would risk the security of the air and sea lanes—and the US military’s ability to operate freely in them—that bind together the economies of East Asia and North America.

Link: China is willing to use its Navy in the region in violation of international rules about freedom of the seas

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

The South China Sea (SCS) is the third maritime domain of special interest to Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan is a claimant in the SCS dispute for reasons of history—its claim matches that of the mainland as Beijing and Taipei both vie to uphold what they argue is China’s historical suzerainty over the SCS. Unlike China, however, Taiwan has not pursued gunboat diplomacy against Vietnam, India, Japan, the United States, and other claimants in violation of basic maritime conventions associated with freedom of the seas.

Impact: Japanese economy crippled without SCS (South China Sea) access

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

Taiwan and Japan are dependent on freedom of passage through the SCS for energy imports and trade flows. Nearly 60 percent of Japan and Taiwan’s energy supplies are shipped through the SCS, demonstrating how a hostile power’s chokehold on its sea lanes could rapidly cripple the two countries’ economies—or, at a minimum, could require adjustments to their foreign policies in return for secure passage. One third of all global trade passes through the SCS. For tradedependent economies such as Taiwan and Japan—not to mention South Korea and China—free passage through the sea lanes linking the Straits of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific is essential.

4. North Korea negotiations damaged

Link: U.S. making a deal on Taiwan would increase China’s intransigence [resistance, stubbornness] on N. Korea negotiations

*Michael Mazza 2011.* (participated in Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; M.A. in international relations from Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ; program manager for American Enterprise Institute's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy) 18 Nov 2011 “Don’t Ditch Taiwan” THE AMERICAN (online magazine of the American Enterprise Institute) (ellipses in original) <http://www.american.com/archive/2011/november/dont-ditch-taiwan/> (Note: Pyongyang is the capital of North Korea; Taipei is the capital of Taiwan; Beijing is the capital of the People’s Republic of China / mainland China / communist China)

For example, it is not the case that Beijing’s support for Pyongyang results from Washington’s support for Taipei. Rather, Beijing wishes to ensure the continued existence of an independent North Korea, which acts as a buffer state between China and democratic South Korea (a U.S. ally) and which provides China with strategic depth. Beijing fears that taking measures to actually achieve denuclearization in North Korea would so weaken Kim Jong-Il that his regime might fall, leading to either chaos in the North or Korean unification—both outcomes are detrimental to Chinese interests as Beijing perceives them. In fact, China would likely become more intransigent on these issues if the United States were to deal with China on Taiwan.

Link: Chinese cooperation is essential to preventing North Korean nuclear proliferation

Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force 2010. (Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairmen; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director; CFR is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Pritchard - former aide to Pres. Bush in negotiations with N. Korea; former US Representative to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Org. Tilelli - retired US Army 4-star general, former commander of US forces in Korea) “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” June 2010 <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf>

Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability. Sino-U.S. cooperation to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is in the mutual interests of both countries and will be a critical proving ground for the relationship. Failure to make progress toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would be a significant setback for efforts to promote a cooperative approach to regional security in Northeast Asia. The level of China’s cooperation and involvement is the main factor that will determine whether it is possible to achieve a strategy that goes beyond containment and management of North Korea’s nuclear and missile aspirations to rollback.

Impact: North Korean nuclear proliferation is an urgent threat

Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force 2010. (Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairmen; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director; CFR is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Pritchard - former aide to Pres. Bush in negotiations with N. Korea; former US Representative to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Org. Tilelli - retired US Army 4-star general, former commander of US forces in Korea) “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” June 2010 <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf>

The urgency of the threat is undeniable. North Korea possesses nuclear-weapon and missile capabilities, has threatened its neighbors, and has been willing to sell nuclear materials and technology to the highest bidder. Its reclusive leadership is unpredictable, something yet again underscored by the unprovoked destruction of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel, by a North Korean torpedo in late March 2010.

5. Reverse Justification: Taiwan military upgrade impeded.

Link: Affirmative says it’s bad that Taiwan isn’t spending enough on their national defense. It’s one of the justifications for their plan

Response: Withdrawing US support is exactly the wrong approach to strengthening Taiwan. US support is essential to help Taiwan strengthen itself. Whatever impact this has in the Affirmative case, it gets worse if you vote Affirmative

“Finlandization” advocated by Gilley is wrong: We should support Taiwan’s security. US support is vital to Taiwan’s defense transformation goals

Dr. Michael S. Chase 2010. (Ph.D. Associate Research Professor and Director of Mahan Scholars Program Warfare Analysis & Research at US Naval War College) 5 Mar 2010 The Role of U.S. Arms Sales in Taiwan's Defense Transformation, China Brief, Volume: 10 Issue: 5 <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36121&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=20ca05408d>

Political scientist and former journalist Bruce Gilley has even suggested that “Finlandization” is the appropriate model for Taiwan. Of course, it is true that China’s importance to the United States is growing and the recent cross-Strait détente is certainly a welcome development, but U.S. support for Taiwan’s security—including but not limited to arms sales—remains vital to Taiwan’s defense transformation goals. Indeed, for its part, the United States should regard the recent thaw in cross-Strait ties as an opportunity to help Taiwan strengthen its defense posture.

6. Reverse Justification: Taiwan / PRC reconciliation impeded

Link: Affirmative removes US security assistance to Taiwan

Link: US security assistance helps Taiwan negotiate resolution with China

Dr. Michael S. Chase 2010. (Ph.D. Associate Research Professor and Director of Mahan Scholars Program Warfare Analysis & Research at US Naval War College) 5 Mar 2010 The Role of U.S. Arms Sales in Taiwan's Defense Transformation, China Brief, Volume: 10 Issue: 5 <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36121&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=20ca05408d>

Indeed, for its part, the United States should regard the recent thaw in cross-Strait ties as an opportunity to help Taiwan strengthen its defense posture. Perhaps even more importantly, in a larger political sense, U.S. security assistance provides Taiwan with the confidence it needs to pursue a more pragmatic policy toward China without fear of being bullied into a resolution of cross-Strait differences on terms that are unacceptable to the people of Taiwan.

Link: Relaxed Taiwan/PRC tensions depend on continued supply of arms from the USA

Dr. Michael S. Chase 2010. (Ph.D. Associate Research Professor and Director of Mahan Scholars Program Warfare Analysis & Research at US Naval War College) 5 Mar 2010 The Role of U.S. Arms Sales in Taiwan's Defense Transformation, China Brief, Volume: 10 Issue: 5 <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36121&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=20ca05408d>

"The relaxed tensions depend very much on the continued supply of arms from the United States to Taiwan," President Ma said in a December 2009 interview. "Certainly Taiwan will not feel comfortable to go to a negotiating table without sufficient defense buildup in order to protect the safety of the island" (Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2009). Similarly, Taiwan’s MND greeted the recent U.S. announcement with a statement underscoring its position that the arms sales "would enable Taiwan to be more confident in seeking reconciliation with China and help peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" (Wall Street Journal, January 21).

Impact: Turn the Affirmative’s goal of PRC/Taiwan reconciliation. It gets harder to achieve if you vote Affirmative

7. US/Japan alliance jeopardized

Link: Taiwan’s autonomy is key to Japan’s future as America’s ally in East Asia

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

Too often, analysis of Taiwan’s strategic evolution focuses on its implications for either China or the United States. In fact, the foundations of Japanese grand strategy since 1952 may well be unsustainable should Taiwan fall under the control of a hostile, assertive China that defines Japan as an adversary. As Japan’s primary security partner, the United States therefore has a compelling interest in protecting Taiwan’s autonomy—not only for intrinsic reasons related to Taiwan and US-China relations, but because Taiwan’s autonomy is foundational to Japan’s strategic future as America’s bedrock ally in East Asia.

Link & Brink: Alliance with Japan is absolutely essential to US effectiveness in Asia

Kurt Campbell 2012. (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) 26 Oct 2012 “CSIS-Nikkei Forum Keynote Speech by A/S Campbell” <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20121031-01.html>

It's also the case that the transnational agenda, as we look to define the challenges of the 21st century again including major challenges like climate change, requires a deeper sustained engagement between our two sides. I would just conclude by saying that it is inconceivable that the United States could be effective in Asia without Japan. There are often questions about whether the United States will wander, will see another country that is more enticing. I am here to tell you that the foundation of our engagement, the enduring quality of our partnership is absolutely essential. We cannot do without it.

Link & Brink: US security role in Asia depends on friendly Taiwan and Japan

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

A third and related component of the strategic geography of Japan-Taiwan relations is the role they play in facilitating regional access for the United States, which remains the primary security provider in East Asia and the Pacific. America’s ability to project power in East and Southeast Asia is dependent on allied control of Japan and Taiwan. The largest concentration of American forward-deployed troops— on Okinawa, Japan—is as close to Taiwan as to the Japanese home islands. America’s responsibility to defend Japan lends considerable strategic importance to the southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands. Similarly, US ability to project power to defend Taiwan is dependent on the US military’s ability to operate from Okinawa. Essentially, US bases in Japan reinforce the continued credibility of America’s military commitment to Taiwan’s defense, while a friendly Taiwan helps secure southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands—the most likely route of any airborne or naval assault on America’s closest Asian ally.

Impact: Risk of global conflicts. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. This reassurance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken for granted.

8. China turns aggressive

Link: Losing Taiwan would greatly weaken the US alliance system in Asia

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

The freedom of maneuver that US air and naval forces enjoy in East and Southeast Asia—a freedom that is the basis for American primacy and the foundation of East and Southeast Asian regional stability—would be meaningfully constrained should the air and maritime commons around Taiwan come under contestation. In short, the operation of the US alliance system in Asia and the reassurance American forward-deployed forces have offered Asian partners for decades could be overturned if Taiwan flipped from friendly to unfriendly hands.

Link & Brink: China is less likely to rise peacefully, more likely to be aggressive, without continued US power in Asia

Daniel Twining 2011. (senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he leads the US-based institute’s growing line of work on the rise of Asia and its implications for the West. He is also a consultant to the US government and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Daniel previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff) 10 Nov 2011 “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Diversification in Pursuit of Security, Autonomy, and Prosperity” <http://www.aei.org/files/2012/10/18/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf>

China is more likely to succeed in its self-declared goal of a “peaceful rise” if its ascent occurs in a region of strong and vibrant states that can prosper and sustain open commons that are mutually beneficial. China is less likely to rise peacefully if surrounded by weak states creating a vacuum of power around China and tempting it into external adventurism. Such a scenario would empower Beijing’s militant nationalists at the expense of leaders who would pursue more cooperative relations with neighbors. Japan succumbed to the latter temptation in the 1930s— largely because China was so weak. A crucial element in sustaining a configuration of power that encourages China to focus on internal enrichment rather than external aggrandizement is a continued and enduring US role as a resident power in Asia.

Impact: Authoritarian repression. China promotes authoritarian repressive ideology in Asia

John J. Tkacik, Jr. 2007. (Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud­ies Center at The Heritage Foundation) 17 Mar 2007, “China's Quest for a Superpower Military” HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Backgrounder #2036 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm>

America could engage and strengthen the cur­rent robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting the democracies of the Americas with their counter­parts along the Western Pacific Rim, or a disengaged America could allow a Sino-centric axis to crystal­lize as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, and eventually Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band­wagon with China. The latter would make Leninist-mercantilist China the rule-maker in Asia, not just for transnational trade and financial structures, but also for a new Asian security architecture and a new ideology of authoritarian state-mercantilism that defends repressive "development models based on national conditions."

TERRORISM - NOT A THREAT

(some of the evidence in this brief was researched by Nicholas Bruno)

For “NUCLEAR TERRORISM” – See separate BLUE BOOK brief on Nuclear Terrorism

SOURCE INDICTMENT

Dept of Homeland Security risk assessments not reliable

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

Clearly, the DHS focuses all or almost all of its analyses on the contemplation of the consequences of a terrorist attack while substantially ignoring the equally important likelihood component of risk assessment as well as the key issue of risk reduction. In general, risk assessment seems to be simply a process of identifying a potential source of harm and then trying to do something about it without evaluating whether the new measures reduce risk sufficiently to justify their costs. This conclusion was strongly supported by a 2010 report of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Requested by Congress to assess the activities of the Department of Homeland Security, a committee worked for nearly two years on the project and came up with some striking conclusions. Except for the analysis of natural disasters, the committee “did not find any DHS risk analysis capabilities and methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making,” and therefore “only low confidence should be placed in most of the risk analyses conducted by DHS.”

CRITERION

Criterion should be cost-benefit analysis, not just “does it make us a little bit safer?”

Analysis: This Criterion explains why AFFs who claim a “comparative advantage” of a tiny improvement in security don’t deserve a ballot. Resources that are spent producing tiny improvements in safety are not worth it because they could produce more benefit for society if used for something more productive. For example, if we spend a billion dollars improving safety to prevent a possible terrorist attack that would have caused one million dollars in harm, we are not better off with that improved safety. Likewise, spending a billion dollars to reduce the chance of an attack from 1% to 0.9% would be a waste of money, even if we would feel safer.

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

In seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of the massive increases in homeland security expenditures since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the common and urgent query has been “are we safer?” This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are “safer”—the posting of a single security guard at one building’s entrance enhances safety, however microscopically. The correct question is “are the gains in security worth the funds expended?” Or as this absolutely central question was posed shortly after 9/11 by risk analyst Howard Kunreuther, "How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?"

Advocacy: The 9/11 Commission recommended using cost-benefit analysis to evaluate anti-terrorism policies

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

In this paper we seek to apply conventional cost-benefit and risk analytic approaches to this massive increase in expenditure in an effort to provide an answer to Kureuther’s exceedingly apt question. These approaches have been recommended for many years by the United States Office of Management and Budget, and they are routinely used by such agencies as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Aviation Administration, and in 2004 the 9/11 Commission specifically called on the government to apply them to assess the risks and cost-effectiveness of security measures put in place to deal with terrorism.

Burden of Proof: Must prove benefit of the security (saved lives and damages averted) outweighs the costs

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

It is certainly true that improbable disastrous events—like the 9/11 attacks—do sometimes transpire. That is, in fact, why we call them improbable as opposed to impossible. But because improbable events sometimes do take place does not mean that all improbable events therefore become probable. To avoid or to ignore this elemental consideration is to engage in faulty, even irrational, planning and decision-making. A conventional approach to cost-effectiveness compares the costs of security measures with the benefits as tallied in lives saved and damages averted. A security measure is cost-effective when the benefit of the measure outweighs the costs of providing the security measures.

SIGNIFICANCE

More Americans drown in bathtubs every year than die from Muslim extremist terrorism

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Although these tallies make for grim reading, the total number of people killed in the years after 9/11 by Muslim extremists outside of war zones comes to some 200 to 300 per year. That, of course, is 200 to 300 too many, but it hardly suggests that the destructive capacities of the terrorists are monumental. For comparison, during the same period more people—320 per year—drowned in bathtubs in the United States alone.

Risk of terrorism is essentially zero, justifying no action at all

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

A recent book by Gregory Treverton, a risk analyst at the RAND Corporation whose work we have found highly valuable at various points in this study, contains a curious reflection:  
  
When I spoke about the terrorist threat, especially in the first years after 2001, I was often asked what people could do to protect their family and home. I usually responded by giving the analyst’s answer, what I labelled “the RAND answer.” Anyone’s probability of being killed by a terrorist today was essentially zero and would be tomorrow, barring a major discontinuity. So, they should do nothing. It is not surprising that the answer was hardly satisfying, and I did not regard it at such.

Potential “worst case scenarios” don’t justify policy responses

Turn: Worrying about worst-case scenarios makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism

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It is sometimes argued that conventional risk analysis breaks down under extreme conditions because the risk is now a very large number (losses) multiplied by a very small number (attack probability). However, it is not the risk analysis methodology that is at fault here, but our ability to use the information obtained from the analysis for decision-making. Analyst Bruce Schneier has written penetratingly of worst case thinking. He points out that it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. It leads to bad decision making because it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes.

The fact that any bad thing can possibly happen doesn’t justify policy

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It [worst-case thinking] also assumes “that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible,” and it “can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy.” And worst, it “validates ignorance” because, “instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know—and what we can imagine.” In the process “risk assessment is devalued” and “probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking."

“Critical Infrastructure” protection doesn’t justify policy

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Applying common sense English about what “critical infrastructure” could be taken to mean, it should be an empty category. If any element in the infrastructure is truly "critical" to the operation of the country, steps should be taken immediately to provide redundancies or backup systems so that it is no longer so. An official definition designates “critical infrastructure” to include “the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” Yet vast sums of money are spent under the program to protect elements of the infrastructure whose incapacitation would scarcely be “debilitating” and would at most impose minor inconvenience and quite limited costs.

INHERENCY

Terrorism incidents are declining in Status Quo

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

We have been using “historical” data here, and there is, of course, no guarantee that the terrorism frequencies of the past will necessarily persist into the future. However, there seems to be little evidence terrorists are becoming any more destructive, particularly in the West. In fact, if anything, there seems to be a diminishing, not expanding, level of terrorist activity and destruction at least outside of war zones. As Andrew Mack concludes, there is “no evidence of any substantial increase in the fatality toll since data on both domestic and international terrorism began to be collected in 1998.” Indeed, the two datasets he examines that have statistics going back to that year both “reveal a decline in deaths from terrorism.”

AL QAEDA IS NO THREAT

Al Qaeda is a handful of miserable individuals making threats they don’t have the capability to do

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In start contrast, Glenn Carle, a 23-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats, has warned that "We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al-Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist organization," and although they have threatened attacks, "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."

Al Qaeda has been unable to establish significant presence in the U.S.

**Prof.** John Mueller 2009. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), April 15, 2009, “How Dangerous Are the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs, http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=101896.0;wap2

“In addition, al Qaeda has yet to establish a significant presence in the United States. In 2002, U.S. intelligence reports asserted that the number of trained al Qaeda operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000, and FBI Director Robert Mueller assured a Senate committee that al Qaeda had "developed a support infrastructure" in the country and achieved both "the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." However, after years of well funded sleuthing, the FBI and other investigative agencies have been unable to uncover a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell or operative within the country. Mueller's rallying cry has now been reduced to a comparatively bland formulation: "We believe al Qaeda is still seeking to infiltrate operatives into the U.S. from overseas."

Al Qaeda is disjointed and largely discredited in the Muslim world

**Prof.** John Mueller 2009. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), April 15, 2009, “How Dangerous Are the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs, http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=101896.0;wap2

“At present, al Qaeda consists of a few hundred people running around in Pakistan, seeking to avoid detection and helping the Taliban when possible. It also has a disjointed network of fellow travelers around the globe who communicate over the Internet. Over the last decade, the group has almost completely discredited itself in the Muslim world due to the fallout from the 9/11 attacks and subsequent counterproductive terrorism, much of it directed against Muslims.”

OTHER TERROR GROUPS ARE NOT A SIGNIFICANT THREAT

Pathetic sympathizers talk a lot, but are no existential threat to the country

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

Beyond the tiny band that constitutes al-Qaeda central, there are, continues Sageman, thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe who mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. All of these rather hapless—perhaps even pathetic—people should of course be considered to be potentially dangerous. From time to time they may be able to coalesce enough to carry out acts of terrorist violence, and policing efforts to stop them before they can do so are certainly justified. But the notion that they present an existential threat to just about anybody seems at least as fanciful as some of their schemes.

Muslim extremists in the US are “tiny” - committed 0.02% of the homicides in this country since 9/11

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Assessing the threat from homegrown Islamist terrorists, Brian Jenkins stresses that their number is “tiny,” representing one out of every 30,000 Muslims in the United States. This “very low level” of recruitment finds very little support in the Muslim community at large: “they are not Mao’s guerrilla swimming in a friendly sea.” Given this situation, concludes Jenkins, what is to be anticipated is “tiny conspiracies, lone gunmen, one-off attacks rather than sustained terrorist campaigns.” In the meantime, note other researches, Muslim extremists have been responsible for one fiftieth of one percent of the homicides committed in the United States since 9/11.

Islamic militants in Europe are unsophisticated and not capable

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locations. Political scientist Michael Kenney has interviewed dozens of officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents. He finds that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS, Islamic militants there are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to make mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.

RISK OF DEATH LOW

Chance of being killed by a terrorist: one in 80,000

Dr. Amy Zalman 2007. (senior research strategist in a private sector consulting firm; presented testimony to the U.S. Congress and NATO; doctorate from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at New York University, and has served on the faculties of The New School, New York University, and Cornell University), January 8, 2007, “What Threat of Terrorist Attack?” <http://terrorism.about.com/od/counterterrorism/a/TerroristThreat.htm>

It should be reassuring to know that, as Mueller points out in his article, the chance that an American will be killed in an attack by international terrorists is one in 80,000 or so. (By comparison, it has been estimated that an American's chances of dying of heart disease are 1 in 3.)

Threat of terrorist is almost zero: many other causes of death in US

Prof. Paul Campos 2010 (professor of law at Univ of Colorado) January 9, 2010. “Undressing the Terror Threat”, Wall Street Journal. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574644651587677752.html>

(1) America is a country of 310 million people, in which thousands of horrible things happen every single day; and (2) The chances that one of those horrible things will be that you're subjected to a terrorist attack can, for all practical purposes, be calculated as zero. Consider that on this very day about 6,700 Americans will die.

Americans killed by terrorists is the same as deaths from peanuts or bathtubs

Prof. John Mueller 2007. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), February 6, 2007, “Reacting to Terrorism: Probabilities, Consequences, and the Persistence of Fear,” National Convention of the International Studies Association. http://www.newstatesman.com/law-and-reform/2010/01/terrorism-security-scanners

Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, however, the number of Americans killed by international terrorism over the period is not a great deal more than the number killed by lightning--or by accident-causing deer or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts over the same period. In almost all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States--some 300-400.

RISK FROM RESURGENT TALIBAN LOW

If Taliban comes back to power they would be highly unlikely to host internationally provocative terrorist groups

**Prof.** John Mueller 2009. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), April 15, 2009, “How Dangerous Are the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban>

“Multiple sources, including Lawrence Wright's book *The Looming Tower*, make clear that the Taliban was a reluctant host to al Qaeda in the 1990s and felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad. Then the al Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 attacks -- which the Taliban had nothing to do with -- led to the toppling of the Taliban’s regime. Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention. And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan.”

A geographic base is not necessary for al Qaeda to operate

**Prof.** John Mueller 2009. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), April 15, 2009, “How Dangerous Are the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban>

“The very notion that al Qaeda needs a secure geographic base to carry out its terrorist operations, moreover, is questionable. After all, the operational base for 9/11 was in Hamburg, Germany. Conspiracies involving small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning -- but not a major protected base camp.”

RISKS FROM RADICAL MUSLIM-AMERICANS LOW

Muslim-Americans self-police against terrorism

CNN, January 2010. CNN January 6, 2010, “Study: Threat of Muslim-American terrorism in U.S. exaggerated,” CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/01/06/muslim.radicalization.study/index.html>

But it is the Muslim-American communities themselves who play a large role in keeping the number of radicalized members low through their own practices, according to the study. Leaders and Muslim-American organizations denounce violent acts, for instance, in messages that have weight within communities. In addition, such communities often self-police -- confronting those who express radical ideology or support for terrorism and communicating concerns about radical individuals to authorities. Some Muslim-Americans have adopted programs for youth to help identify those who react inappropriately to controversial issues so they can undergo counseling and education, the researchers said.

Terrorist threat by Muslim-Americans is exaggerated

CNN, January 2010. January 6, 2010, “Study: Threat of Muslim-American terrorism in U.S. exaggerated,” CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/01/06/muslim.radicalization.study/index.html>

The terrorist threat posed by radicalized Muslim- Americans has been exaggerated, according to a study released Wednesday by researchers at Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A small number of Muslim-Americans have undergone radicalization since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the study found. It compiled a list of 139 individuals it categorized as "Muslim-American terrorism offenders" who had become radicalized in the U.S. in that time -- a rate of 17 per year. That level is "small compared to other violent crime in America, but not insignificant," according to the study, titled "Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans."

DISADVANTAGES

1. Over-reaction to terrorism, or: The Only Thing to Fear is Fear Itself

Impact 1. Loss of Liberty and Life

1,000 Americans died in 2001 because of fear of terrorism (not the terrorism itself)

Prof. John Mueller 2008. (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), May/June 2008. “Terrorphobia: Our false sense of insecurity,” The American Interest Online. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=418>

That conclusion probably holds for present concerns about domestic terrorism, too—at least outside of cable news shows. True enough, there was a lot of pseudo-rational evasive behavior after the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, several studies conclude that more than 1,000 Americans died between September 11, 2001 and the end of that year because, out of fear of terrorism, they avoided airplanes in favor of much more dangerous automobiles.

Over-reacting causes a loss of liberty and accomplishes the goals of the terrorists

Gene Healy 2010 (vice president at the Cato Institute) April 6, 2010, “Gene Healy: Terrorism isn't an 'existential threat”, Washington Examiner**.** http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/terrorism-isnt-existential-threat

one of this should be taken as a counsel of complacency. The low risk of terrorist WMD doesn't make guarding against it a waste of time. It makes sense, for example, to boost funding for international efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling, as the Obama administration has done. But when we overreact, we're doing terrorists' job for them. Conservatives understand that exaggerated fears of environmental threats make government grow and liberty shrink. They'd do well to recognize that the same dynamic applies to homeland security.

Impact 2. Economic Damage

Terrorists rely on overreaction to cause economic harm

Gene Healy 2010 (vice president at the Cato Institute) April 6, 2010, “Gene Healy: Terrorism isn't an 'existential threat”, Washington Examiner. http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/terrorism-isnt-existential-threat (brackets in original)

Terrorists bank on overreaction. As Osama bin Laden put it in 2004, "All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses." Adam Gadahn, the U.S.-born al Qaeda spokesman, recently called for more "lone-wolf" strikes, because "even apparently unsuccessful attacks on Western mass transportation systems can bring major cities to a halt [and] cost the enemy billions."

Impact 3. Bad Policies & Costly bad decisions

Fear of terrorism causes people to make unwarranted decisions that have high costs

Prof. John Mueller and Prof. Mark G. Stewart 2011. (Mueller - Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, Ohio State Univ. Stewart - Professor of Civil Engineering; Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, University of Newcastle, Australia) 1 Apr 2011 “TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY” <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>

Terrorism-induced fears can be debilitating. For one thing they can cause people routinely to adopt skittish, overly risk-averse behavior, at least for a while, and this can much magnify the impact of the terrorist attack, particularly economically. That is, the problem is not that people are trampling each other in a rush to vacate New York or Washington, but rather that they may widely adopt other forms of defensive behavior, the cumulative costs of which can be considerable. As Cass Sunstein notes, "in the context of terrorism, fear is likely to make people reluctant to engage in certain activities, such as flying on airplanes and appearing in public places," and "the resulting costs can be extremely high."

Fear of terrorism can make constructive policies impossible

Dr. Amy Zalman 2007. (senior research strategist in a private sector consulting firm. For over a decade she has worked to support more culturally astute communication between the United States and Middle Eastern audiences in educational, commercial, and national security contexts; presented testimony to the U.S. Congress and NATO, Zalman received her doctorate from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at New York University, and has served on the faculties of The New School, New York University, and Cornell University), 8 Jan 2007, “What Threat of Terrorist Attack?” <http://terrorism.about.com/od/counterterrorism/a/TerroristThreat.htm>

The growth of jihadist sympathies can endanger global security. But panic about their imminent danger on U.S. soil both simplifies and obscures the nature of the threat, making it impossible to understand, evaluate or create constructive policies and strategies.

Impact 4. Victory for Terrorism

Only victory terrorists can achieve: over-reaction by US

Prof. Paul Campos 2010. (prof of law at the Univ of Colorado) 9 Jan 2010. “Undressing the Terror Threat” Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574644651587677752.html>

Unfortunately, the politics of cowardice can also make it rational to spend otherwise irrational amounts of resources on further minimizing already minimal risks. Given the current climate of fear, any terrorist incident involving Islamic radicals generates huge social costs, so it may make more economic sense, in the short term, to spend X dollars to avoid 10 deaths caused by terrorism than it does to spend X dollars to avoid 1,000 ordinary homicides. Any long-term acceptance of such trade-offs hands terrorists the only real victory they can ever achieve.

Continued focus on terrorism guarantees success for terrorism

Prof. Paul Campos 2010. (prof of law at the Univ of Colorado) 9 Jan 2010. “Undressing the Terror Threat” Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574644651587677752.html>

“What then is to be done? A little intelligence and a few drops of courage remind us that life is full of risk, and that of all the risks we confront in America every day, terrorism is a very minor one. Taking prudent steps to reasonably minimize the tiny threat we face from a few fanatic criminals need not grant them the attention they crave. Continuing to play Terrorball, on the other hand, guarantees that the terrorists will always win, since it places the bar for what counts as success for them practically on the ground.”